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Abstract 
Inadvertent Expansion in World Politics 
Nicholas Duncan Anderson 
2021 
 
Why do great powers adopt expansionist foreign policies? Despite its great variety, much of 
the existing literature shares a common characteristic: that of seeing expansion as the centrally-
driven and strategic extension of the state’s territorial domain. However, many important 
historical instances of great power expansion do not comport with these expectations, 
showing expansion to be far more peripherally driven and far less strategic than they would 
expect. In this dissertation, I make a distinction between centrally-driven “strategic expansion” 
and peripherally-driven “inadvertent expansion,” and I explain inadvertent expansion in the 
modern history of great power politics. I make three central arguments. First, inadvertent 
expansion is a surprisingly general phenomenon, occurring in approximately one-in-four cases 
of great power territorial expansion. Second, inadvertent expansion is a manifestation of a 
principal-agent problem, being much more likely to occur when leaders in the capital have 
limited control over their agents on the periphery of the state or empire. Third, leaders will be 
more likely to engage in inadvertent expansion when the perceived geopolitical risks associated 
with doing so are relatively low. These arguments are supported with a mixed-methods 
research strategy. First, I present and analyze new quantitative data on great power territorial 
expansion, comprising 250 observations coded as either strategic or inadvertent from 1816 to 
2014. Second, I lay out a series of paired qualitative case studies of great power inadvertent 
expansion (and non-expansion), including an introductory case of the United Kingdom in Sind 
(1843); the United States in Florida (1818-19) and Texas (1836-37); Russia in the Khanate of 
Kokand (1864-66) and the Ili Region (1871-81); France in Tonkin (1873-74, 1882-83); Japan 
in Manchuria (1931-32) and Italy in Fiume (1919-20); and Germany in East Africa (1885) and 
Kenya and Uganda (1890). The arguments and evidence in this dissertation have important 
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This is a dissertation about the ways in which leaders can lose complete control over 
important segments of the states and empires they are purportedly in charge of, producing 
foreign policy outcomes they hadn’t intended at all. Funnily enough, the process by which 
this dissertation came about, to some extent, reflects this basic theoretical insight. I didn’t set 
out to write a historical dissertation. And I didn’t intend to write a dissertation focused on 
empire. But a historical dissertation, focused, at least in part, on empire, is what I got. 
I came to my dissertation topic as, I think, many graduate students in international 
relations do—by reading the work of Robert Jervis. In what I’d argue is his greatest book, 
System Effects, Jervis speculates in one very brief section that territorial expansion might be 
subject to positive feedback effects, with expansion itself helping to generate the conditions 
that drive future instances of expansion, which, in turn, generate still further expansion, and 
so on.1 This 130-word section of his 300-page book began an intellectual and personal 
journey that would lead through various cities, libraries, university departments, academic 
conferences, and hundreds, if not thousands, of books, articles, and diplomatic documents. 
This dissertation has been more years in the making than I care to admit. This means, not 
only that I’ve gotten older, but that I’ve accumulated an unusually large number of debts 
along the way. It began at Yale, where I got incredibly helpful advice and guidance very early 
on from Alex Debs, Emily Erikson, Philip Gorski, Adria Lawrence, Jason Lyall, Susan Hyde, 
Maggie Peters, Didac Queralt, James Scott, Ian Shapiro, and Elisabeth Wood. Robert Jervis 
was also kind enough to sit down with me at an early stage to, in his words, help me “wrestle 
this beast to the ground.” I also thank Pablo Brum for early inspiration. In the early stages of 
 




the project, I spent two semesters as a visiting student at Georgetown University, and I am 
grateful for the warm hospitality of Kate McNamara and the Government Department. My 
partner’s own academic pursuits then brought us to UC Berkeley for two years of my 
graduate school experience, and there I benefited from the hospitality of the Political Science 
Department and the generous advice of Ron Hassner, Aila Matanock, and Paul Pierson. A 
turning point in the project’s development occurred as the result of a series of challenging 
and constructive conversations with Dan Altman, David Edelstein, Charles Glaser, Richard 
Maass, Dan Nexon, and, especially, Keir Lieber and Josh Shifrinson. From Berkeley, we 
moved for a year to Cambridge, MA, where I was a predoctoral fellow in the International 
Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard 
Kennedy School. There I had many useful exchanges on various aspects of the project with 
Paul Behringer, Dan Jacobs, Tyler Jost, Sean Lynn-Jones, Steve Miller, and Steve Walt. From 
Harvard we moved back to Washington, DC, where I was, once again, a predoctoral fellow 
in the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School for International 
Affairs at The George Washington University. Here I have had many helpful exchanges on 
the project with Neha Ansari, Andrew Bowen, Alex Downes, Charles Glaser, Alex Kirss, 
Igor Kovac, Kendrick Kuo, Do Young Lee, Alex Lennon, Harris Mylonas, Jo Spear, and the 
world’s greatest office mate, Dani Gilbert. 
I’ve also been fortunate to have some of the very best in the business read and comment 
on various parts of this project, including David Edelstein, Tanisha Fazal, Mathias Ormestad 
Frendem, Eugene Gholz, Stacie Goddard, Kyle Haynes, Lindsay Hundley, Min J. Kim, Sarah 
Kreps, Matthew Kroenig, Paul MacDonald, John Mearsheimer, Sebastian Rosato, Madison 
Schramm, John Schuessler, Travis Sharp, Andrew Szarejko, Rachel Tecott, and Dani Villa. 
For many years, my colleagues at Yale have provided much-needed constructive criticism, 
ix 
 
encouragement, support, and friendship. These include Dave Allison, Consuelo Amat, 
Jonathon Baron, Tyler Bowen, Suparna Chaudhry, Matthew Cebul, Mike Goldfien, Guatam 
Nair, Stephen Herzog, Will Nomikos, Chris Price, Lauren Pinson, Hari Ramesh, Remco 
Zwetsloot, and Dana Stuster. And special thanks go to Mariya Grinberg and Asfandyar Mir, 
who have read and commented on more versions of this project, at more stages of its 
development, than they probably wanted to. 
I’ve spent an inordinate amount of time in various libraries over the course of this 
project, and have benefited immensely from the hard-working staff at Sterling Memorial 
Library at Yale, Widener Library at Harvard, Gelman Library at George Washington, the 
Library of Congress, and in the UC Berkeley library system. Much of the writing of this 
dissertation took place during the COVID-19 global pandemic, and the staff at Sterling and 
Gelman libraries bent over backwards to provide me with as much access to library materials 
as they possibly could. Various aspects of this project have also benefited from many 
presentations over the years, including at George Washington, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, the 
IR Theory Colloquium (virtual), and various annual meetings of the American Political 
Science Association and the International Studies Association. My research has been 
generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
the Belfer Center at Harvard, and the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George 
Washington. I’d also like to acknowledge Barry Posen, whose truly great book Inadvertent 
Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks was the inspiration for this project’s title. 
I was fortunate to have the best dissertation committee a graduate student could possibly 
hope for. Jack Snyder was generous enough to join the committee as an outside member, 
and the project has benefited immensely from his penetrating theoretical insights and 
encyclopedic knowledge of the modern history of great power politics. Frances Rosenbluth 
x 
 
has been a consistent source of guidance and support, always asking tough questions and 
encouraging me to keep the big picture in mind. And Nuno Monteiro, my committee chair, 
has been a model mentor. Challenging, responsive, generous, and kind—always pushing me 
to ask big questions but to fit the answers into article- or book-sized packages, and to dig 
deeper and to get to the theoretical core of whatever problem was in front of me. I feel very 
fortunate to have worked with him. Victor Cha, though not on my committee, has also been 
an incredibly important part of my academic, professional, and personal development over 
the past decade. And I owe an incredible amount to the Department of Political Science and 
the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Yale University. Being a student at Yale for 
these years has been the privilege of a lifetime. 
The most important thanks go to my family: my parents-in-law, Kyong-ja and Adam; my 
siblings, Em and Ben; my sister-in-law, Jen; my nieces, Victoria and Charlotte; and my 
parents, Carol and Duncan. Thank you for a lifetime of unconditional love, support, and 
understanding. The other result of having spent so many years on this project is that my life 
has changed dramatically in the meantime: I got married and had two kids along the way. 
Our kids—Murphy and Perry—themselves reflect the academic journey we’ve been on, 
being born in Berkeley, CA and in Cambridge, MA (respectively), a mere 360 days apart. 
Their curiosity, energy, humor, passion, and love are a constant and much-needed reminder 
of what is really important in life—and what isn’t. And my most important thanks go to my 
partner, Babs. For the late-night pep talks, for your patience during all the inane discussions 
of international relations theory, research design, and Imperial Japanese history, and for all 
of the support, encouragement, understanding, laughter, and love—I can’t thank you 
enough. Doing a Ph.D. has been far more psychologically and emotionally challenging than I 
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“Colonies can be conquered by accident. This may at first appear unlikely when we 
contemplate the immense colonial empires that Europe once possessed—such 
elaborate constructions must surely be the product of a policy, of a design, of 
economic calculation. But if you believe that, you may well be deceiving yourself.” 
—Douglas Porch1 
 
By the time Major-General Sir Charles James Napier arrived in the Sind region of the South 
Asian subcontinent in 1842,2 he was eager to reclaim some of his perceived past greatness. 
The sixty-year-old decorated veteran of the Peninsular War (1807-14) had spent the 
intervening thirty years in relative obscurity, holding a variety of military posts and moving 
between the Greek Islands, France, Australia, and England. A small, lean, short-sighted man, 
with penetrating eyes resting under a prominent brow, a thick, greying beard, and a beak-like 
nose, Napier had a reputation for combativeness, self-confidence, for holding radical 
political views, and for being cleverly expressive in speech and writing.3 This deeply-devout 
and rapidly-aging general was also known to bristle at authority, to be impatient with control, 
and to deeply distrust his political superiors.4 Napier had been appointed by the British East 
 
1 Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 5. 
2 Contemporary Sindh Province, Pakistan. 
3 Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1989), p. 564. 
4 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 564; Robert A. Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind 
(1843),” in Michael H. Fischer, ed., The Politics of The British Annexation of India, 1757-1857 (Oxford: Oxford 
2 
 
India Company as the military commander with responsibility for Sind, and was to exercise 
Company authority over all relevant military and political matters in the area. 
 Napier was appointed to his station by the Governor-General of India, Edward Law, the 
1st Earl of Ellenborough. Lord Ellenborough had himself only just arrived in Calcutta—
having been appointed that very year—and though the two had never met,5 he and Napier 
shared a great deal in common. Like Napier, Ellenborough tended to favor military solutions 
to a variety of problems. Like Napier, Ellenborough too, was deeply distrustful of the 
political wing of the East India Company. And like Napier, Ellenborough was similarly 
looking to reclaim his own and his country’s prestige after recent, devastating losses in the 
Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42).6 
 Sind itself, at this time, was a largely-autonomous region of roughly 125,000 km2 on 
India’s northwest frontier. With nearly two million, predominantly Muslim, inhabitants,7 
Sind had been ruled since the late 18th century by the Balochi Talpur clan. There were three 
power centers in the region led by three Amirs: one in the Upper Sindian city of Khairpur, 
and one in each of the two Lower Sindian cities of Hyderabad and Mirpur.8 The East India 
Company had been gradually penetrating Sind since the Talpur clan took over, though the 
territory remained formally independent of Britain. The Amirs, in fact, saw the Company as 
 
University Press, 1993), p. 228; Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1997), p. 102. 
5 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 565. 
6 Sarah Ansari, “The Sind Blue Books of 1843 and 1844: The Political ‘Laundering’ of Historical Evidence,” 
The English Historical Review, Vol. 120, No. 485 (February 2005), pp. 40-41. 
7 Area and population data from Territorial Change Data (v5.0). Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and 
Gary Goertz, “Territorial Changes, 1816-1996: Procedures and Data,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 
16, No. 1 (1998), pp. 89-97. Available online at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/territorial-change 
8 Fischer, ed., The Politics of The British Annexation of India, p. 225. 
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a useful counterweight against their nominal overlord, the Emir of Afghanistan.9 
Unbeknownst to them, however, this friendly relationship with the Company would soon 
prove to be their undoing. 
 Though he was completely new to India, had no knowledge of local languages and 
customs, and had no previous diplomatic experience, Napier soon formed strong opinions 
regarding the moral standing of the Amirs, seeing them, in his words, as “tyrannical, 
drunken, debauched, cheating, intriguing, [and] contemptible…”10 He also wrote in an early 
journal entry, that the Amirs are “scoundrels, who are such atrocious tyrants that it is 
virtuous to roll them over like ninepins.”11 Napier quickly made up his mind as to what the 
situation called for. As he noted in an ominous late-1842 journal entry, “We have no right to 
seize Scinde; yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it 
will be.”12 
 Ellenborough was soon leaning in a similar direction. He began to strongly suspect the 
Amirs of engaging in subterfuge, and he tasked Napier with uncovering any emerging plots.13 
Napier soon acquired letters that supposedly contained damning evidence of a conspiracy 
against the Company at work. That the letters were of questionable authenticity, and that 
Napier, in fact, couldn’t read the language they were written in, seemed not to deter the 
Major-General.14 Ellenborough too, was not one to be dissuaded by such details. As he 
 
9 Fischer, ed., The Politics of The British Annexation of India, p. 225; James, Raj, p. 101. 
10 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 567. 
11 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, pp. 566-567. 
12 Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” p. 236. 
13 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 565; Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” p. 233. 
14 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 566. 
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wrote to Napier in November of 1842, “You are much more competent to decide on the 
spot as to the authenticity of the letters… than I am here, and I am prepared to abide by and 
support your decision.”15 
 Ellenborough decided to push for a series of harsh new treaties to govern relations 
between the Company and the Amirs, and charged Napier with attaining the Amirs’ 
signatures on them, encouraging Napier to use whatever means he deemed necessary. As 
Ellenborough noted in a December 1842 letter to Napier, “I very much fear that until our 
force has been actually felt, there will be no permanent observance of the existing treaty or 
of any new Treaty we may make.”16 Napier took this advice to heart. After a brief foray into 
the desert, where he blew up an abandoned fort, Napier turned his attention toward 
Hyderabad. Based on rumors that the Amirs were gathering their forces there, Napier set out 
in late January 1843 with an army of 3,000. While these rumors were unfounded, news of 
Napier’s advance would convince the Amirs to mobilize, with Napier, effectively, generating 
the very threat that he believed he was going out to meet.17 As a Hyderabad official reported 
to his superiors after a scout saw Napier’s forces advancing, “The General is bent up on war, 
so get ready.”18 
 As news slowly began to filter back to the capital as to what was transpiring in Sind, 
officials in London became deeply unsettled. The East India Company had been on a much 
shorter leash since the late 18th century, with a series of acts passed in Parliament to regulate 
 
15 Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” pp. 235-236. 
16 Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” p. 243. 
17 Robert A. Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, 1799-1843: An Anatomy of Imperialism (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), p. 99; Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 572; 
Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” p. 237. 
18 Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, p. 98-99. 
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its behavior. The East India Company Act of 1784, otherwise known as “Pitt’s India Act,” 
explicitly stated that “to pursue Schemes of Conquest and Extension of Dominion in India, 
are Measures repugnant to the Wish, the Honour, and Policy of the Nation,” and it 
prohibited the use of force or the pursuit of conquest without the expressed approval of 
home authorities.19 Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, who was then a powerful 
member of the House of Lords, informed Ellenborough that the cabinet was uneasy with 
the amount of discretion that Napier had been afforded.20 Lord Fitzgerald, the President of 
the Board of Control,21 sent a more desperate letter to Ellenborough in early February 1843, 
urging him to use extreme caution and to avoid hostilities in Sind.22 Fitzgerald also warned 
British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel that if he did not intervene, he would likely “be 
awakened some fine morning by finding out that Lord Ellenborough has brought them into 
some new difficulty.”23 This, it turns out, is precisely what would occur. 
 Napier continued his march on Hyderabad in early February. A political officer of the 
Company was there, and was making good progress in negotiation with the Amirs. Yet 
Napier would have none of it, writing on 13 February, “I neither can nor will halt now. Their 
object is very clear and I will not be their dupe. I shall march to Hyderabad tomorrow… and 
attack every body of armed men I meet.”24 The following day, the Amirs relented and signed 
 
19 Panchanandas Mukherji, Indian Constitutional Documents, 1773-1915 (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink, & Co., 1915), 
pp. 22-23. 
20 Huttenback, “The Annexation of Sind,” p. 237. 
21 The civilian body that oversaw the British East India Company. 
22 Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, p. 105. 
23 Ansari, “The Sind Blue Books of 1843 and 1844,” p. 47. 
24 Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, p. 102. 
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the treaties, yet Napier continued his advance. “I am in full march on Hyderabad,” he wrote 
on 15 February, “and will make no peace with the Ameers. I will attack them instantly whenever I 
come up to their troops, they need send no proposals, the time has passed…”25  
On 18 February, Napier’s army came upon and attacked the joint armies of the Amirs at 
Miani. Despite being outnumbered nearly four-to-one,26 it was a decisive victory for the 
Company’s forces, inflicting as many as six thousand casualties while losing only 63 killed 
and 193 wounded.27 Napier then marched on Hyderabad, quickly deposed and exiled the 
Amirs, and declared the Sind region to be under British control.28 Ellenborough, elated upon 
receiving news of the conquest, summarily declared Sind to be a province of the British 
Empire and appointed Napier as its Governor, all without consulting political authorities in 
London.29 In what would, disappointingly, turn out to be an apocryphal tale, Napier was 
widely reported to have informed Ellenborough of the acquisition by sending him a one-
worded Latin message: “Peccavi” or “I have sinned.”30 
 News of the annexation shocked and infuriated officials in London. The Council of 
Directors31 was absolutely livid, and passed a resolution condemning Ellenborough and 
Napier’s actions and calling for the restoration of the Amirs and the return of their 
 
25 Emphasis in original. Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, p. 102. 
26 The Amirs’ armies were estimated to be approximately 11,000. James, Raj, p. 103. 
27 Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, p. 103; Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 573. 
28 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 573; James, Raj, p. 104. 
29 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 574; James, Raj, p. 104; Ansari, “The Sind Blue Books of 
1843 and 1844,” p. 48. 
30 It turned out the clever pun was not attributable to Napier. Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 
575; James, Raj, p. 105. 
31 The East India Company’s leadership, based in London. 
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territories.32 Prime Minister Peel privately referred to Napier’s actions as “unconscionable 
folly” and said the whole affair was “disgraceful to the character of this country.”33 However, 
the prime minister and his cabinet were more circumspect in their public response.34 Though 
they would never have approved the Sind conquest beforehand, now that British blood had 
been spilt in its acquisition, they were hard-pressed to quickly call for its reversal.35 As 
William Gladstone, a cabinet member as President of the Board of Trade, later recalled, the 
cabinet was “powerless, inasmuch as the mischief of retaining it was less than the mischief of 
abandoning it, and it remains an accomplished fact.”36  
A key problem for the government in London had been the speed of communication. 
This was still the pre-telegraph era, as the first telegraph line between Britain and India 
would only be operational in 1865.37 Under these conditions, it took three months to receive 
a reply to a letter sent to-or-from Calcutta or London, and even responses to letters sent 
within India often took weeks.38 This greatly hampered central control, as was well 
understood by Prime Minister Peel, who noted that “Time—distance—the course of events 
 
32 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 575. 
33 Norman Gash, Sir Robert Peel: The Life of Sir Robert Peel after 1830 (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972), pp. 
488-489; “Sir Robert Peel to Sir James Graham, September 19, 1843,” in Charles Stuart Parker, ed., Sir Robert 
Peel: From his Private Papers, Vol. III, 2nd Edition (London: John Murray, 1899), p. 11. 
34 Gash, Sir Robert Peel, p. 488; Ansari, “The Sind Blue Books of 1843 and 1844,” p. 41-42. 
35 Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India, p. 575. 
36 W.E. Gladstone, “Russian Policy and Deeds in Turkistan,” The Contemporary Review, Vol. 28 (November 
1876), p. 875. 
37 Maurice G. Simpson, “The Indo-European Telegraph Department,” Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol. 76, 
No. 3928 (2 March 1928), p. 385. 
38 Gash, Sir Robert Peel, p. 486; Huttenback, British Relations with Sind, pp. 115-116; Ansari, “The Sind Blue Books 
of 1843 and 1844,” p. 43. 
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may have so fettered our discretion that we had no alternative but to maintain the 
occupation of Scinde.”39 
Thus, during the British Empire’s acquisition of a territory the size of New York State, 
containing nearly two million inhabitants, the central government in London had virtually no 
knowledge of, or control over, the process, whatsoever. 
 
Puzzles & Questions 
This is a dissertation about inadvertent expansion in world politics. It addresses a number of 
puzzles and questions that are raised by the escapades of Napier and Ellenborough 
recounted above, and many others like them. 
For one, why do frontier actors such as Ellenborough and Napier launch these 
unauthorized expansionist bids? Is it rooted in their personalities, with actors who are more 
aggressive, nationalistic, and insubordinate being more likely to independently claim foreign 
territory? Does it have to do with their capabilities, and the corresponding weaknesses of 
their adversaries across the frontier, with more powerful frontier armies being more likely to 
engage in unauthorized expansion? Or is it explained by the vast distances involved, the 
vagaries of rudimentary technology, and the difficulties associated with controlling such 
peripheral actors from the capital, with conditions of lower control being associated with 
more peripheral expansion? 
Second, why do the leaders in the capital, such as Prime Minister Peel, accept these 
independent territorial claims in some cases, but not others? Does it have to do with the 
characteristics of the territory itself, with economically- or strategically-valuable territory 
 
39 “Sir Robert Peel to Lord Ripon, December 9, 1843,” in Parker, ed., Sir Robert Peel, p. 18. 
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being more difficult to turn away? Is it a function of the foreign policy stance of the leaders, 
with expansionist leaders being more prone to these temptations? Or is it explained by the 
security environment surrounding these territorial claims, with geopolitically-risky conditions 
being associated with rejection, and geopolitically-safe conditions being associated with 
acceptance? 
Third, how common are such inadvertent forms of territorial expansion as the British 
experienced in Sind? Was it—as much existing international relations theory would lead us 
to believe—a one-off? An unexpected blip amid the broader and more predictable patterns 
of great power politics, attributable to the contingency of real-world international relations 
and the “messiness” of history? Or is inadvertent expansion a regular feature of the history 
of great power politics, displaying patterns of behavior and a regularity of occurrence that 
suggest it is a general phenomenon befitting its own theory? 
These are the central questions I will tackle in this dissertation, and in doing so, I will put 
forward a theory of inadvertent expansion. 
 
Territorial Expansion in International Relations 
Much of the international relations literature has not addressed inadvertent expansion 
directly. In debate and discussion over what explains the tendency for great powers to 
expand territorially, scholars have given a wide variety of answers, focusing on the gains of 
conquest,40 anarchy and the search for security,41 the offensive or defensive nature of 
 
40 Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Ch. 3; Peter 
Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1998). 




technology or geography,42 commitment problems and the presence of “buffer states,”43 
state institutional capacity,44 and the revisionist intentions of leaders.45 However, despite their 
great variety and value, all of these arguments share a common tendency: that of seeing 
expansion as a largely strategic activity, dependent upon decisions made by leaders in the 
capitals of powerful states. 
As a clear example of this sort of thinking, in War and Change in World Politics, Robert 
Gilpin argues that “a state will seek to change the system through territorial, political, and 
economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than 
the marginal benefits.”46 Another examples comes from John Mearsheimer, who, in laying 
out his theory of offensive realism, explicitly assumes that states are “rational actors” and 
argues that “conquering and controlling territory” is their “paramount political objective.”47 
Tanisha Fazal similarly points to the “strong incentives” states have “to take over the buffer 
states that lie between themselves and their opponents.”48 And Dan Altman, focusing on 
modern conquest, unpacks the “calculated risk” that leaders engage in when making forcible 
 
42 Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
Ch. 6; Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence 
Balance,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 45-83. 
43 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). 
44 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
45 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, 
Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of 
Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 35-40. 
46 Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics, p. 106. 
47 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 31, 43. 
48 Fazal, State Death, p. 38. 
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territorial gains.49 In short, a centralized and strategic conception of territorial expansion 
pervades much of the existing literature. 
The strategic nature of territorial expansion is relaxed in certain cases, with scholars 
focusing on the biases associated with domestic political regime type,50 the influence of 
financial and capitalist elites,51 leader psychology,52 status-seeking,53 domestic-political 
logrolling and nationalist mythmaking,54 and a “cult of the offensive” in military doctrine and 
strategy.55 However, even with these theories, while the motives driving expansion make the 
activity less-than-wholly strategic or rational from the perspective of the state or empire as a 
whole, expansion still tends to be rooted in decisions made by the leaders in the capital. For 
instance, Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors argue that “leaders of small winning-coalition 
systems”—in effect, autocrats—will be “more inclined to seek territorial expansion” than 
 
49 Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 4 (2017), pp. 881-891; Dan Altman, “The Evolution of Territorial 
Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Norm of Territorial Integrity,” International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 
3 (Summer 2020), pp. 490-522. 
50 David Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, 
No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. 
Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 412-414. 
51 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: James Nisbett & Co., 1902), chs. 4, 6-7; V.I. Lenin, “Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” in Henry M. Christman, ed., Essential Works of Lenin (New York: Dover, 
1987), pp. 177-270. 
52 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention on the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2004). 
53 Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2016), pp. 385-419. 
54 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
See also: Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
55 Jack Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, “Better Now Than Later: The Paradox of 1914 as Everyone’s Favored Year for 
War,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Summer 2014), pp. 71-94. See also: Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of 
the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 
58-107; Van Evera, The Causes of War, ch. 7. 
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their large winning-coalition counterparts.56 Similarly, Jeffrey Taliaferro argues that when 
“leaders perceive themselves as facing losses relative to their expectation level, the pursuit of 
relatively risky strategies in the periphery becomes more likely.”57 Thus, even many of the 
non-unitary and non-rational theories of territorial expansion tend to explain expansion 
decisions by reference to state leaders. 
There are two recent exceptions to these broader trends in the literature. The first is 
research by Peter Krause and Ehud Eiran on territorial expansion by small, non-state groups 
and organizations—what they refer to as “radical flank groups.”58 Krause and Eiran argue 
that modern constraints on territorial expansion by states are not equally binding on non-
state actors, and, in fact, can be used to their advantage. They test their arguments by 
focusing on Israeli settlement of the West Bank from 1967 to the present, and find that, in 
fact, these radical flank groups established a majority of all settlements in this period. This is 
important research, and it shares a great deal of theoretical affinity with my own. However, 
there is a lot of variation left unexplained in their arguments, such as when and where 
“radical flanks” are more or less likely to claim territory, and when leaders in the capital are 
more or less likely to accept or reject it. My own arguments, in contrast, aim to account for 
these behaviors and decisions, and thereby provide a more comprehensive explanation of 
periphery-driven expansion in world politics. 
 
56 Bueno de Mesquita, et al., The Logic of Political Survival, p. 414. 
57 Taliaferro, Balancing Risks, p. 48. 
58 Peter Krause and Ehud Eiran, “How Human Boundaries Become State Borders: Radical Flanks and 
Territorial Control in the Modern Era,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 2018), pp. 479-499. 
13 
 
The second exception to the leader-centrism of the broader literature is research by Paul 
MacDonald on “autonomous expansion” in colonial empires.59 MacDonald argues that the 
unique governance structures of colonial empires—with chains of delegation running from 
the capital, to the imperial proconsul, to the local intermediary—predispose these empires to 
expand autonomously from metropolitan leadership. MacDonald shows that various forms 
of instability in these hierarchical governance structures can prompt a number of forms of 
autonomous expansion. These arguments are illustrated with various examples from the 
history of the British in India and Sub-Saharan Africa. MacDonald’s contributions are also 
important, pushing research on territorial expansion in a very positive direction. And while 
his arguments also have a great deal of affinity with my own, they are intended to apply only 
to circumstances of organized European imperialism—situations where there are formal 
proconsul positions as well as local imperial officials. In contrast, I aim to explain a broader 
set of cases—standard imperialism, as well as the extension of state territory, wartime 
expansion, and the like. 
In sum, with just two recent exceptions, much of the international relations literature 
relies heavily upon leader-centric explanations for why great powers engage in territorial 
expansion. While these arguments may account for many, perhaps even most, cases of great 
power expansion, there is a relatively-large subset of cases that they have a difficult time 




59 Paul K. MacDonald, “The Governor’s Dilemma in Colonial Empires,” in Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp 
Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, eds., The Governor’s Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals 
and Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 39-58. 
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The Argument in Brief 
The process of inadvertent expansion tends to unfold in two basic steps—“unauthorized 
peripheral expansion” and “subsequent central authorization.” In the first step, unauthorized 
peripheral expansion, state or non-state actors on the periphery of states and empires plan, 
execute, and in most cases fully carry out instances of territorial expansion, without the aid, 
authorization, or foreknowledge of leaders at home in the capital. This might consist of the 
military or colonial army engaging in armed conquest, diplomats or colonial officials 
annexing territory, or merchants and other private actors seizing territory. Whatever the case 
may be, what is crucial at this stage is that the leaders in the capital with responsibility for 
national or imperial security policy are not involved in the planning or execution of the 
expansion.  
I argue that this first step is largely the result of inadequate central control over the 
periphery. It is a manifestation of what is known as a “principal-agent problem”—a situation 
in which one actor (the principal) delegates decision-making authority to another actor (the 
agent), yet the agent makes decisions that differ from those the principal would make if it 
were present. In this first stage of unauthorized peripheral expansion, the principal is the 
central leadership of the state or empire, and the agent is a state or non-state actor on the 
periphery, and the problem is that the agent has just acquired foreign territory without the 
necessary permission or authority to do so.  
Principal-agent problems are exacerbated by a lack of central control over the periphery, 
typically in the form of the ability to monitor the behavior of peripheral agents. When and 
where leaders in the capital have difficulty monitoring, and thereby controlling, their 
peripheral agents, unauthorized peripheral expansion is more likely to occur. In contrast, 
when and where leaders in the capital are better able to monitor and control their peripheral 
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agents, unauthorized peripheral expansion is less likely to occur. In the history of great 
power territorial expansion, the ability to monitor and control the periphery is crucially 
determined by the state of transportation and communications technology, with rudimentary 
technology hindering central control and advanced technology enabling it. However, it is not 
the only determinant. In a number of important cases, weak civilian control over the 
military, and even the fog of a major war, can hamper civilian or central control to an extent 
that unauthorized peripheral expansion becomes more likely. In short, we should expect the 
incidence of unauthorized peripheral expansion to vary inversely with the amount of central 
control over the periphery—when central control is weaker, we should see more, and when 
it is stronger, we should see less. 
 However, there is a second step in the process of inadvertent expansion, which I refer to 
as subsequent central authorization. In this step, the peripheral agents present their 
principals in the capital with the partly or wholly acquired territory as a fait accompli. This 
initiates a deliberative process in the capital that results in a decision among central leaders to 
either reject the fait accompli, leaving their peripheral agents to fend for themselves, or to 
accept the fait accompli, completing the process of inadvertent expansion.  
 It is important to recognize that the very act of unauthorized peripheral expansion 
changes “the facts on the ground” and thereby alters the strategic calculus of the leaders in 
the capital. It creates a set of incentives for these leaders to consider retaining the territory in 
question, and it does so for three basic reasons. Fist, unauthorized peripheral expansion 
often dramatically drives down the costs of territorial acquisition. Second, unauthorized 
peripheral expansion tends to generate domestic political pressure on the leaders in the 
capital to support their own agents and nationals. And third, unauthorized peripheral 
expansion tends to engage the national honor and prestige of the leaders in the capital in a 
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way they simply weren’t engaged before, making withdrawal significantly more difficult. 
Thus, for reasons of reduced costs, domestic political pressure, and national honor, leaders 
often have pretty strong incentives to subsequently authorize the territorial claims of their 
wayward agents. 
 However, despite these incentives, leaders in the capital still have one other crucial 
consideration: the geopolitical risk associated with acquiring the territory in question. When 
leaders perceive few significant geopolitical risks associated with acceptance of the fait 
accompli, they are significantly more likely to subsequently authorize the acquisition. In 
contrast, when leaders perceive significant geopolitical risk associated with acceptance of the 
fait accompli—such as crippling economic isolation, a costly regional conflict, or major power 
war—they will be far less likely to subsequently authorize the acquisition. 
In sum, inadvertent expansion is most likely to occur when leaders in the capital lack 
adequate control over their peripheral agents, and when there are few perceived geopolitical 
risks associated with acceptance. To put it simply, inadvertent expansion is most common in 
low control, low stakes contexts. Even in cases where the leaders don’t positively “want” the 
territory in question, the incentives generated by unauthorized peripheral expansion are 
often enough to force their hands and encourage subsequent central authorization, leading 
to inadvertent expansion. 
 
Importance 
Inadvertent expansion is a surprisingly general phenomenon. Far from being an unusual and 
highly-contingent outcome—a curiosity to be pondered by historians of particular empires in 
particular time periods—it was, in fact, a regular feature of great power politics right up to 
the 1930s. To preview the findings of Chapter 3, between 1816 and 2014, nearly one-in-four 
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instances of territorial expansion among the great powers are inadvertent in nature. 
Inadvertent expansion occurs regularly over the course of more than a century and is 
experienced by all but two (Austria-Hungary, China) of the nine great powers. It occurs in all 
regions of the world with the exception of Europe, and a wide variety of territories are 
acquired in this manner, from remote islands in the South Pacific, to topographically-
forbidding central-African kingdoms, to densely-populated regions of East and Southeast 
Asia (see Figure 1.1, below60). In short, inadvertent expansion is a regular feature in the 
modern history of great power politics, which international relations theory and research has 
just barely begun to grapple with. 





This dissertation makes three central contributions to the literature on territorial expansion 
and to international relations theory more broadly. First, I put forward the concept of 
inadvertent expansion, a phenomenon that has been largely ignored in the international 
 
60 Map created using MapChart.net (2021). Available at: https://mapchart.net/.  
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relations literature. As I show in the chapter that follows, while a few scholars have 
recognized that territorial expansion can vary in terms of its process or the form it takes, 
very few have discussed the radically-decentralized nature of inadvertent expansion. 
Recognizing the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion, clearly conceptualizing it in terms 
of its attributes, and observing it across dozens of cases is an important contribution to the 
literature I make in this dissertation. 
 Second, I present a new theory of inadvertent expansion. As shown above, few scholars 
have recognized, let alone tried to explain, the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion. 
Drawing on principal-agent theory, I construct a theory that applies to a broader set of cases, 
and a longer swath of time, than existing explanations for periphery-driven territorial 
expansion. 
 Third, I conduct the first-ever comprehensive accounting of inadvertent expansion in the 
post-1815 history of great power politics. I present new data comprising 250 observations of 
territorial expansion by the great powers, each of which is coded with respect to whether its 
expansion was inadvertent or strategic in nature. This allows me to show the broad patterns 
of inadvertent expansion across space and time, and provides a wide variety of historically-
rich cases with which to illustrate how inadvertent expansion works in practice, ten of which 
are presented in the pages that follow. 
 In sum, this dissertation contributes to the international relations literature by putting 
forward a new concept, a new theory, and a great deal of new empirical evidence. 
 
Roadmap 
The pages that follow will present a theory of inadvertent expansion, and then test and 
illustrate it in the modern history of great power politics. I begin, in Chapter 2, by laying out 
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my theory of inadvertent expansion in two parts. The first part covers the unauthorized 
peripheral expansion stage of inadvertent expansion, drawing on principal-agent theory to 
explain when we should expect this phenomenon to be more or less common. The second 
part covers the subsequent central authorization stage of inadvertent expansion, showing 
how the perceived geopolitical risks associated with accepting the fait accompli can encourage 
or discourage acceptance. I close this chapter with a detailed discussion of the research 
design, the methods employed, and the case selection criteria that guide the empirical 
chapters that follow. 
 In Chapter 3, I present the broad patterns of inadvertent expansion among the great 
powers. I introduce new data on great power expansion between 1816 and 2014, and show 
how inadvertent expansion varies—and doesn’t vary—with a wide variety of important 
factors. In this chapter I also support the central claims of my theory of inadvertent 
expansion—that a lack of central control over the periphery and conditions of low 
geopolitical risk are associated with more inadvertent expansion. Using a linear probability 
model and the great power expansion data, I show that territorial expansion is significantly 
more likely to be inadvertent rather than strategic when the territory in question lacks a 
connection to the global telegraph network, and under conditions of relatively low 
geopolitical risk. 
 Chapters 4 through 8 present a series of paired case studies of inadvertent expansion (and 
non-expansion) in the modern history of great power politics. These are intended to show 
how the explanatory variables and outcomes in the cases vary in ways expected by the 
theory, to illustrate the mechanisms of the theory of inadvertent expansion at work in 
practice, and to demonstrate the generality of the theory by examining a wide variety of great 
power actors, regional contexts, and historical time periods. 
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Chapter 4 presents two U.S. cases. The first is the U.S.’s acquisition of Florida in 1819-19 
and the second is the U.S.’s non-acquisition of the Republic of Texas in 1836-37. This pair 
of cases is useful, both methodologically and theoretically, in that the very same individual—
Andrew Jackson—is the peripheral agent in the first case, as a U.S. Army Major-General, 
and is the leader in the capital in the second case, as president of the United States. This 
allows us to observe how dramatically perceptions can differ from periphery to center, even 
with the same individual. 
Chapter 5 presents two cases of inadvertent expansion involving Russia on the Eurasian 
Steppe. The first case covers the Russian acquisition of parts of the Khanate of Kokand—
the cities of Chimkent and Tashkent—from 1864-66. The second case examines Russia’s 
non-acquisition of the Ili Region from 1871-81. As the chapter shows, the lack of perceived 
geopolitical risk in Kokand, and its presence in the Ili Region, is important to explaining the 
varied outcomes across these two cases. 
Chapter 6 presents two French cases. The first examines the French Empire’s non-
acquisition of the Kingdom of Tonkin in 1873-74, and the second covers France’s ultimate 
acquisition of Tonkin in 1882-83. This pair of cases is also methodologically and 
theoretically useful due to the striking similarity of the two cases, involving the same great 
power, operating in the same region, dealing with the exact same territorial entity, separated 
by only a decade, and an almost-identical process of inadvertent expansion, leading to 
divergent outcomes—and for reasons explained by my theory. 
Chapter 7 presents the only cross-great power comparison in the dissertation, examining 
the case of the Italian non-acquisition of the port city of Fiume in 1919-20, as well Japan’s 
acquisition of Manchuria in 1931-32. These two cases highlight the dilemma of inadvertent 
expansion—the difficult position leaders are put in when they are stuck between a domestic 
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public pushing for acceptance of the fait accompli and looming geopolitical risk associated 
with doing so. These two cases also differ from the rest in that they show the possibility of 
inadvertent expansion even in the presence of modern communications technology. 
Chapter 8 concludes the empirical component of the dissertation by presenting a pair of 
German cases in East Africa. The first case examines Germany’s acquisition of what is now 
Tanzania in 1884-85. The second case focuses on Germany’s non-acquisition of an 
important part of what is now Kenya and Uganda in 1890. This final empirical chapter 
presents the dissertation’s only two cases of inadvertent expansion via political annexation (the 
previous chapters all consist of cases of armed conquest), showing how hampered central 
control and perceptions of geopolitical risk are also central to the process of inadvertent 
expansion in this other important form. 
 Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation. It reviews the arguments and central findings, and 




A THEORY OF INADVERTENT EXPANSION 
 
“We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence 
of mind.” 
—John R. Seeley1 
 
This chapter presents a theory of inadvertent expansion. A comprehensive understanding of 
inadvertent expansion requires answering at least two basic questions. First, under what 
conditions are inadvertent expansion opportunities most likely to arise? More concretely, 
under what conditions are actors on the periphery likely to present leaders in the capital with 
faits accomplis in the form of unauthorized territorial claims and acquisitions? Second, what 
explains variation in central leaders’ decisions when faced with these faits accomplis? Or, more 
plainly, why do leaders in the capital subsequently authorize this peripheral expansion and 
accept the territory in some cases, but not others? The theory presented in this chapter will 
directly address both questions and, with the help of a variety of illustrative examples, will lay 
out three primary arguments. First, that inadvertent expansion opportunities are most likely 
to arise when leaders in the capital have limited control over their agents on the periphery of 
the state or empire. Second, that the very act of these peripheral agents engaging in 
unauthorized expansion creates incentives for leaders in the capital to retain their territorial 
acquisitions, as a result of reduced costs, domestic political pressure, and the engagement of 
national honor. And third, that perceived geopolitical risk associated with acquiring the 
 
1 John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: MacMillan and Co., 1883), p. 8. 
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territory in question is a crucial factor determining when leaders accept, and when they 
reject, the territorial fait accompli presented by their peripheral agents. 
 I begin by clearly defining the outcome of interest—inadvertent expansion—and 
differentiating it from related and existing concepts. Second, I introduce principal-agent 
theory, showing how a lack of control over the periphery is a crucial condition under which 
inadvertent expansion is likely to arise. Third, I explain why inadvertent expansion 
opportunities can often be so difficult for leaders in the capital to resist when they are 
presented with them. Fourth, I discuss the importance of geopolitical risk as a crucial factor 
driving leader decision making, followed by a discussion of the painful dilemma leaders face 
in certain cases. The chapter ends with a presentation of the alternative explanations that are 
considered throughout, as well as the research methods that guide the empirical chapters 
that follow, focused on research design, scope conditions, and case selection. 
 
Expansion, Strategic & Inadvertent 
The outcome I am seeking to explain, or dependent variable, is “expansion,” which I define 
somewhat narrowly as the coercive acquisition of foreign territory that is intended to be 
long-term or permanent for the expanding state. Expansion, as it is being used here, includes 
the gain of territory through armed conquest, political annexation, and coercive cession. This 
definition excludes largely-voluntary transfers of territory, such as when states engage in 
treaty-based territorial exchange or the adjustment of shared borders. It also excludes 
purchases or leases of territory that don’t include an important coercive component, such as 
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when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867.2 It excludes various forms of 
“domestic expansion,” such as territorial expropriation, ethnic cleansing, counterinsurgency, 
and other pacification campaigns. Finally, it excludes forcible acquisitions of territory that are 
intended to be temporary or provisional in nature, such as military occupations or, in its 
contemporary guise, what is known as “neotrusteeship.”3 Thus, expansion refers narrowly to 
lasting, coercive acquisition of foreign territory. 
Others have conceptualized it more broadly. For instance, Fareed Zakaria defines 
expansion to include, not only imperialism, but also “an activist foreign policy that ranges 
from attention to international events to increases in diplomatic legations to participation in 
great power diplomacy.”4 The problem with such an inclusive definition is its conceptual 
clarity and precision: it has become so broad as to lose much of its meaning.5 A more 
circumscribed definition, such as the one employed here, helps mitigate this problem. 
Expansion, as I am using it, is related to, but distinct from, a number of concepts in 
international relations scholarship with which it is often conflated. For instance, expansion is 
not identical with “imperialism,” as expansion can also consist of the extension of a state’s 
national borders, and it only covers the initial acquisition of foreign territory, not its ongoing 
 
2 On this issue more broadly, see: Dominic Alessio and Wesley B. Renfro, “The Voldemort of Imperial 
History: Rethinking Empire and US History,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 3 (August 2016), pp. 
250-266. 
3 On military occupation, see: David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). On neotrusteeship, see: James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 
“Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 5-43. 
4 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), p. 5. 
5 Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Realism and America’s Rise,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), p. 161n10. 
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administration.6 Expansion is also not the same thing as “war,” but often includes the use of 
force and regularly precipitates or follows from the occurrence of war.7 Expansion is not 
identical to “power-maximization,” as this concept doesn’t merely refer to extended 
territorial control, but also to a variety of other policies intended to increase the relative 
economic and military capabilities of a state.8 Finally, expansion is distinct from the 
somewhat opaque concept of “rise,” which most often refers to the secular increase in 
economic and military capabilities of one state relative to others.9 
As noted in the previous chapter, most international relations scholarship has tended to 
treat expansion as if it were a singular phenomenon: the largely-strategic and leader-directed 
extension of the state’s territorial domain. But not all have. For instance, Colin Elman draws 
a distinction between what he refers to as “manual and automatic expansion,” the former 
consisting of “conscious bids for hegemony,” and the latter, “incremental, localized attempts 
to expand, with a view to immediate opportunities… [not] with the deliberate purpose of 
becoming the dominant state in the international system.”10 Similarly, Randall Schweller 
argues that “we must distinguish between aggressive and nonaggressive expansion and 
 
6 For definitions of empire, see: Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 30-47; 
Daniel H. Nexon, and Thomas Wright, “What’s at Stake in the American Empire Debate,” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 2 (May 2007), pp. 253-271. 
7 For example, Weisiger defines “conquest” as a “decisive military victory.” See: Alex Weisiger, “Victory 
Without Peace: Conquest, Insurgency, and War Termination,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 31, No. 
4 (2014), p. 359. 
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Revised ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2014), 
pp. 33-34. 
9 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First 
Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Winter 
2015/16), pp. 7-53. 
10 Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 28-29. See also: Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the 
Expansion of War Aims,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 12-14. 
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between safe and risky expansion. All states… can be expected to engage in nonaggressive 
expansion as well as cheap, relatively safe expansion on the periphery.”11 These are welcome 
distinctions, to be sure. But because the concepts aren’t thoroughly developed, we aren’t 
given much of an indication of when to expect one form over the other.12 And more 
importantly for our purposes here, both forms remain largely leader-centric in nature. 
The primary distinction I am drawing is between what I refer to as “strategic expansion” 
and “inadvertent expansion.” Strategic expansion is territorial expansion that is planned and 
ordered by the central leadership of a state or empire, and is executed in accordance with 
those plans. Thorough strategic planning for expansion by state leaders will include four 
considerations: where it will take place, when it will take place, how much territory to acquire, 
and how it will be acquired. Strategic expansion is exemplified in many cases of territorial 
expansion that are well-known in the historical record and in international relations 
scholarship, such as Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1905, the German invasion of Poland in 
1939, and, as best we can tell, the Russian conquest of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. 
In contrast, inadvertent expansion is territorial expansion that is planned and executed by 
actors on the periphery of a state or empire, without the foreknowledge or involvement of 
central leadership in the capital. Inadvertent expansion is exemplified by the case that 
opened this dissertation—the British conquest of Sind in 1843—as well as those that 
populate later chapters (among many others), including the U.S.’s conquest of Florida in 
1818-19, the Russian conquests of Chimkent and Tashkent in 1864-65, France’s conquest of 
 
11 Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), pp. 112-113. 
12 Though, Schweller does posit that “democracies have little or no appetite for risky, aggressive expansion.” 
Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 113. 
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Tonkin in 1882-83, the German annexation of East Africa in 1884-85, and the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931-32. 
It is important to note that this idea of inadvertent expansion isn’t entirely new, 
particularly in the history of empire. In summarizing this literature, Michael Doyle refers to a 
whole category of theories as “peri-centric” which root the sources of imperialism in the 
periphery.13 In the history of the British Empire this includes foundational works by 
Gallagher and Robinson on the “Imperialism of Free Trade” and informal empire,14 John 
Galbraith on the “turbulent frontier” and the “man on the spot,”15 and David Fieldhouse on 
“colonial sub-imperialism.”16 In their footsteps have followed a number of historians who 
have taken a more interactionist view of the relationship between center and periphery in 
producing imperialism, such as Ronald Robinson,17 John Darwin,18 and Ronald Hyam19—
though, all still retaining an important role for the periphery. 
In international relations specifically, the only other research adopting a similar concept is 
by Paul MacDonald on what he refers to as “autonomous expansion.” In MacDonald’s 
 
13 Doyle, Empires, pp. 25-26. 
14 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-15. 
15 John S. Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1960), pp. 150-168. 
16 D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire, 1830-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 76-84. 
17 Ronald Robinson, “Chapter 5: Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory 
of Collaboration,” in Roger Owen and Robert B. Sutcliffe, eds., Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: 
Longman, 1972), pp. 117-142. 
18 John Darwin, “Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion,” The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 447 (June 1997), pp. 614-642. 
19 Ronald Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763-1963,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1999), pp. 27-52. 
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terms, autonomous expansion is “political expansion of overseas empires without prior 
authorization or approval from officials in the metropole.”20 This is virtually equivalent to 
inadvertent expansion, however, for two reasons I don’t simply adopt MacDonald’s 
terminology. First, the term “autonomous” has a number of meanings, including self-
governing, independent, and operating without human control—none of which exactly 
capture what occurs in cases of inadvertent expansion.21 And having multiple meanings 
associated with the term can hinder conceptual clarity, leading readers to ask “autonomous in 
what sense?” Second, if the term autonomous applies to any party in these cases, it is to the 
actors on the periphery, as they are the ones acting autonomously, without direction from 
the center. Yet what, perhaps, most is interesting about inadvertent expansion is how little 
control those in power, the leaders in the capital, often have over the process. In contrast, 
the term “inadvertent” has fewer meanings—being defined as “not resulting or achieved 
through deliberate planning”22—and it is geared toward the actors in the center, which I 
would argue makes it a more fitting term for the phenomenon. 
 
Principals, Agents, & Peripheral Expansion 
As will be detailed in Chapter 3, inadvertent expansion has been a regular feature of the 
modern history of great power politics, occurring dozens of times over the course of more 
than a century. However, despite the wide variety of actors involved, regions in which it 
occurs, temporal contexts, and territories acquired, at a basic level instances of inadvertent 
 
20 Paul K. MacDonald, “The Governor’s Dilemma in Colonial Empires,” in Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp 
Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl, eds., The Governor’s Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals 
and Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 43. 
21 “Autonomous,” US Dictionary, Lexico (2021), https://www.lexico.com/definition/autonomous.  
22 “Inadvertent,” US Dictionary, Lexico (2021), https://www.lexico.com/definition/inadvertent.  
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expansion typically involve three or four key actors and tend to follow a two-step sequence. 
The key actors are leaders in the capital, actors on the periphery, a foreign sovereign entity, 
and sometimes another great power whose interests might be threatened by the expansion. 
The leaders in the capital include the head of state or government—such as the president, 
prime minister, autocrat, or monarch—and the key members of his or her cabinet primarily 
responsible for national or imperial security policy, including the defense, foreign, and 
colonial ministers. The actors on the periphery consist of a variety of state and non-state 
actors, including members of the military, colonial armies, imperial officials, members of 
private-chartered companies, merchants, and explorers. The foreign sovereign entities are 
generally local kingdoms and empires, components of other states, and other foreign 
imperial holdings. And finally, the other great powers are those that are commonly and 
conventionally understood as such.23 
  The two basic steps of inadvertent expansion are what I refer to as “unauthorized 
peripheral expansion” and “subsequent central authorization.” In the first step of 
unauthorized peripheral expansion, the state or non-state actors on the periphery of a given 
state or empire plan, execute, and in many cases fully carry out an instance of territorial 
expansion, without the aid, authorization, or foreknowledge of the leaders at home in the 
capital.24 This unauthorized peripheral expansion can take the form of a military or colonial 
army engaging in armed conquest, such when French colonial forces invaded German 
 
23 For more details on the coding of the “great powers,” see Chapter 3. 
24 For the seminal discussion of private violence in international politics, see: Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, 
Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996). 
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Cameroon in the opening months of the First World War, without orders from Paris.25 It 
can also take the form of diplomatic or colonial officials annexing territory, such as when Sir 
Stamford Raffles acquired Singapore on behalf of the British Empire in 1819, without prior 
authorization from London.26 It can also consist of members of private chartered companies 
and other economic actors seizing territory for economic gain, such as the German trader 
Adolph Lüderitz annexing territory without government authorization in what would 
become Germany’s first overseas colony of South West Africa.27 Despite their many 
differences, what these forms of peripheral expansion share in common is that they were not 
specifically ordered by authorities at home in the capital. 
 The first question that needs addressing, then, is under what conditions are peripheral 
actors more likely to claim foreign territory without authorization? In short, what explains 
unauthorized peripheral expansion? The best way to understand the first step of 
unauthorized peripheral expansion is as a particular manifestation of what is known as a 
“principal-agent problem.”28 Whenever one actor, known as the “principal,” delegates some 
 
25 Hew Strachan, The First World War in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 30-31; Elizabeth 
Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 118-
119. 
26 R.M.J. Stewart, “Raffles of Singapore: The man and the legacy,” Asian Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1982), pp. 23-
24; C.M. Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 27-31. 
27 J. H. Esterhuyse, South West Africa, 1880-1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South West Africa (Cape 
Town: C. Struik, 1968), pp. 38-42, 46-62. 
28 This is an absolutely enormous literature. For a foundational work, see: Michael C. Jensen and William H. 
Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1976), pp. 305-360. For helpful overviews, see: Kenneth J. Arrow, 
“The Economics of Agency,” in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds., Principals and Agents: The 
Structure of Business (Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 1984), pp. 37-51; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, 
“Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1989), 
pp. 57-74; Edgar Kiser, “Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and 
Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 17, No. 2 (July 1999), pp. 
146-170; Gary J. Miller, “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,” Annual Review of Political Science, 
Vol. 8 (2005), pp. 203-225; Susan P. Shapiro, “Agency Theory,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 31 (2005), pp. 
263-284. For a useful critique, see: Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization,” American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol 28, No. 4 (November 1984), pp. 739-777. And for an early application in international 
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decision-making authority to another actor, known as the “agent,” the possibility for 
principal-agent problems arises. In the theory of inadvertent expansion, the principals are the 
leaders in the capital and the agents are the peripheral actors.29 In some cases, when the 
peripheral agents are state actors, such as members of the military or colonial apparatus, the 
delegation will be direct and explicit. In other cases, when the peripheral agents are non-state 
actors, such as private merchants or explorers, the delegation is far more implicit. In either 
case, what matters is that every act of delegation entails potential losses in terms of agency or 
control on the part of the principal, and this is what can pose problems. 
 There are two jointly-necessary conditions for principal-agent problems to occur. The 
first of these are information asymmetries in favor of the agent. Agents will typically possess, 
or have greater access to, information that is, or would be, of value to the principal. This can 
be due to the agent’s proximity to the task at hand, its expertise in a given issue-area, or the 
sometimes-exorbitant costs associated with monitoring the agent’s behavior. In cases of 
inadvertent expansion, these information asymmetries can be particularly severe. In many 
cases, we’re talking about relatively few people communicating over vast distances, often 
using 19th century transportation and communications technology. For instance, in 1850, 
when the explorer Gennadii Nevelskoi unilaterally annexed the Amur Basin to the Russian 
Empire, it took at least five months to get a reply to a message sent from St. Petersburg to 
 
relations, see: George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The 
Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 362-
380. 
29 For the classic application of agency theory to empire, see: Julia Adams, “Principals and Agents, Colonialists 
and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 
61, No. 1 (February 1996), pp. 12-28. 
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the Amur region.30 Similarly, in 1852, when Commodore George Lambert independently 
sparked the Second Anglo-Burmese War, leading to the British conquest of lower Burma, it 
took approximately four months to get a reply to a message sent from London to 
Rangoon.31 These conditions greatly exacerbated information asymmetries in favor of 
peripheral agents, and hampered central control by leaders in the capital. As British Colonial 
Secretary Hicks Beach told a colleague, shortly before a peripheral agent of his 
independently conquered Zululand in 1879, “I cannot really control him without a 
telegraph.”32 
 However, the information asymmetries common in cases of inadvertent expansion are 
not simply a matter of vast distances and slow communications. Even distance-demolishing 
technologies such as the telegraph wouldn’t solve all problems in this regard—though, as I 
show in Chapter 3, they make a significant difference. For one, telegraph cables were rapidly 
connected to coastal regions throughout the world in the late 19th century, yet 
communication with the interior of many regions would prove much more difficult to 
establish. Second, leaders in the capital still relied upon their peripheral agents to send 
information from the frontier, allowing these agents a great deal of artistic license in how 
they dealt with the facts.33 As one historian of the Russian Empire in Central Asia notes, the 
“real power which local officers wielded… [lay] in their monopoly of information. It was 
 
30 John L. Evans, Russian Expansion on the Amur, 1848-1860: The Push to the Pacific (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 1999), pp. 73-74. 
31 Oliver B. Pollack, “A Mid-Victorian Coverup: The Case of the ‘Combustible Commodore’ and the Second 
Anglo-Burmese War, 1851-1852,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 
(Summer, 1978), p. 172. 
32 “Hicks Beach to Lord Beaconsfield, 3 November 1878,” quoted in Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the 
British Empire, 1781-1997 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), p. 180. 
33 McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, p. 381. 
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extremely difficult to resist the arguments for action which these officers pressed when the 
only information available came from them too.”34 And third, even when specific orders 
could get through to them in time, peripheral agents without representatives from the capital 
peering over their shoulders always had the opportunity to turn a blind eye. As the famed 
counterinsurgent of French Algeria Thomas Robert Bugeaud once declared, “In the face of 
the enemy, one must never accept any precise instructions or plans imposed from above… 
One should burn instructions so as to avoid the temptation of reading them.”35 
The second necessary condition for principal-agent problems to occur is a divergence of 
preferences between principal and agent. In delegating, the principal wants the agent to act 
exactly as the principal would if it were making the decisions itself, while agents will be 
tempted to make its own decisions, at least some of the time. There are many reasons why 
divergences of preferences can arise in delegated-agency relations, including agent self-
interest, barriers to communication, varied perceptions, differing risk orientations, and 
divergent structural conditions facing principal and agent. In the theory of inadvertent 
expansion, the most important driver of preference divergence is the differing positions and 
associated perceptions of the leaders in the capital and their peripheral agents. And the most 
important issue on which preferences diverge is on national or imperial security policy, with 
peripheral agents often wanting to act quickly and aggressively, and leaders in the capital 
preferring to act slowly and cautiously. 
 
34 Peter Morris, “The Russians in Central Asia, 1870-1887,” The Slavonic and European Review, Vol. 53, No. 133 
(October 1975), pp. 529-530. 
35 C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, “Centre and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial 
Empire, 1815-1920” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1988), p. 13. 
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 These differences can be neatly summed up with the ideas of the “view from the capital” 
and the “view from the frontier.” The view from the capital is that which is typically held by 
the leaders in the capital. Their responsibilities are broad, being concerned with the interests 
of the state or empire as a whole. Their areas of concern are often global, including not only 
the territory at issue, but also adjacent territories, other important regional actors, 
relationships with the other great powers, and, of course, domestic politics at home. And the 
leaders’ distance from the frontier means that their sense of urgency to act in response to 
any given peripheral contingency is generally lower than that of the peripheral agents. From 
the perspective of the capital, the daily fluctuations of threats and opportunities presented by 
the periphery are seen as distant and abstract.  
The view from the frontier, in contrast, is that which is held by peripheral agents. Their 
responsibilities are relatively narrow, being concerned, at most, with a portion of the state or 
empire. Their areas of concern are often local, being essentially limited to the territory at 
issue and, perhaps, some surrounding areas. And their proximity to the frontier means that 
their sense of urgency to act in any given contingency is often much higher than that of the 
leaders back in the capital. The threats and opportunities these peripheral agents regularly 
face, though often mild when considering the security of the state or empire as a whole, are 
immediate and very real. Thus, viewing a given problem from the capital or from the frontier 
can lead to highly divergent perceptions, and to corresponding differences in policy 
preferences. 
 This difference between the view from the capital and the view from the frontier is well 
articulated in a letter from the governor-general of India who was introduced in Chapter 1, 
Lord Ellenborough, to Queen Victoria, justifying the recent conquest of Sind. “Your Majesty 
will not have failed to observe,” Ellenborough wrote in October 1843: 
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“how very different a position the British Government stands in Europe from that 
which it is placed in India. In Europe peace is maintained by the balance of power 
amongst several states. In India all balance has been overthrown by our 
preponderance, and to exist we must continue to be supreme. The necessity of our 
position may often render necessary here measures wholly unsuited to the state of 
things which prevails in Europe. The least appearance of weakness or of hesitation 
would lead to a general combination of all against a foreign, and necessarily an 
unpopular, Government.”36 
Thus, a combination of information asymmetries and preference divergence will tend to 
produce principal-agent problems. The most important among these, for our purposes, is 
what is known as “moral hazard.”37 Given that the agent is acting at the behest of the 
principal, and given that it is generally the principal that is responsible for the outcomes in 
question, the agent may feel emboldened to make riskier, less-responsible choices than it 
otherwise would, potentially creating significant problems for the principal. In the case at 
hand, the most important manifestation of moral hazard is unauthorized peripheral 
expansion. Given that these peripheral agents are representatives of—or, at the very least, 
claim to be acting in the name of—a powerful state back home, they will often have a well-
founded expectation that they will be supported by leaders in the capital, regardless of 
whether their actions were authorized or not. 
 
36 “Ellenborough to the Queen, Allahabad, June 27, 1843” in Lord Colchester, ed., History of the Indian 
Administration of Lord Ellenborough, in his Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington: To Which is Prefixed, by Permission 
of Her Majesty, Lord Ellenborough's Letters to the Queen During that Period (London: R. Bentley and Son, 1874), p. 
101. 
37 For foundational works, see: Bengt Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” The Bell Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 74-91; Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of 
Ownership and Control,” The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 301-325. 
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This is the first step in the process of inadvertent expansion. The question that needs 
addressing, then, is under what conditions peripheral agents are more likely to engage in 
unauthorized peripheral expansion. There are a wide variety of motives that drive individual 
peripheral agents to engage in unauthorized expansion. In some cases, the territory in 
question has intrinsic strategic or economic value, and an irresistible window of opportunity 
presents itself.38 In other cases, the agents are genuinely threatened by actors on the other 
side of the frontier, and expand for defensive reasons.39 In other cases still, these peripheral 
agents’ have more bureaucratic or parochial interests, such as promotion within the military 
or advancement in their organizations.40 Finally, in some cases they simply want the glory 
and prestige that is so often historically associated with territorial conquest.41  
Whatever their individual motivations may be, the crucial permissive factor enabling 
unauthorized peripheral expansion is the degree of control leaders in the capital have over 
these peripheral agents. When leaders in the capital have only limited control over their 
peripheral agents, unauthorized peripheral expansion is more likely. In contrast, when 
leaders in the capital have significant control over their peripheral agents, unauthorized 
peripheral expansion is much less likely. In line with principal-agent theory, “control” results 
from the ability to monitor the agents’ behavior, often coming in the form of advanced 
transportation and communications technology. However, there are other ways in which 
 
38 For strategic considerations, see the case of Japan in Manchuria (Chapter 7). For economic motives, the 
German acquisition of South West Africa is a useful representative case: Esterhuyse, South West Africa, 1880-
1894, pp. 38-42, 46-62. 
39 Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion.” 
40 See: A. S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 178; Morriss, “The Russians in Central Asia,” p. 535. 
41 Robert Aldrich and John Connell, France’s Overseas Frontier: Départements et Territoires D’Outre-Mer (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 38. 
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central control can break down. For instance, in cases of weak civilian oversight of the 
military, control by leaders in the capital over their peripheral agents can be severely 
hampered, as the cases of Japan and Italy (Chapter 7) indicate. 
 
Peripheral Pulls42 
In sum, unauthorized peripheral expansion is most likely when control by leaders in the 
capital over their agents on the periphery is relatively low. It is a principal-agent problem 
driven by a combination of information asymmetries favoring peripheral agents, a 
divergence of preferences between the capital and the periphery, and moral hazard on the 
part of peripheral agents. This is the first step in the process of inadvertent expansion. But, 
as noted above, inadvertent expansion consists of two key steps: unauthorized peripheral 
expansion and subsequent central authorization. After claiming territory without 
authorization, the actors on the periphery present the leaders in the capital with their 
acquisitions as a fait accompli.43 In some cases, they directly contact their metropolitan bosses 
to notify them of their gains. In other cases, news filters back to the capital through other 
channels. In either case, knowledge of the acquisition among leaders in the capital initiates a 
deliberative process on whether to reject or accept the fait accompli. If leaders in the capital 
decide to reject the fait accompli, then they effectively cut these peripheral actors loose, 
instructing them to either return the acquired territories or to fend for themselves. In 
contrast, if the leaders decide to accept the fait accompli, as they have in dozens of cases in the 
 
42 This heading is from: Paul K. MacDonald, “Peripheral Pulls: Great Power Expansion and Lessons for the 
‘American Empire’,” Unpublished manuscript, International Studies Association 2004, Montreal, Canada. 
43 On the growth of empire by fait accompli, see: David S. Landes, “Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic 
Imperialism,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (December 1961), pp. 505-506. 
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modern era, the territory then becomes part of the state or empire, thereby completing the 
process of inadvertent expansion. 
The key question that needs addressing for this second step, then, is why leaders in the 
capital accept these faits accomplis in some cases, but not in others? More simply, what 
explains subsequent central authorization? Before getting into what explains variation in 
leader choice, it is important to note that, for leaders facing these faits accomplis, there appears 
to be a bias in favor of acceptance. Across numerous cases of inadvertent expansion, leaders 
seem to come up with a variety of arguments for retaining these territories ex post that it is 
difficult to imagine they would marshal in favor of their acquisition ex ante. The primary 
reason this is the case is that, by engaging in unauthorized expansion, the peripheral agents 
have changed “the facts on the ground,” altering the strategic calculus of the leaders in the 
capital. And for three central reasons, these changed facts tend to incentivize leaders toward 
acceptance. 
 First, unauthorized peripheral expansion will often drastically drive down the costs of 
territorial acquisition for leaders in the capital. Great powers, as a general rule, have a 
tendency to engage in territorial expansion, and the fact that one of their peripheral agents 
has mostly done it for them can make it all the more enticing. If we think of the costs of 
territorial expansion as being divided between current “acquisition costs” and future 
“governance costs,” unauthorized peripheral expansion has eliminated the first half of the 
equation.44 This tends to strengthen the arguments of pro-expansion hawks in the capital and 
to weaken the arguments of cost- or risk-conscious doves, inclining the leaders toward 
acceptance. 
 
44 I thank Mariya Grinberg for this formulation. 
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 Second, leaders in the capital will often feel significant pressure to support their own 
citizens and subjects, regardless of “who started it” or how unscrupulous they may have 
been. This sometimes comes in the form of a sense of personal or professional responsibility 
on the part of the leaders to protect and defend their own subordinates or nationals. In other 
cases, the great power’s domestic public at large becomes aware of events on the periphery, 
rallies in favor of their co-nationals, and puts pressure on the government to support them 
as well. These effects can also be felt on the opposition in government. In cases where the 
leadership is supportive, but powerful opponents in the legislature are opposed, the 
opposition will often be muted out of a fear of looking unpatriotic or being accused of 
“siding with the enemy.”45  In short, it is simply very difficult for leaders to deny their own 
citizens aid in times of need, incentivizing them toward acceptance of faits accomplis. As David 
Landes puts it, “imperialism was in large measure built on the fait accompli… with the state 
almost always ready to pull its nationals’ chestnuts out of the fire.”46 
 Third, unauthorized peripheral expansion engages the prestige, honor, and reputation of 
leaders in the capital, and the state or empire as a whole, in a way they simply weren’t 
engaged before. This can make relinquishing the territory and retrenching appear 
prohibitively difficult from the perspective of the leaders in the capital.47 These concerns are 
 
45 See, for example: Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan p. 108; Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for 
Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 (New York: Perennial, 2003), p. 178; William 
Earl Weeks, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Vol. 1: Dimensions of the Early American Empire, 
1754-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 106. 
46 Landes, “Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism,” p. 505. 
47 On the somewhat-excessive preoccupation with reputation among leaders in international relations, see: 
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 19-21; Daryl G. 
Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 158-
159; Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 
(2005), pp. 34-62. On status as a driver of imperial expansion, see: Joslyn Barnhart, “Status Competition and 




particularly potent in the colonial context, where great powers often have other territorial 
holdings in the area, and feel that their continued control rests heavily upon the maintenance 
of a reputation for resolve in the face of a challenge.48 These concerns for national honor are 
nicely illustrated by Tsar Nicholas I of Russia, who remarked, upon learning of the 
unauthorized annexation of the Amur Basin by one of his agents, “where once the Russian 
flag has been raised, never shall it be lowered.”49 
 Thus, for reasons of reduced costs, domestic political pressure, and the engagement of 
national honor, leaders in the capital will often have strong incentives to accept their 
peripheral agents’ territorial faits accomplis. And the peripheral agents often know this, and will 
use these very same forces to manipulate the leaders in the capital, further increasing their 
incentives toward acceptance. They do this, for instance, by making reference to cost-saving 
in their communications with the capital, in order to make these issues salient for these 
leaders. The peripheral agents can also help gin up domestic political support in favor of 
their cause through a variety of means, including waging press campaigns, engaging in 
pamphleteering, sending allied individuals and organizations on speaking tours, and directly 
lobbying members of the great power’s government. Some of their strategies are incredibly 
shrewd. For instance, in the process of his unauthorized acquisition of what would become 
Rhodesia in 1890, the famed British colonialist Cecil Rhodes made a point of recruiting 
young men from influential families for his column, so that the government in London 
 
48 Landes, “Some Thoughts on the Nature of Economic Imperialism,” pp. 505-506; Andrew and Kanya-
Forstner, “Centre and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial Empire,” p. 14; Morriss, “The 
Russians in Central Asia,” p. 575; Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics.” 
49 Sharyl Corrado, “A Land Divided: Sakhalin and the Amur Expedition of G.I. Nevel’skoi, 1848-1855,” Journal 
of Historical Geography, Vol. 45 (July 2014), p. 77. See also: S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their 
Disputed Frontier (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 38-39. 
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would have an extra incentive to intervene on their behalf if needed.50 Finally, peripheral 
agents also make regular reference to concerns of national honor and prestige in their 
communications with the capital. Many arguments of this variety are commonly put forth, 
such as that backing down would weaken the great power’s authority in the region and 
elsewhere,51 that it would only invite attack and encourage dissension,52 that the locals 
“respect only force,”53 that the other great powers “are watching,”54 and, more generally, 
about the need to support the great power’s important political and social mission,55 and to 
“honor the flag.”56 And the knowledge among peripheral agents that these incentives exist, 
and of their ability to manipulate them, only feeds the moral hazard that leads them to 
engage in unauthorized peripheral expansion in the first place. 
 Unauthorized peripheral expansion can also generate incentives for leaders in the capital 
to reject the territorial fait accompli, largely out of a desire to rein in the rogue peripheral 
agents and to reassert central control.57 However, this incentive often pales in comparison 
with the stronger domestic political pressures and honor concerns that leaders feel bound 
 
50 H.L. Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914, Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), pp. 295-296. 
51 John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854 (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), p. 239. 
52 Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, p. 240;  
53 David MacKenzie, “The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85,” in Michael Rywkin, ed., 
Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 (New York: Mansell, 1988), p. 220. 
54 “Konstantin Petrovich Kaufman” in Joseph L. Wieczynski, et al. eds., The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and 
Soviet History, Vol. 16 (Academic International Press, 1976), p. 69. See also: Pollack, “A Mid-Victorian 
Coverup,” p. 124. 
55 Frederick Quinn, The French Overseas Empire (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), p. 115. 
56 Douglas Porch, The Conquest of the Sahara (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1984), p. 134. 
57 See, for example: Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 103. 
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by, particularly in cases of successful peripheral acquisition, when the cost-saving motive will 
also be powerful. Once important segments of the public become aware of what has 
transpired on the frontier, and rally to the peripheral agents’ cause, it becomes very politically 
difficult for leaders in the capital to censure or punish their agents in any way. This, in 
important part, explains why the peripheral agents who engage in unauthorized peripheral 
expansion are so often, not only not punished, but rewarded for their insubordination. But 
perhaps more importantly, these are often deeply embarrassing experiences for leaders in the 
capital, threatening to make them look weak, incompetent, and out of control in front of 
their own populace and the world at large. A quick and tidy acceptance—along with an 
effort to cover the inadvertence up—is often a more appealing alternative than engaging in a 
long, drawn out, and very public process of rejection and retrenchment.58 
 
Geopolitical Risk & Central Authorization 
However, there is still variation that needs explaining. For there are instances in which 
leaders in the capital decide to deny their peripheral agents, and to refrain from subsequently 
authorizing the acquisition. With so many incentives pushing them toward acceptance of the 
fait accompli, why would they ever choose to reject it? The modern history of inadvertent 
expansion shows a number of motivations for these decisions. When British Colonial 
Secretary Lord Glenelg rejected his agents’ claims of the Transkei region of South Africa in 
 
58 In the context of the British empire, see: Pollack, “A Mid-Victorian Coverup,” pp. 176-177; Sarah Ansari, 
“The Sind Blue Books of 1843 and 1844: The Political ‘Laundering’ of Historical Evidence,” The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 120, No. 485 (February 2005), pp. 35-65. In the Russian empire, see: David MacKenzie, 
“Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. the Turkestan Generals,” Canadian Slavic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 
(Summer 1969), pp. 307-308n86; S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and their Disputed Frontier (Armonk: 
M.E. Shape, 1996), pp. 120-121. For a related discussion in the context of the French empire, see: Porch, The 
Conquest of the Sahara, p. 181. For an example from the Japanese empire, see: Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The 
Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 384. In the context of 
American expansion, see: Howe, What Hath God Wrought, p. 104. 
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1835, it was a combination of the perceived worthlessness of the territory and popular 
revulsion at the inhumane treatment of the locals that led to relinquishment.59 When French 
leaders rejected their peripheral agent Joseph Galliéni after his unilateral annexation of 
Senegal in 1881, it was due to the unacceptable terms of the annexation treaty he had 
negotiated.60 And when the United States declined to accept Hawaii in 1893 after a coup 
orchestrated, in part, by its own local consular official, the primary reason was that the 
incoming president, Grover Cleveland, was much less interested in the territory than the 
outgoing president, Benjamin Harrison.61 Thus, like any important decision in world politics, 
leaders are influenced by a variety of factors. 
 However, what stands out as the most important factor weighing on the minds of leaders 
in the capital when they decide to accept or reject the fait accompli of their peripheral agents is 
the degree of perceived geopolitical risk associated with doing so. The prospect of significant 
geopolitical repercussions is often enough to discourage leaders from authorizing their 
peripheral agents’ deeds. And the absence of these potential risks will usually clear the way 
for the incentives toward acceptance to take hold, and for leaders to accept the fait accompli 
and to engage in inadvertent expansion. While this is not the sole motivation driving 
decisions to accept or reject the agents’ claims, the quantitative evidence and the historical 
 
59 “Despatch from Glenelg to D’Urban, December 26, 1835 [Extracts],” in Kenneth Norman Bell, eds., Select 
Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 470-473; Galbraith, 
Reluctant Empire, pp. 129, 132. 
60 Quinn, The French Overseas Empire, p. 157. See also: A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A 
Study in French Military Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 72-83; Thomas F. Power, 
Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), pp. 78-80. 
61 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol. 3, Transcontinental 
America, 1850-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 365-366; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A 
History of American Expansion (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), p. 261. 
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case studies that populate the latter chapters of this dissertation will show that it is the most 
important determinant of this decision. 
 There are three key kinds of geopolitical risk that will give leaders pause and lead them to 
rethink the option of acceptance of the fait accompli. The first is the prospect of crippling 
international economic isolation. If leaders think that authorizing peripheral expansion will 
lead to international trade sanctions, substantial foreign economic disinvestment, or the 
cutting off of international aid, they will be far less likely to accept the fait accompli, as the case 
of Italy in Fiume (Chapter 7) illustrates. The second type of geopolitical risk is the prospect 
of armed conflict with a local regional power. The possibility of fighting a war with a distant, 
regional power—even one that is significantly inferior to the great power in question—will 
often lead leaders to hesitate to authorize the peripheral expansion, as the cases of the 
United States in Texas (Chapter 4) and Russia in the Ili Region (Chapter 5) show. The third, 
and perhaps the gravest risk, is the prospect of encroaching on the interests of one of the 
other great powers to the point of risking a major crisis or even war. Leaders will be highly 
reluctant to accept the offerings of their peripheral agents when the consequence could be 
this grave, as the cases of France in Tonkin in 1873 (Chapter 6) and Germany in Kenya and 
Uganda (Chapter 8) illustrate. In contrast, the absence of such perceptions of geopolitical 
risk clears the way for the incentives toward acceptance to take hold, and leaders will be 
significantly more likely to accept the fait accompli, as the cases of the U.S. in Florida (Chapter 




 A skeptical reader might point out, however, that leaders risk economic isolation and war 
for territorial gain all the time.62 We need look no further than the U.S.’s annexation of Texas 
in 1845, not to mention Japan and Germany’s expansion in the late 1930s, to see that leaders 
can be highly risk acceptant when pursuing territorial gains. What makes inadvertent 
expansion different? The key difference between inadvertent expansion and strategic 
expansion in this regard is, quite simply, central planning and preparation. Territorial 
expansion is among the highest-risk and least-certain foreign policy initiatives a state can 
undertake. While it can promise the acquisition of strategic territory and valuable resources, 
it also risks overburdening the state with obligations, creating new enemies on the frontier, 
and impinging upon the interests of other great powers. Thus, when it comes to strategic 
expansion, leaders will generally carefully consider where to expand, when to do so, how 
much territory to take, and how to do so. And leaders will conduct their campaigns in ways 
that aim to minimize adverse consequences, or at the very least to prepare themselves to 
weather them. In contrast, inadvertent expansion is thrust upon leaders in the capital 
unwittingly. They have had no control over what territory was taken, when it was taken, how 
much was taken, and the mode by which it was taken. And they have also had little 
opportunity to try to avoid adverse consequences or to dig in and bear them. Given these 
differences, leaders will usually be hard-pressed to face significant risks for policies that they 
have had no control over. 
 A final important point on geopolitical risk is to emphasize that this is a perceptual 
variable—it is geopolitical risk as perceived by leaders in the capital at the time. And leaders are 
 
62 See: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1991); Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention on the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
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human beings: they can vary considerably in their perceptions, their risk propensities, and 
their views of the appropriate policy to any given problem. These facts are borne out in 
many of the case studies in the chapters ahead, where different leaders in the capital have 
divergent views on the geopolitical risk associated with their situation—most commonly, 
with defense ministers tending to see less risk in any given situation, and foreign ministers, 
more. And leaders can also get this wrong, misperceiving the risk associated with territorial 
acquisition, as France’s leaders did in Tonkin in 1883 (Chapter 6) and Japan’s leaders did in 
Manchuria in 1931 (Chapter 7). Thus, while there clearly are important objective indicators 
of geopolitical risk, which I’ll introduce in Chapter 3, it is equally important to examine this 
variable at the level of the perceptions of individual leaders. 
 
The Dilemma of Inadvertent Expansion 
To sum up, the second step of inadvertent expansion—subsequent central authorization—is 
explained by two key factors. First, leaders in the capital will often have incentives pushing 
them in favor of acceptance of the fait accompli. This is due to the way peripheral expansion 
changes the facts on the ground and alters the strategic calculus of leaders in the capital, by 
reducing costs, generating domestic political pressure, and engaging the national honor. 
Second, the degree of geopolitical risk associated with acceptance will importantly influence 
the ultimate decisions these leaders make, with the absence of perceived geopolitical risk 
making acceptance more likely, and the presence of such risk making it less likely. 
 It is worth noting that the two forces present at this second stage of subsequent central 
authorization can often push in opposite directions. On the one hand, there are incentives 
for leaders to accept the territory due to reduced acquisition costs, domestic political 
pressure, and honor concerns. On the other hand, leaders can perceive severe geopolitical 
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risk associated with doing so, discouraging them from accepting the fait accompli. The 
confluence of these countervailing forces can periodically put leaders in a deeply-unenviable 
position. On the one hand, they may face a nationalistic public rallying for acceptance, an 
opposition in government urging them to defend the national honor, and, in extreme cases, 
the risk of a coup or assassination for appearing to look weak. On the other hand, leaders 
may face the risk of crippling economic isolation, conflict with a regional power thousands 
of kilometers from home, or a territorial dispute with another great power, possibly 
escalating to all-out war. This veritable minefield of decision-making for leaders in the capital 
is what I refer to as the “dilemma of inadvertent expansion.” 
 Thankfully, for the leaders involved, these situations are relatively rare. In most cases, 
leaders in the capital are presented the territorial fait accompli by their peripheral agents with 
few significant risks associated with acceptance, and acceptance is the result. In other cases, 
metropolitan leaders face significant risks associated with acceptance, yet the public is not 
fully engaged or the government is divided on the issue, giving leaders a safe off-ramp to 
reject the fait accompli. However, in rare cases—such as the U.S. in Florida (Chapter 4), Russia 
in the Ili Region (Chapter 5), Japan in Manchuria, and Italy in Fiume (Chapter 7)—these two 
potent forces come together. In these circumstances, leaders effectively have to weigh the 
costs and risks associated with making one decision or the other. In some cases, such as the 
U.S. in Florida, leaders deem the geopolitical risk as manageable enough for them to 
tentatively accept the fait accompli. In others—such as Russia in Ili, Japan in Manchuria, and 
Italy in Fiume—the perceived geopolitical risks are deemed too great, and leaders aim to rein 
in their wayward peripheral agents. 
 To sum up the argument in its entirety and to be crystal clear: the outcome I’m seeking to 
explain, or dependent variable, is inadvertent expansion. It occurs in two basic steps: 
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unauthorized peripheral expansion and subsequent central authorization. The most 
important explanatory variable for unauthorized peripheral expansion is the degree of 
control leaders in the capital have over their agents on the periphery, with low degrees of 
control being associated with an increased likelihood of unauthorized peripheral expansion. 
Once this occurs, the very act of unauthorized peripheral expansion tends to generate 
incentives for leaders in the capital to accept the territory being offered, due to reduced 
acquisition costs, the emergence of domestic political pressure, and the engagement of 
national honor. Yet at the second step of subsequent central authorization, leaders in the 
capital also need to consider the degree of perceived geopolitical risk associated with 
acquiring the territory, with lower perceived risk being associated with an increased 
likelihood of authorization. Thus, we should expect to observe most inadvertent expansion 
when leaders in the capital have relatively low control over their peripheral agents, and when 
there are few perceived geopolitical risks associated with expansion into a given territory. 




There are three alternative explanations that I consider alongside my own theory in 
examining the evidence that follows. The first, and most obvious, is what I’ve referred to as 
“strategic expansion,” the large body of theories introduced in Chapter 1 that see expansion 
Figure 2.1: Theory of Inadvertent Expansion 
 






























as a strategic activity and as directed by the leaders of powerful states.63 For the purpose of 
this dissertation, I remain fairly agnostic as to what exactly causes strategic expansion in any 
given case—be it opportunity, threat, domestic-political institutions, or individual-level 
factors. Rather, my interest here is in the extent to which a given observation of expansion 
can be reasonably classified as strategic or inadvertent. If many expansion observations 
occur due to decisions made by actors on the periphery, without the prior authorization of 
leaders in the capital, this will indicate that existing explanations embracing a strategic 
expansion concept are missing something important, which my theory will account for. 
I also have two additional alternative explanations that apply to each of the two stages of 
inadvertent expansion. The first, focused on unauthorized peripheral expansion, is state 
institutional weakness.64 Perhaps states with relatively weak institutions will have less control 
over their agents and populace, and this will make unauthorized peripheral expansion more 
likely. While control issues based on technology or civil-military relations can, in practice, be 
difficult to distinguish from the state’s institutional capacity, the quantitative evidence 
presented in Chapter 3 will allow the examination of the broad patterns of territorial 
expansion with respect to the strength or weakness of the state’s institutions. The second 
additional alternative explanation, focused on subsequent central authorization, is about 
 
63 Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 3; Randall 
Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 
1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107; Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998); Zakaria, From Wealth to Power; Stephen Van Evera, The Causes of 
War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), ch. 6; Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack 
and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security, Vol. 
28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 45-83; Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, 
Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, ch. 2; Dan Altman, “The Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Norm of 
Territorial Integrity,” International Organization, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Summer 2020), pp. 490-522. 
64 On state institutional strength and expansion, see: See: Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 
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leader interests.65 Perhaps leaders, faced with territorial faits accomplis presented by their 
peripheral agents, simply accept the territories they want and reject those they don’t. If there 
are cases in which leaders want territories that they can’t have, due to geopolitical risk, or 
cases in which leaders don’t want territories that they end up with, due to domestic political 
pressure or honor concerns, this would be evidence against a simple interests-based 
argument for subsequent central authorization. These alternative explanations will be 
considered alongside the theory of inadvertent expansion in the empirical chapters ahead. 
However, it is important to clarify the relationship between my theory and these existing 
explanations. I am not putting forth a general theory of territorial expansion that should be 
tested across all of world political history in a “three-cornered fight” against rival 
explanations.66 While some existing explanations clearly capture more of the evidence than 
others, my claim is not that the existing literature “gets territorial expansion wrong” in each 
and every case. My more modest claim, rather, is that there is an important subset of cases of 
territorial expansion that strategic expansion theories cannot fully account for, and that these 
instances display patterns of behavior that indicate a general phenomenon befitting its own 





65 On interests and expansion, see: Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit.” 
66 The three corners being two competing theories and the evidence. See: Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 115. 
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In the chapters that follow, the theory of inadvertent expansion will be illustrated with, and 
tested against, both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Defining the relevant 
counterfactual of inadvertent expansion is no simple task.67 If the outcome of interest is 
inadvertent expansion, is the relevant counterfactual strategic expansion, with the most 
important variation being between forms of expansion? Is it considered-but-not-executed 
territorial expansion?68 Is it non-expansion? Or is it what might be termed inadvertent non-
expansion; essentially, unauthorized peripheral expansion with leaders in the capital rejecting 
the fait accompli at the subsequent central authorization stage? A further complication is that 
some of these counterfactuals, particularly considered-but-not-executed expansion and 
inadvertent non-expansion, are not easily observable in the empirical record.69 For most 
historians and in most histories, these are essentially “non-events.” Thus, given the subject 
matter of this project, defining and observing the relevant counterfactual poses serious 
challenges. 
 What I’ve decided upon is to examine two counterfactuals. The first, which I examine in 
Chapter 3, is variation between forms of expansion: strategic and inadvertent. This helps 
deal with the problem of the non-observability of the counterfactual condition, and gives the 
reader a sense of what is distinctive about inadvertent expansion within the broader universe 
of cases of territorial expansion by the great powers. The second counterfactual, which I 
 
67 On the importance of counterfactuals to causal explanation, see: James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and 
Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169-195. See also: 
Jack S. Levy, “Counterfactuals and Case Studies,” in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David 
Collier, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 627-
644. 
68 This is the approach Zakaria takes. See: Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 54-55. 
69 Zakaria gets around this by examining a single great power over the course of 43 years. See: Zakaria, From 
Wealth to Power, pp. 54-55. 
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examine in Chapters 4 through 8, is variation between inadvertent expansion and inadvertent 
non-expansion. This is much closer to the specific variation explained by the theory, giving 
the reader a stronger sense of what explains leaders’ choices when faced with similar 
inadvertent expansion opportunities. 
 This is a mixed-methods study of inadvertent expansion, making use of both quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The quantitative component, which is confined to Chapter 3, 
presents and analyzes new data on all instances of great power territorial expansion from 
1816 to 2014. Each expansion observation is coded as to whether it is inadvertent or 
strategic, and this variation provides the primary basis for comparison. The purposes of the 
quantitative component are three-fold. First, to give the reader a sense of the generality of 
the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion by presenting the entire universe of cases. 
Second, to present basic descriptive statistics regarding inadvertent expansion, and to 
illuminate some of the broad patterns the phenomenon displays over space and time. And 
third, to analyze the data using statistical modeling techniques, in order to show support for 
some of the claims made in the theory of inadvertent expansion laid out above. The 
quantitative component mainly shows what is distinctive about inadvertent expansion within 
the universe of great power territorial expansion observations. 
 The qualitative component, which is presented in Chapters 4 through 8, consists of a 
series of paired theory-testing case studies of inadvertent expansion (and non-expansion) by 
the great powers between 1818 and 1932.70 Each of Chapters 4 through 8 includes a detailed 
case of inadvertent expansion, as well as a “negative” case of inadvertent non-expansion. 
 
70 On the different types of case studies, see: Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 74-76. 
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Including cases of both expansion and non-expansion helps mitigate the risk of selection 
bias that might result from including only one or the other.71  
With the historical cases, I implement two staples of qualitative social-scientific methods: 
the comparative method and process tracing. First, the inclusion of five pairs of cases allows 
me to engage in a controlled comparison across cases.72 This is accomplished by comparing 
cases of inadvertent expansion with cases of inadvertent non-expansion, in order to show 
that the outcomes covary with the key explanatory variables highlighted by the theory. 
Second, in each case I also engage in process tracing, providing ground-level evidence of the 
argument and its causal mechanisms at work in practice.73 While the controlled comparison 
provides evidence that the causes and outcome vary in the manner specified by the theory, 
process tracing shows that the outcomes are produced for the reasons specified by the 
theory.74 While this qualitative component provides evidence for all parts of the theory, its 
primary value-added is in addressing the question of why leaders in the capital agree to 
accept the territorial fait accompli of their peripheral agents in some cases, but not others. 
 Finally, a few words on scope conditions and case selection. I focus solely on the great 
powers from 1816 to the present. This is not to suggest that minor powers haven’t or don’t 
engage in inadvertent expansion, as they most certainly have and do.75 But as I detail in 
 
71 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative 
Politics,” Political Analysis, Vol. 2 (1990), pp. 131-150; Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 128-139. 
72 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, chs. 3, 8. 
73 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, ch. 10; Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 
“Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices,” in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, 
eds., Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 3-38. 
74 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 
Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008), pp. 10-11. 
75 On Israel, see: Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 (New 
York: Times Books, 2006); Peter Krause and Ehud Eiran, “How Human Boundaries Become State Borders: 
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Chapter 3, I have limited the empirical scope to the great powers because they do most of 
the territorial expansion, their expansion is most consequential, and the historical record for 
these actors is most complete. I have also limited my temporal scope to the post-Napoleonic 
(1816- ) international system. This is similarly not intended to suggest that inadvertent 
expansion is a strictly modern phenomenon. In fact, given the importance of weak central 
control over the periphery to inadvertent expansion, it is likely to be more common the 
farther back we go in time. However, for reasons of empirical tractability and to build off of 
existing data collection efforts, I focus only on the post-1815 period. 
 In terms of the actual cases, they were selected with two broad goals in mind: to generate 
a broad and representative sample, and to facilitate controlled comparison across cases.76 
First, I include ten cases,77 as well as at least one from each of the seven great powers that 
have experienced inadvertent expansion.78 The inclusion of this many cases both increases 
the representativeness of the sample selected, and helps illustrate the generalizability of the 
theory.79 In the appendix to this dissertation, I include the results of a balance test between 
the cases selected and the broader population of inadvertent expansion observations, which 
 
Radical Flanks and Territorial Control in the Modern Era,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 2018), pp. 
479-499. 
76 On case selection, see: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 139-149; John Gerring, Social 
Science Methodology: A Critical Framework (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 163-199 Andrew 
Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political 
Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 2007), pp. 172-178; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, pp. 
83-84. 
77 Eleven, if the illustrative case of the United Kingdom in Sind in Chapter 1 is included. 
78 The United States (Chapter 4), the United Kingdom (Chapter 1), France (Chapter 6), Germany (Chapter 8), 
Italy (Chapter 7), Russia (Chapter 5), and Japan (Chapter 7). 
79 Though, this obviously involves a trade-off of breadth for depth. On the value of increasing the number of 
cases included, see: King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, ch. 6; Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 
pp. 165-171, 181-183. 
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shows that the sample is relatively well-balanced on most important variables.80 The cases 
included, furthermore, cover over a century of history,81 occur in five of six world regions,82 
and show considerable variation in terms of the great power’s domestic political regime 
type,83 its continental- or maritime-orientation,84 its relative power,85 and whether the 
expansion itself is an extension of state borders or overseas empire.86 All of this variation 
should boost our confidence that the theory, and the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion 
more broadly, is not simply the product of a particular actor or a particular context.87 
Second, cases were selected to facilitate controlled comparison and to highlight important 
aspects of the theory.88 Each of Chapters 4 through 8 consists of a pair of highly-comparable 
cases. For instance, Chapter 4 includes a pair of U.S. cases in which it is the same great 
power, operating in the same region, in roughly the same time period, but with divergent 
 
80 See: Table A2.1. For full details regarding variable definitions and operationalizations, see Chapter 3. 
81 From the U.S. in Florida (1818) to Japan in Manchuria (1932). 
82 The Western Hemisphere (Chapter 4), Europe (Chapter 7), Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 8), South and 
Central Asia (Chapter 5), and the Asia-Pacific (Chapters 6 and 7). 
83 Including the reasonably-democratic France; the mixed-regime United States, United Kingdom, and Italy; 
and the autocratic Germany, Japan, and Russia. 
84 Including the United Kingdom and Japan as maritime powers and Russia and the (early) U.S. as continental 
powers. 
85 Including the mid-19th century United Kingdom, at the peak of its power, as well as the “barely-great” early-
19th century United States, interwar Italy, and early-1930s Japan. 
86 Including Russia, the United States, and Italy for the extension of the state’s borders, and the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan for overseas empire. 
87 This is what McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly refer to as an “uncommon foundations” research strategy: Doug 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 81-83. See also Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the 
Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War,” 
International Organization, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 2018), pp. 604-605. 
88 Gerring, Social Science Methodology, pp. 174-178; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, pp. 83-
84; Bennett and Elman, “Case Study Methods,” pp. 174-175; Levy, “Case Studies,” pp. 10-11. 
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outcomes. What is notable about these U.S. cases is that it is also the very same individual—
Andrew Jackson—that is the peripheral agent in one case (Florida) but the leader in the 
capital in the other (Texas). This allows us to control, to some extent, for any potential 
idiosyncrasies associated with the United States, the earlier-19th century, America’s southern 
frontier, or with Jackson himself (of which there are many). Having Jackson figure 
prominently in both cases also well-illustrates the notion of the “view from the frontier” and 
the “view from the capital,” showing how it manifests in the very same individual in both 
positions. Chapter 5 consists of a pair of Russian cases in which it is the same great power, 
operating in the same region, separated by only five years, and, notably, nearly all of the same 
leaders in the capital across the two cases, yet with divergent outcomes. Chapter 6 includes a 
pair of French cases that also involve the same great power, operating in the same region, 
dealing with the very same territorial entity (Tonkin), separated by only a decade, and an 
almost-identical process of peripheral expansion, yet leading to divergent outcomes. Chapter 
6 is, in some ways, a pair of comparative cases, yet in other ways, a single longitudinal case.89 
Chapter 7 involves the only cross-great power comparison, presenting one Japan case and 
one Italy case, but they are very well matched on many important factors—such as relative 
power, time period, domestic political regime type, and the proximity of the expansion to 
their respective capitals. And Chapter 8 includes a pair of German cases involving the same 
great power, operating in the same region, separated by only five years, and, in these cases, 
involving the very same peripheral agent across the two cases, but with variation in the 
outcomes. This, again, allows us to control for a number of potential confounds by 
effectively holding many factors constant. 
 
89 On longitudinal control techniques, see: Bennett and Elman, “Case Study Methods,” p. 176; George and 
Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, pp. 166-167 & ch. 9. 
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It is finally worth noting that, while the quantitative data presented in Chapter 3 includes 
both armed conquest and political annexation, the qualitative component is primarily 
focused armed conquest, with only a single chapter—Germany in East Africa (Chapter 8)—
including cases of annexation. This is partly because these cases tend to be the most 
consequential, but primarily in order to facilitate comparisons across cases. In short, the 
cases were selected and structured to enable a “most similar” comparison within each 
chapter, and a “most different” comparison across the chapters. The within-chapter 
comparisons increase our confidence that the variation in outcomes is explained by the 
factors specified by the theory, and the across-chapter comparisons help indicate the 
generalizability of the theory.90 
*** 
In this chapter, I have introduced the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion and put forth a 
theory that explains its occurrence in the modern history of great power politics. What 
remains is to examine the theory in light of an abundance of quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. It is to this task that I now turn. 
 
90 Bennett and Elman, “Case Study Methods,” pp. 174-175; Levy, “Case Studies,” pp. 10-11; George and 




PATTERNS OF INADVERTENT EXPANSION, 1816-2014 
 
This chapter discusses the broad patterns of strategic and inadvertent expansion over the 
course of the past two centuries. The purposes of this chapter are three-fold. First, to give 
the reader a sense of the generality of the phenomenon of inadvertent expansion by 
presenting the entire universe of cases. Drawing on new data on great power territorial 
expansion from 1816 to the present, I show inadvertent expansion to be a surprisingly 
general phenomenon in the history of great power politics, occurring in almost one-in-four 
cases of territorial expansion. A second purpose is to present basic descriptive statistics 
regarding inadvertent expansion, and to illuminate some of the broad patterns the 
phenomenon displays over space and time. The data collected shows that inadvertent 
expansion exhibits considerable variation by great power actor, time period, region, and 
many other factors. The third purpose of the chapter is to statistically analyze the data in 
order to show support for some of the central claims made in the theory of inadvertent 
expansion laid out in Chapter 2. The analysis suggests that great power territorial expansion 
is more likely to be inadvertent rather than strategic under conditions of relatively low 
control by the capital over the periphery, and when geopolitical risk is relatively low. Overall, 
the chapter shows what is distinctive about inadvertent expansion within the broader universe 
of great power territorial expansion observations. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by introducing the data I collected on great 
power territorial expansion from 1816 to 2014. Second, I present some basic descriptive 
statistics to support the claim that inadvertent expansion is a general phenomenon. Third, I 
present and discuss the results of a linear probability model that supports the argument that 
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inadvertent expansion is most likely to occur under conditions of low control by the capital 
over the periphery, and low geopolitical risk. Finally, I conclude the chapter by reviewing its 
findings and previewing what lays ahead. 
 
Data 
In order to get a better understanding of the conditions under which inadvertent expansion 
occurs, I collected data on territorial expansion by the great powers between 1816 and the 
present. I made use of a wide variety of sources in compiling the data, including existing data 
on the topic, encyclopedias, historical dictionaries and chronologies, historical surveys, in-
depth histories, and even primary source documents when necessary.1  
The most detailed and comprehensive existing data on territorial expansion is the 
Correlates of War’s (COW) “Territorial Change Data,” collected by Jaroslav Tir, Philip 
Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz.2 Despite the immense value and important 
contribution of the Territorial Change data, I didn’t simply take it “off the shelf” and rely on 
it for two reasons. First, some opacity in the data itself made it difficult to identify each-and-
every observation of expansion in the data, and therefore to build off of their coding, even 
when relying upon the same source material. And second, in the course of research I came 
across a number of observations that, as best I could tell, aren’t included in the Territorial 
 
1 An online appendix accompanying this dissertation includes the full list of observations, brief narratives for 
each observation, coding justification for key variables, and citations of all the sources relied upon. See the 
author’s website: https://campuspress.yale.edu/nickanderson/data/.  
2 Territorial Change Data (v5.0). Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Gary Goertz, “Territorial 
Changes, 1816-1996: Procedures and Data,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1998), pp. 89-
97. Available online at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/territorial-change 
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Change data,3 and therefore the data presented here provides a more complete picture of the 
history of great power territorial expansion. 
The unit of analysis for the data is the great power expansion observation. So, for 
instance, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in May 1936 is considered a single observation. In 
Chapter 2, I defined expansion as the coercive acquisition of foreign territory that is 
intended to be long-term or permanent for the expanding state. In accordance with this 
definition, expansion observations had to meet five criteria to be included in the data set. 
First, the expansion observations had to be coercive in nature. Thus, voluntary purchases, 
transfers, and trades of territory are not included in the data.4 Second, the territory acquired 
had to be foreign at the time of acquisition. Various forms of domestic expansion—such as 
expropriation, counterinsurgency campaigns, and territorial pacification—are therefore not 
included in the data.5 Third, the territory had to be inhabited or claimed by another political 
entity. Genuine terra nullius claims are not included in the data.6 Fourth, the territorial 
acquisition had to be non-temporary, at least in its intent. Cases of temporary military 
occupation are not included in the data.7 Finally, the expansion observation had to be carried 
 
3 This is hardly surprising, given that the Territorial Change data covers the entire globe, whereas I focus 
narrowly on the nine great powers. 
4 Cases such as the U.S. purchase of Alaska in 1867 are not included on this basis. 
5 Cases from the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the 19th century are not included on this basis, as the 
territory had been formally ceded to Russia by Persia in 1828. 
6 Claims of various uninhabited small islands and reefs, as well as territorial claims in Antarctica, are not 
included on this basis. 




to its full fruition. Cases where expansion was attempted-but-not-completed, as well as those 
where it was considered-but-not-attempted, are not included in the data.8  
This fifth and final criterion suggests that a more accurate term for the unit of analysis 
would be the successful great power expansion observation. On the one hand, only including 
successful cases introduces the risk of “selection bias” in the quantitative data, since the 
cases in which expansion succeeds may differ in important ways from those where it fails (or 
is not even attempted), and therefore may not be representative of the phenomenon as a 
whole.9 On the other hand, the data collection effort was already substantial, involving 
traversing the histories of nine great powers over the course, in some cases, of two hundred 
years. And given the difficulties of observing “attempted” and “considered” expansion 
discussed in Chapter 2, I think this is simply a problem to be aware of, and in light of which 
the results should be interpreted, not one that can be readily solved. Five unsuccessful cases 
of inadvertent expansion—where faits accomplis were presented by peripheral actors but 
rejected by leaders in the capital due to perceptions of geopolitical risk—are given detailed 
qualitative examination in Chapters 4 through 8. 
I have restricted the empirical scope of the data to the great powers from 1816 to the 
present. I limit my focus to the great powers for three reasons.10 First, the great powers do 
 
8 Cases such as the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 are not included on this basis. 
9 James D. Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5-29. 
Zakaria includes attempts and considerations in his study, though he is only examining a single great power (the 
U.S.) over the course of 43 years. See: Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s 
World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 54-55. Dan Altman has impressively compiled 
global conquest data that also includes attempts, though it only begins in 1918. See: Dan Altman, “The 
Evolution of Territorial Conquest after 1945 and the Limits of the Norm of Territorial Integrity,” International 
Organization, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Summer 2020), pp. 490-522. 
10 I use the Correlates of War’s (COW) State System Membership data on “Major Powers” to indicate the 
identity and the tenure of the great powers, with a few modifications. Correlates of War Project. 2017. “State 
System Membership List, v2016.” Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. The great powers are defined 
as follows (modifications are underlined): USA (1816-2014), UK (1816-1945), France (1816-1940), 
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most of the territorial expansion. According to the Territorial Change data, great powers 
account for 67 percent of all conquest, annexation, and conflict-related cession observations. 
Second, territorial expansion by the great powers tends to be more consequential. As just 
one possible indicator of “consequence,” the Territorial Change data suggests that great 
power expansion accounts for 72 percent of the territorial area gained and 45 percent of the 
population gained through conquest, annexation, and coercive cession.11 And third, the 
empirical record is most complete for the great powers, and reliably coding expansion as 
inadvertent or strategic often requires a great deal of in-depth historical research. 
Altogether, I collected 250 observations of territorial expansion by the great powers 
between 1816 and 2014. For each observation I include a set of variables with basic 
information about the event in question. For the purpose of this dissertation, the most 
important of these is Inadvertent—a dichotomous variable indicating whether the expansion 
observation is inadvertent or not (and therefore, implicitly “strategic”). As outlined in 
Chapter 2, I consider an expansion observation to be inadvertent when it is planned and 
executed by actors on the periphery, without the knowledge or authorization of leaders in 
the capital. My basic coding procedure for each observation was to seek out information on 
who specifically ordered the territorial acquisition in question. When I found evidence in the 
historical record that the acquisition was ordered or authorized by leaders in the capital—the 
chief executive or key members of the security apparatus, including the foreign minister, 
 
Prussia/Germany (1816-1945), Austria-Hungary (1816-1918), Italy (1860-1943), Russia/Soviet Union (1816-
2014), China (1950-2014), Japan (1868-1945). 
11 This is how Goertz and Diehl operationalize the importance of a given piece of territory. See: Gary Goertz 
and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 66-67. 
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defense minister, or colonial minister—I considered the observation strategic.12 When I 
found at least two sources indicating that the territory was acquired without the prior 
authorization of any of these leaders in the capital, I coded the observation as inadvertent.13 
For three reasons, who ordered a given territorial acquisition is often a surprisingly-
difficult piece of information to uncover. First, in writing on territorial expansion and empire 
in both history and political science, process tends to be brushed over in favor of causes and 
consequences.14 That is, scholars usually focus on why a piece of territory was acquired, or how it 
was governed after acquisition, but the actual process of acquisition tends to get far less attention. 
A second issue is the widespread personification of the state or empire, which is also 
common in both history and the broader social sciences.15 Frequent references to “Russia,” 
“Japan,” or “the British Empire” acquiring various territories obscure the nature of the 
specific actors involved, as well as the authorities under which they were operating. 
Relatedly, many scholars operate with implicit (or explicit) rational and unitary assumptions 
of the state, which can encourage post-hoc reasoning and reliance upon “revealed 
preferences”—they acquired the territory, so they must have wanted to. Third, the historical 
record on many of these cases is very thin. Cases of inadvertent expansion are often less 
dramatic than their strategic counterparts, and therefore tend to receive less attention in 
 
12 In wartime, I also include the military high command among those whose orders make an observation 
“strategic.” 
13 This “two-source standard” is met in all but three observations of inadvertent expansion. In many cases, I 
draw on considerably more sources in an effort to mitigate the risk of bias in individual historical sources. See: 
Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of 
Selection Bias,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 605-618. 
14 Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996), pp. 167-192. 
15 For a discussion and defense, see: Alexander Wendt, “The State as a Person in International Theory,” Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 289-316. 
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historical research. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 2, the leaders who experience 
inadvertent expansion often have incentives to cover these episodes up, so as to not appear 
incompetent or out-of-control, and may suppress, distort, or even destroy records of events. 
It seems likely, therefore, that inadvertent expansion is even more common than I have been 
able to uncover here. 
Thus, coding expansion observations as either strategic or inadvertent is often both time-
consuming and challenging. As a result, I’ve coded the vast majority, though not the entirety, 
of the great power expansion observations with respect to whether they were inadvertent or 
strategic. Table 3.1 (below) summarizes the completeness of the inadvertent expansion 
coding by great-power actor. 
Table 3.1: Missing Data on Inadvertent Expansion by 
Great Power 
Actor Years Coded/Total Observations 
USA 1816-2014 12/12 (100%) 
U.K. 1816-1945 74/78 (95%) 
France 1816-1940 47/52 (90%) 
Germany 1816-1945 26/26 (100%) 
Austria 1816-1918 3/3 (100%) 
Italy 1860-1943 18/18 (100%) 
Russia 1816-2014 33/34 (97%) 
China 1950-2014 3/3 (100%) 
Japan 1868-1945 24/24 (100%) 
Total  240/250 (96%) 
 
Besides whether the expansion was inadvertent, each observation includes the Year and 
Month in which it took place, the identity of the gaining great power (Gainer), the territorial 
Entity acquired, and the Region in which the observation occurred.16 I also include the 
 
16 I define regions broadly, dividing the world into just six regions: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North Africa, South & Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. Region 
classification derived from: Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: 
Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2004), pp. 133-
154 (Region data no longer available online). 
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dichotomous variable Annexation, which indicates whether the territorial entity was acquired 
via annexation or, by default, conquest. Following the Territorial Change data, and in line 
with international-legal definitions, I consider expansion to be annexation when territory is 
acquired primarily through diplomacy, and I consider expansion to be conquest when 
territory is acquired primarily through the use of military force.17 
The theory presented in Chapter 2 argues that inadvertent expansion should be more 
likely when leaders in the capital have low levels of control over their peripheral agents, and 
in situations where they perceive relatively low levels of geopolitical risk. In order to capture 
the concept of control over the periphery, I include the variable Telegraph, which is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the territorial entity acquired was connected to the 
global telegraph network at the time of acquisition.18 The idea here is that, if there was a 
telegraph station in the territory at the time of acquisition, this would allow leaders in the 
great power capital to rapidly communicate with any of their agents in and around the 
territory, and thereby better monitor and potentially control their behavior.19 Another 
variable included to get at the concept of control is Extra_regional, a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether the territorial entity acquired is outside of the great power’s own region. 
The idea here is that, all else equal, agents within a great power’s own region are easier to 
 
17 Territorial Change Data (v5.0), “Territorial Change Coding Manual,” p. 3; Marcelo G. Kohen, “Conquest” in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015). Available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/home/MPIL.  
18 See the online appendix to this dissertation for full coding details. Much of the telegraph data is from: Bill 
Glover, “Cable Timeline: 1845-2018” in History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications (2021), 
Available at: https://atlantic-cable.com/; Anton A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications 
(Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), ch. 8, Appendix A. 
19 On the importance of the telegraph in imperial history, see: Paul M. Kennedy, “Imperial Cable 
Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914,” The English Historical Review, Vol. 86, NO. 341 (Oct. 1971), pp. 728-
752; Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981), Ch. 11. 
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control than those in other regions. A third, more granular, measure that I include along 
these lines is the Distance of the entity acquired from the great power’s capital.20 This, again, 
is on the assumption that, all else equal, actors in more distant territories should be more 
difficult to control than those in more proximate territories. 
I also include two variables meant to capture the second factor, perceived geopolitical 
risk. While, according to the theory of inadvertent expansion, this factor mainly influences 
the second step of subsequent central authorization, it is worth seeing if there are broad 
differences between strategic and inadvertent expansion with respect to geopolitical risk. 
Building off of arguments made by Colin Elman and Randall Schweller, I construct the 
dichotomous variable Risky.21 I consider territorial expansion to be risky when it is onto: 1) 
the territory, at home or abroad, of another great power, 2) territory adjacent to a great 
power’s national borders, 3) the territory of a state allied with another great power,22 and/or 
4) the territory of a regional power—a large and relatively powerful state that doesn’t meet 
the typical threshold of great power status.23 I also consider expansion to be risky when it is 
in violation of a prior agreement with another great power on the territorial integrity of the 
 
20 Distance refers to “Great-Circle” or orthodromic distance, measured in kilometers. It is measured using the 
“Measure distance” tool in Google Maps to ensure as accurate a measure between locations as possible. See: 
Google Maps (2021). https://www.google.com/maps. 
21 Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies, Vol. 6, 
No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 28-29; Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 112-113. 
22 I use the Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provision (ATOP) data, as well as the Correlates of War’s Formal 
Alliances data, as measures of formal alliances. See: ATOP v4.01. Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara 
McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” 
International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2002), pp. 237-260. Available at: http://www.atopdata.org/; Formal 
Alliances (v4.1). Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008 (Washington: CQ Press, 2009). 
Available at: https://correlatesofwar.org/. 
23 Examples of regional powers include Mexico, Austria (post-1918), Spain, Romania, the Ottoman Empire, 
Egypt, China (pre-1950), and Taiwan (post-1949). 
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entity in question. A related variable that I include is the dichotomous variable Conflict, which 
indicates whether the expansion observation is part of a broader conflict. I consider 
expansion to be part of a broader conflict when it is undertaken during, and as part of, a 
broader war, or when it took place in the immediate aftermath, and as a direct result of, a 
broader war.24 
I also include a number of variables that can be thought of as controls for other plausible 
explanations for inadvertent expansion. First, I include two measures of the capacity of the 
state’s institutions. As noted in Chapter 2, it seems plausible that relatively-weak states may 
be more likely to experience inadvertent expansion, since they have smaller central state 
apparatuses and less capacity to monitor their agents at any distance from the capital. The 
first of these is the great power’s “information capacity” (Info_cap), an annual index that 
measures the state’s ability to collect and process reliable information about its population 
and territory.25 The second of these is the central government’s total revenue as a percentage 
of its Gross National Product (GNP, Rev_GNP). This is a measure of the state’s fiscal 
capacity, and is a standard measure of state institutional capacity in political science.26  
 
24 For the purpose of this variable, I consider wars as being those conflicts included in the Correlates of War’s 
“Inter-state”, “Intra-state”, and “Extra-state” war lists. See: “COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0).” Meredith 
Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 - 2007 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
25 The measure combines information on whether the state has a regular census, a regularly-published statistical 
yearbook, a population registry, and a statistical agency. See: Thomas Brambor, Agustin Goenaga, Johannes 
Lindvall, and Jan Teorell, “The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State,” Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), pp. 175-213. Data available at: http://www.stanceatlund.org/.  
26 Data from: “G6 Asia: Central Government Revenue with Some Main Tax Yields” (pp. 1743-1772), “J1 Asia: 
National Account Totals” (pp. 1992-2000),” “J1 North America: National Accounts Totals” (pp. 3273-3308), 
“G6 North America: Central Government Revenue, with Some Main Tax Yields” (pp. 3153-3171), “G6 
Europe: Central Government Revenue and Main Tax Yields” (pp. 4672-4733), and “J1 Europe: National 
Account Totals” (pp. 4818-4875) in International Historical Statistics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
Available at: https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057%2F978-1-137-30568-8. Russian GNP data for 
1885-1913 from: Paul R. Gregory, Russian National Income, 1885-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), ch. 3 (tables 3.1 & 3.2, pp. 56-59). 
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Finally, I include two controls that are standard in the international relations literature. First, 
I include the dichotomous variable Democracy, which indicates whether the expanding great 
power has a Polity score of 6 or greater at the time of acquisition.27 There is an enormous 
literature in international relations pointing to the unique foreign policy behavior of 
democratic states. And it is at least plausible that, allowing more individual liberty for their 
citizens and being more subject to popular pressures, democracies may be more likely to 
experience inadvertent expansion. Second, I include the great power’s Composite Index of 
National Capabilities (CINC) score, a standard measure of relative power.28 Again, many  
Table 3.2: Great Power Territorial Expansion Data Variables 
Year The year in which the expansion observation occurred 
Month The month in which the expansion observation occurred 
Gainer The actor engaging in expansion 
Entity The territorial entity gained 
Region The region in which the expansion observation occurred 
Inadvertent Indicates whether the expansion was inadvertent (1/0) 
Annexation Indicates whether expansion took the form of annexation (1/0) 
Telegraph Indicates whether the entity was connected to the global telegraph network at 
the time of acquisition (1/0) 
Extra_regional Indicates whether the entity is in a region outside of the great power’s own 
region (1/0) 
Distance Distance (km) from the great power’s capital to the entity in question 
Risky Indicates whether the expansion involved significant risk (1/0) 
Conflict Indicates whether the expansion took place as part of a broader conflict (1/0) 
Info_cap The great power’s capacity to collect reliable information about its population 
and territory 
Rev_GNP State revenue as a percentage of its Gross National Product 
Democracy Indicates whether the great power has a Polity2 score of 6 or greater (1/0) 
CINC The great power’s Composite Index of National Capabilities score 
 
27 Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, 
“Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018,” Center for Systemic Peace 
(2019). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
28 National Material Capabilities (v5.0). J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability 
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965,” in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 19-48. Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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theories in international relations point to relative power as an important explanatory factor 
for a variety of foreign policy outcomes, so it is accounted for here. All of these variables 
and their definitions are listed in Table 3.2 (above). 
Descriptive Statistics 
The data collected shows inadvertent expansion to be a surprisingly-general phenomenon. 
Of the 240 cases of great power territorial expansion that I’ve coded as either inadvertent or 
strategic, a total of 56—or 23 percent—are inadvertent. This point, I think, deserves 
emphasis: in the modern history of great power politics, approximately one-in-four cases of 
territorial expansion are the result of decisions made by actors without the authority to make 
them. Thus, in about a quarter of cases of territorial expansion by the great powers, there is a 
complete disconnect between the intentions of the leaders in charge and the states that they 
are supposedly in charge of. And the kinds of territories acquired in this manner run the 
gamut, from tiny islands in the South Pacific—such as France’s annexation of Tahiti in 
1842—to large swathes of territory containing tens of millions of people—such as Japan’s 





Table 3.3: Cases of Inadvertent Expansion 
Great Power Date Territory Great Power Date Territory 
United States 1818/5 Florida  1880/6 Gabon 
    1880/9 Congo 
United Kingdom 1818/6 Maratha Empire  1883/2 Southern French Sudan 
 1819/2 Singapore  1883/8 Annam 
 1825/12 Upper Burma  1883/8 Tonkin 
 1842/4 Chatham Islands  1893/4 Northern French Sudan 
 1843/3 Sind  1894/8 Ubangi-Shari 
 1846/2 Eastern Punjab  1900/4 Chad 
 1847/12 Xhosa Territory  1904/6 Eastern Morocco 
 1848/2 Orange River Territory  1914/8 Togoland 
 1849/3 Punjab  1916/1 Cameroon 
 1852/12 Lower Burma    
 1857/3 Keeling (Cocos) Islands Germany 1884/4 South West Africa 
 1874/4 Western Peninsular Malaya  1884/5 Togoland 
 1874/9 Fiji  1885/5 East Africa 
 1878/7 Xhosa Territory  1885/5 Wituland 
 1879/9 Zulu Kingdom    
 1884/11 Papua (New Guinea) Russia 1850/8 Amur Region 
 1888/5 North Borneo  1852/summer Ussuri Region 
 1890/9 Rhodesia  1864/9 Chimkent 
 1900/1 Northern Nigeria  1865/6 Tashkent 
 1914/8 Togoland  1866/5 Khujand 
    1868/6 Khanate of Bukhara 
France 1840 Nosy Be  1876/2 Khanate of Kokand 
 1841/4 Mayotte Island  1884/3 Merv 
 1842/8 Tahiti    
 1843/6 Coastal Gabon Japan 1914/10 Caroline Islands 
 1860/9 Senegal (part)  1914/10 Mariana Islands 
 1862/3 Obock  1914/10 Marshall Islands 
 1863/8 Cambodia  1932/2 Manchuria 




Besides being a regular occurrence, inadvertent expansion is a general phenomenon in 
other ways. First, there are cases of inadvertent expansion as early as 1818 and as late as 
1932, though, notably, it tends to occur in earlier years than strategic expansion. As shown in 
Figure 3.1 (below), inadvertent expansion is a regular occurrence throughout the 19th 
century and into the early 20th century, with a small cluster of observations during World 
War I. Strategic expansion, in contrast, is more common throughout, and sees increases in 
the late-19th century and during the two World Wars.29 
 
Second, a majority of the great powers experience inadvertent expansion, though, again, it 
is important to note that they vary considerably in the extent to which they do. As Table 3.4 
shows (below), France, the United Kingdom, and Russia top the list of great powers in terms 
of what percentage of their expansion is inadvertent. Japan, Germany, and the United States 
experienced moderate-to-low amounts of inadvertent expansion. And great powers such as 
Austria, Italy, and China have experienced none at all. 
 

































































































































































Table 3.4: Inadvertent Expansion by Great Power 
Actor Inadvertent/Total 
France 19/47 (40.4%) 
UK 20/74 (27.0%) 
Russia 8/33 (24.2%) 
Japan 4/24 (16.7%) 
Germany 4/26 (15.4%) 
USA 1/12 (8.3%) 
Austria 0/3 (0%) 
Italy 0/18 (0%) 
China 0/3 (0%) 
Total 56/240 (23.3%) 
 
Third, inadvertent expansion occurs in almost all world regions, though some regions 
experience a lot more than others. As Table 3.5 (below) shows, Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
& Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific see significant amounts of inadvertent expansion, 
whereas the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East & North Africa, and Europe see little-to-
none. 
Table 3.5: Inadvertent Expansion by Region 
Region Inadvertent/Total 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24/62 (38.7%) 
South & Central Asia 10/26 (38.5%) 
Asia-Pacific 20/84 (23.8%) 
Western Hemisphere 1/7 (14.3%) 
Middle East & North Africa 1/16 (7.7%) 
Europe 0/45 (0%) 
 
In sum, inadvertent expansion occurs in nearly one-in-four cases of great power territorial 
expansion, a wide variety of territories have been acquired in this manner, it covers over a 
century of history, it is experienced by a majority of the great powers, and it occurs in almost 
all world regions. It is, therefore, a general phenomenon. However, the questions that 
primarily concern this dissertation are when and why it occurs. As noted above, I’ve argued 
that two factors are central to the process: control by leaders in the capital over their 
peripheral agents, and perceptions of geopolitical risk associated with acquisition. The key 
variables here are Telegraph and Risky. If the theory of inadvertent expansion is correct, with 
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respect to the telegraph, we should expect to see less inadvertent expansion in cases where 
there is a telegraph station in the territory at the time of acquisition, and more inadvertent 
expansion in cases where there is not a telegraph station in the territory at the time of 
acquisition. With respect to risk, we should expect to see less inadvertent expansion in cases 
that are risky, and more inadvertent expansion in cases that are not risky. Figure 3.2 (below) 
presents two difference-in-means comparisons. 
Figure 3.2: The Telegraph, Risk, & Inadvertent Expansion 
  
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Significance testing conducted using bivariate linear regression 
analysis with robust standard errors. 
 
As is clear, these theoretical expectations appear to be borne out. Starting with Telegraph, 
on the left-hand side, just shy of 10 percent of expansion observations are inadvertent in 
cases where there is a telegraph station in the territory at the time of acquisition. In contrast, 
whereas approximately 38 percent of observations are inadvertent in cases where there is not 
a telegraph station in the territory at the time of acquisition—a large and highly statistically-
significant difference. A similar pattern is evident with respect to Risk, on the right-hand 
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considerable risk, whereas approximately 34 percent of observations are inadvertent in cases 
that do not involve much risk—again, a rather large and statistically-significant difference. 
The average differences in value between strategic and inadvertent expansion for all the 
remaining variables are presented in Table 3.6 (below). As is clear, some variables see much 
greater differences than others across the two types of expansion. Variables such as Year, 
Telegraph, Extra_regional, Distance, Risky, and Conflict show considerable differences between 
strategic and inadvertent expansion. Based on these figures, it appears that inadvertent 
expansion is more likely: in earlier years; when the territorial entity is outside the great power’s 
home region, and; at a greater distance from the great power’s capital. It appears that 
inadvertent expansion is less likely, in contrast: when there is a telegraph station in or around 
the territorial entity acquired; when there is significant geopolitical risk associated with 
expansion, and; when the expansion is part of a broader conflict. 
Table 3.6: Strategic & Inadvertent Expansion by Variable 
Variable Range Ave. (strategic) Ave. (inadvertent) Difference n 
Year* 1816-2014 1894 1875 -19 240 
Gainer** 1-9 9 6 -3 240 
Region** 1-6 6 5 -1 240 
Annexation 0/1 0.35 0.45 0.10 240 
Telegraph 0/1 0.62 0.22 -0.40 235 
Extra_regional 0/1 0.55 0.77 0.22 240 
Distance (km) 206-18,817 5,367 6,948 1,582 240 
Risky 0/1 0.52 0.20 -0.32 240 
Conflict 0/1 0.57 0.39 -0.18 239 
Info_cap 0.13-0.9 0.64 0.59 -0.05 240 
Rev_GNP 1.2-67.9 14.6 10.7 -3.9 180 
Democracy 0/1 0.34 0.30 -0.04 240 
CINC 0.02-0.38 0.14 0.16 0.02 239 
* Median reported. 
** Count reported. 
 
Other variables, such as Annexation, show only mild differences between strategic and 
inadvertent expansion. It appears that inadvertent expansion may be somewhat more likely 
to take the form of annexation, though the difference is quite small. For the final variables, 
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there is either little difference between forms of expansion or it is difficult to tell based on 
the data. Neither Democracy nor CINC show a meaningful difference between strategic and 
inadvertent expansion. 
Particularly notable for its lack of variation is Information Capacity, the index measuring the 
state’s ability to collect and process information about its population and territory. In 
Chapter 2, I presented the state’s institutional capacity as a key alternative argument 
potentially explaining cases of inadvertent expansion. The fact that there is so little 
difference between these two forms of expansion with respect to information capacity 
should be seen as evidence against this alternative argument. And while at first glance it 
appears that there is a fairly large difference between strategic and inadvertent expansion 
with respect to Revenue as a percentage of GNP (Rev_GNP), for two reasons these figures 
are likely to be unreliable. First, there is a significant amount of missing data on this measure, 
with 25 percent of observations not included. Second, as a great deal of political science 
research has shown, revenue as a percentage of GNP is strongly correlated with time, 
increasing as the state institutions of the great powers increase their extractive capacities 
through the modern era.30 Thus, it is not at all clear that low state institutional capacity is 
associated with inadvertent expansion. 
 
Analysis 
These comparisons are certainly interesting, and even enlightening. But with the evidence 
presented so far, it is difficult to tell which factors most distinguish inadvertent and strategic 
expansion. Because some of these measures may be correlated with each other, and many are 
 
30 For a foundational work, see: Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, War and State Making: The Shaping of 
the Global Powers (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
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likely correlated with time, it is necessary to observe the independent relationship of each 
while conditioning on the others. This is the task I turn to now. 
 As noted above, the unit of analysis is the great power territorial expansion observation 
and the outcome of interest is Inadvertent, a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
expansion was inadvertent or not. Thus, the variation that is being analyzed here is between 
forms of expansion: inadvertent or strategic. In an ideal world, I would have data that 
includes all observations of inadvertent expansion as well as all cases of inadvertent non-
expansion—cases in which peripheral agents present territorial faits accomplis that are later 
rejected by leaders in the capital. This would provide a much more complete picture of the 
broad conditions under which inadvertent expansion opportunities arise, as well as when 
leaders accept and when they reject the fait accompli. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
cases of inadvertent non-expansion are not easily observable in the historical record, making 
comprehensive collection difficult. As a result, this quantitative analysis examines variation 
between forms of expansion. The qualitative case studies in the chapters that follow will take 
up the question of variation between acceptance and rejection of the fait accompli. 
The primary explanatory variables I include are Telegraph and Risky. One concern with the 
telegraph measure may be that it is simply a proxy for the passage of time, and inadvertent 
expansion is actually correlated with some other variable that is also associated with time. To 
try to deal with this concern, I include the Year in which the expansion observation occurred 
as a control variable. Another concern with the telegraph measure may be that it is simply a 
proxy for distance, since territories that are closer are likely to be telegraphically connected 
to the capital sooner than those that are more distant. To try to deal with this concern, I 
include Extra_regional as a control variable in the analysis. 
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As for geopolitical risk, one concern may be that it is simply picking up the difference 
between peacetime and wartime expansion. To try to address this concern, I also include 
Conflict as a control variable. I also assess the alternative argument of state institutional 
capacity presented in Chapter 2 by including Information Capacity as a control variable. Finally, 
I include Annexation, Democracy, and CINC as controls. The analysis is conducted using a 
linear probability model. In all cases, “robust” standard errors are reported in order to 
account for error heteroskedasticity. Table 3.7 (below) presents the results. 
Table 3.7: Linear Probability Analysis of Inadvertent 
Expansion 
=============================================== 
                        Dependent variable:     
                    --------------------------- 
                            inadvertent         
----------------------------------------------- 
telegraph                    -0.185**           
                              (0.084)           
                                                
risky                        -0.142**           
                              (0.068)           
                                                
year                          -0.001            
                              (0.001)           
                                                
extra_regional                 0.052            
                              (0.097)           
                                                
conflict                      -0.003            
                              (0.077)           
                                                
info_cap                      -0.064            
                              (0.236)           
                                                
democracy                     -0.039            
                              (0.071)           
                                                
gainer_cinc                   -0.495            
                              (0.362)           
                                                
annexation                    -0.105            
                              (0.074)           
                                                
----------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    233             
=============================================== 




As the results make clear, both the telegraph and geopolitical risk appear to be correlated 
with expansion being inadvertent rather than strategic, even when controlling for other 
factors, such as time, distance, and state institutional capacity. Even with these controls, 
observations of territorial expansion are almost 19 percent less likely to be inadvertent when 
there is a Telegraph in the territory acquired at the time of acquisition. Similarly, when the 
expansion observation involves considerable Risk, it appears to be 14 percent less likely to 
be inadvertent, even when controlling for these other factors. Both of these measures are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, and none of the other variables reach statistical 
significance. 
As a whole, the analysis suggests that two factors are most importantly associated with 
expansion being inadvertent rather than strategic. The first is the absence of a connection to 
the global telegraph network in the territorial entity acquired at the time of acquisition. The 
second is the geopolitical risk associated with the expansion observation in question. The 
great power’s information capacity, notably, does not seem to be correlated with expansion 
being strategic or inadvertent. 
 I ran a number of tests to see how robust these results are to alternative model 
specifications and variable inclusions. First, I reran the analysis using logistic regression 
rather than a linear probability model. The results are mostly unchanged, though here 
Telegraph is only significant at the 0.1 level.31 Second, I reran the analysis including Distance 
rather than Extra_regional as the distance control. The results are, again, unchanged, and 
Distance is not statistically significant.32 Third, instead of using Democracy as the great power’s 
 
31 See: Appendix Table A3.1. 
32 See: Appendix Table A3.2. 
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regime-type measure, I reran the analysis including an Autocracy indicator,33 a simple Polity2 
score, and a Varieties of Democracy Polyarchy score for electoral democracy.34 The results are 
unchanged, and none of the alternative regime-type measures reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance.35 In sum, the results are fairly robust. The presence or absence of 
rapid, modern communications in the form of a telegraph station, as well as relatively-low 




These results provide strong, though partial, support for the theory of inadvertent expansion 
presented in Chapter 2. First, the argument that inadvertent expansion is more likely when 
leaders in the capital lack adequate control over their agents on the periphery is supported by 
the analysis. The strongest predictor of when expansion is inadvertent rather than strategic is 
the absence of a globally-connected telegraph station in the territorial entity acquired at the 
time of acquisition. The presence of such a station is associated with a 29 percent reduction 
in the probability of expansion being inadvertent (see Figure 3.2), and this relationship 
holds even when conditioning on other plausible explanatory factors. As the evidence from 
this chapter suggest, and as will be illustrated in the historical case studies in the chapters 
ahead, the inability of leaders in the capital to rapidly and reliably communicate with, and 
 
33 Operationalized as a Polity2 score of -6 or less. 
34 Michael Coppedge, et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9,” Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) Project (2019). https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19; Daniel Pemstein, et al., “The V-Dem Measurement 
Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data,” V-Dem Working 
Paper, No. 21, 4th Ed. (2019), University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute. 
35 See: Appendix Table A3.3. 
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thereby monitor, their agents on the periphery plays a crucial role in the ability for peripheral 
agents to spring territorial faits accomplis upon them—what I refer to as unauthorized 
peripheral expansion. 
 Second, the argument that inadvertent expansion is more likely when leaders in the 
capital perceive little geopolitical risk associated with territorial acquisition is also supported 
by the analysis. The only other significant predictor of when expansion is inadvertent rather 
than strategic is the absence of geopolitical risk. The presence of such risk is associated with 
a 24 percent reduction in the probability of expansion being inadvertent (see Figure 3.2), 
and this result, too, holds even when conditioning on other explanatory variables. As these 
results indicate, and as will be further supported in the qualitative chapters to follow, 
perceptions of geopolitical risk among leaders in the capital will discourage them from 
accepting the territorial faits accomplis presented by their peripheral agents—what I refer to as 
subsequent central authorization. 
*** 
This chapter has provided a macroscopic perspective of the phenomenon of inadvertent 
expansion in world politics. In it, I introduced and analyzed new data on great power 
territorial expansion from 1816 to 2014. The chapter presented two central findings. First, 
inadvertent expansion is a surprisingly-general phenomenon. Far from being an occasional 
and obscure “accident of history,” it has been a regular feature of the modern history of 
great power politics. It occurs in nearly one-in-four cases of great power territorial 
expansion, spanning over one hundred years, from the early 19th century to well into the 20th 
century. It is carried out by six different great powers, from the sprawling British Empire to 
the late-modernizing and highly-centralized Imperial Germany. And a wide variety of 
territories have been acquired in this manner, from small islands in the South Pacific, to 
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topographically-forbidding central-African kingdoms, to densely-populated regions of East 
and Southeast Asia. 
 Second, the most important conditions under which inadvertent expansion is likely to 
occur is when the capital lacks sufficient control over its agents on the periphery, and when 
the acquisition in question involves little geopolitical risk. Expansion onto territorial entities 
that were not connected to the global telegraph network at the time of acquisition is 
significantly more likely to be inadvertent than expansion onto territories that were 
connected. Similarly, expansion in conditions involving little geopolitical risk is significantly 
more likely to be inadvertent than expansion in conditions involving considerable risk. Other 
factors—most notably, the state’s institutional capacity—do not appear to be related to the 
form territorial expansion takes. What this chapter has primarily accomplished is to present 
what is distinctive about inadvertent expansion within the broader universe of cases of 
territorial expansion, and these distinctions have been shown to be consistent with the 
theory of inadvertent expansion. 
 However, two caveats are necessary in closing. First, a lack of rapid communications 
technology is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for inadvertent expansion. There 
are twelve cases in the data of inadvertent expansion onto territories that are connected to 
the global telegraph network, showing that it can occur under conditions of modern 
communications technology.36 And there are 69 cases in the data of strategic expansion in 
the absence of a proximate telegraph station, indicating that great powers can still readily 
direct territorial expansion from the capital, without the aid of modern communications. 
 
36 The United Kingdom in: Western Peninsular Malaya (1874), North Borneo (1888), Northern Nigeria (1900), 
Togoland (1914). France in: Eastern Morocco (1904), Togoland (1914), Cameroon (1916). Russia in: Merv 




This also applies to geopolitical risk. There are eleven cases of inadvertent expansion in 
conditions that are objectively risky, showing that the existence of geopolitical risk is not a 
fool-proof guarantee of expansion being strategic.37 And there are eight cases of inadvertent 
expansion that are both onto territories with a global telegraph network connection and 
involve considerable geopolitical risk.38 However, what the evidence presented in this 
chapter does suggest, is that relatively low peripheral control by the capital and low 
geopolitical risk seem to make inadvertent expansion significantly more likely.  
The second caveat is that, as mentioned above, the structure of the data and the variation 
examined in the analysis are not ideal for testing the theory of inadvertent expansion as it is 
presented in Chapter 2. The ideal data would include, not only all cases of successful 
strategic and inadvertent expansion, but also all cases of unsuccessful strategic and inadvertent 
expansion. This would give us a much better sense of the universe of cases of inadvertent 
expansion opportunities—helping us deal with problems of selection bias—as well as allow us 
to quantitatively examine the variation between acceptances and rejections of the fait accompli 
by leaders in the capital. Difficulties of observation and data collection rule this possibility 
out. However, it is possible to examine variation between inadvertent expansion and 
inadvertent non-expansion on a smaller sample of cases, in a more focused and detailed way. 
Conducting such an examination is the task of the remainder of this dissertation. 
 
37 The United States in: Florida (1818). The United Kingdom in: Togoland (1914). France in: Eastern Morocco 
(1904), Togoland (1914), Cameroon (1916). Russia in: The Amur Region (1850), The Ussuri Region (1850). 
Japan in: The Caroline Islands (1914), The Mariana Islands (1914), The Marshall Islands (1914), Manchuria 
(1932).  
38 The United Kingdom in: Togoland (1914). France in: Eastern Morocco (1904), Togoland (1914), Cameroon 
(1916). Japan in: The Caroline Islands (1914), The Mariana Islands (1914), The Marshall Islands (1914), 
Manchuria (1932). Note that all but two occur during the First World War, suggesting that the “fog of war” 




INADVERTENT EXPANSION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: THE UNITED STATES 
 
“…the occupation of these places in Spanish Florida by the commander of American 
forces was not by virtue of any orders received by him from this Government to that 
effect.” 
John Quincy Adams1 
 
This chapter examines inadvertent expansion as it manifested itself in two cases from the 
antebellum United States of America. The first case examines the U.S.’s acquisition Florida 
from 1818-19. The second, a briefer case, presents the U.S.’s non-acquisition of the Republic 
of Texas in 1836-37. The purpose of these cases is twofold. First, this chapter presents the 
dissertation’s first pair of comparative, theory-testing case studies, illustrating how varying 
perceptions of geopolitical risk produced divergent outcomes, leading to expansion in 
Florida but non-expansion in Texas. Florida and Texas are a useful comparison in that they 
hold many factors fixed—the same great power, operating in the same region, in the same 
era, and even with one of the same key actors—while the outcomes vary across the two 
cases. Second, this chapter powerfully illustrates the differences between what I referred to 
in Chapter 2 as the “view from the capital” and the “view from the frontier,” in that the very 
same individual inhabits both positions—and adopts the associated perspectives—across the 
two cases. In the case of Florida in 1819, the peripheral agent driving the conquest is 
 
1 “The Secretary of State to George W. Erving, Esq., Department of State, Washington, November 28, 1818,” 
in American State Papers, Class I: Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, 1815-1822 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 
p. 539. Available at: https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsp.html. 
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Andrew Jackson, then a major general in the U.S. Army, whereas by the time the U.S. has an 
opportunity to acquire Texas in 1836, Jackson is president of the United States. Jackson’s 
boldness in the case of Florida, and his reticence in the case of Texas, is a striking indication 
of how vastly different an individual’s perceptions can be depending upon the position they 
inhabit. 
 The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the case study of the 
U.S.’s acquisition of Florida, where Major General Jackson exceeds his orders from 
Washington in conquering a series of Spanish forts and towns, ultimately leading to their 
acquisition. Second, I present the case of the U.S.’s non-acquisition of Texas, where now-
President Jackson is deeply reluctant to risk war with Mexico in the face of a clear opportunity 
to acquire the newly-independent republic, leading to his rejection of the fait accompli. And 
third and finally, I conclude with a consideration of alternative arguments and a brief 
discussion of the importance of these cases for the theory of inadvertent expansion 
presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Jackson Enters the “Wolf’s Den”: The United States in Florida, 1818-1819 
The United States acquired the Spanish imperial provinces of East and West Florida2 
between January 1818 and February 1819, over the course of the First Seminole War (1817-
18). The conquest of these provinces was carried out by Andrew Jackson, then a major 
general in the U.S. Army, overstepping the bounds imposed by his superiors in Washington. 
The theory of inadvertent expansion makes three key arguments that are borne out in this 
case. First, that peripheral expansion is a manifestation of a principal-agent problem, driven 
 
2 Contemporary Florida, U.S.A. 
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by diverse preferences between capital and frontier, and information asymmetries favoring 
the latter. In the case of Florida, the vast distances under pre-telegraph technology made 
controlling frontier agents such as Jackson very difficult for Washington. Second, that the 
acquisition of a given territory, in part or in whole, will often activate mechanisms that make 
it difficult to readily relinquish the new possession. In the case at hand, Jackson’s invasion 
drove down the costs of eventual acquisition, and his powerful domestic-political supporters 
made backing down extremely difficult for Washington. And third, that a lack of perceived 
geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will encourage leaders in the capital to accept the 
territorial fait accompli, resulting in subsequent central authorization. In the case of Florida, 
once it became clear that the Spanish had little appetite for war, and that British weren’t 
coming to their aid, the U.S. partially withdrew and then pressed Spain hard for the complete 
cession of Florida, resulting in their acquisition through the Transcontinental Treaty of 
February 1819. 
Historical Background 
On the eve of the invasion in early 1818, Florida had been a backwater province of Spain’s 
vast “New World” empire for most of the past three-hundred years, predating the founding 
of the Jamestown settlement by more a century. While it was fairly large, at nearly 152,000 
km2, it lacked the natural resources of other Spanish imperial holdings—such as gold, silver, 
and sugar—and was therefore sparsely populated and lightly defended.3 It had been divided 
into East and West Florida during a brief interregnum of British rule (1763-83), and the vast 
majority of the population of 20,000 lived in the two provincial capitals of St. Augustine 
 
3 “Territorial expansion of the United States – land area, by accession: 1790-2000 (Table Cf1),” Historical 




(East) and Pensacola (West).4 Its only neighbor, of course, was the growing American 
juggernaut, whose population had soared from 3.9 million in 1790 up to over 9 million by 
1818.5 The U.S. had acquired an enormous swath of what was very recently Spanish territory 
with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, and had been chipping away at Spanish West Florida 
since 1810, taking approximately half of that province in the process. Florida’s forbidding 
swamps, thick, lush forests, intertwined river systems, and thousands of offshore islands 
made it an attractive destination for those seeking refuge from oppression and those looking 
to escape the clutches of the law.6 
 Anglo-American settler encroachment on Native American lands helped spark a civil war 
within the Creek Confederacy, in which the United States became deeply involved on the 
side of the Lower Creeks against the Red Sticks Creeks in July 1813.7 The Treaty of Fort 
Jackson, which settled the war in favor of the United States on 9 August 1814, led to the 
expulsion of the Red Sticks from Mississippi Territory and the expropriation of 
approximately 93,000 km2 of tribal lands.8 Many of the Red Sticks fled across the southern 
border with Spanish Florida, where they connected with other Native American tribes—
becoming collectively known as the Seminoles—and launched attacks on the Georgia, 
 
4 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, Vol. II, Continental America, 
1800-1867 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 31; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of 
American Expansion (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), p. 111. 
5 “Population: 1790–2000 (Table Aa6-8),” HSUS. 
6 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 145; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 97; William Earl Weeks, The New Cambridge History of American 
Foreign Relations, Vol. 1: Dimensions of the Early American Empire, 1754-1865 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), p. 96. 
7 Nugent, Habits of Empire, p. 117-120; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-
1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 686-687. 
8 Nugent, Habits of Empire, p. 119; Weeks, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, p. 95. 
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Mississippi, and Alabama border regions. The turbulence that would characterize America’s 
border with Spanish Florida, as well as the continued expropriation of Native American 
territory, would ultimately lead to the First Seminole War in late 1817, the occasion for the 
U.S. invasion. 
 The primary agent of the Red Sticks’ expulsion and the eponym of Fort Jackson was, of 
course, Major General Andrew Jackson. Jackson was commander of the southern division of 
the U.S. Army, effectively in charge of the defense of the southern half of the Union. His 
military career was short, but his rise, meteoric. In his early teen years, he served as a courier 
for the militia in his native South Carolina during the American Revolutionary War, and was 
detained for a time by the British as a prisoner of war.9 Jackson wouldn’t again see military 
service until he was elected to command the Tennessee militia at the age of 34 in 1802. In 
the meantime, he had been trained as a lawyer, become a public prosecutor, and been elected 
as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and a judge of the 
Superior Court of Tennessee. Jackson was also a land speculator, a Freemason, and an 
infamous dueler, having participated in at least a dozen such contests.10 During the Creek 
War (1813-14) and the War of 1812 (1812-15), he became a national celebrity with his 
spectacular victories at the Battles of Horseshoe Bend and of New Orleans.11 Jackson had a 
 
9 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1977), pp. 14-23; H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times (New York: Doubleday, 2005), p. 24-28. 
10 Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, pp. xv-xvi, 344. On Jackson’s dueling, see: Jack K. 
Williams, Dueling in the Old South: Vignettes of Social History (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 
pp. 18-19. 
11 William Earl Weeks, Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 32. 
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rugged, frontier persona, but could be extremely well-mannered when he needed to.12 
Having relatively little formal education and not being particularly well-read, he had 
famously-atrocious spelling and grammar, but could nevertheless be powerfully expressive in 
writing and speech.13 Jackson was egotistical, impulsive, excessively sensitive to criticism, and 
had a notoriously violent temper. He also had a tendency to defy orders and to disregard 
authority, and was deeply nationalistic.14 Jackson was the key actor on America’s 
southeastern frontier who would independently launch the conquest of Florida. 
 The President at the time was James Monroe. Often seen as the least impressive of the 
“Virginia Dynasty,” Monroe was, in fact, a deeply experienced politician by the time he took 
office, and would be quite successful as president.15 He had twice served as governor of 
Virginia, had been minister to France and the United Kingdom, and a Senator, a Secretary of 
War, and a Secretary of State. Monroe was pragmatic, deliberate, thoughtful to the point of 
seeming unemotional, and was a consummate political animal, whose considerable talents 
were almost entirely devoted to a lifetime in politics.16 Serving as Monroe’s Secretary of War 
was John C. Calhoun. A former House member and future Vice President, Calhoun was 
ambitious, incredibly hardworking, radiated confidence to the point of arrogance, and was a 
 
12 George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1952), p. 124; Weeks, 
Building the Continental Empire, p. 32. 
13 Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, pp. 7-8; Brands, Andrew Jackson, pp. 17-18. 
14 Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, pp. 7-8, 25, 342-343; Weeks, Building the Continental 
Empire, p. 32; Brands, Andrew Jackson, pp. 17, 297. 
15 Weeks, Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, p. 101. 
16 Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. xi; Noble E. 
Cunningham, The Presidency of James Monroe (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 4. 
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famously-ardent defender of slavery.17 Finally, the position of Secretary of State was held by 
John Quincy Adams. The son of a president and a future president himself, Adams is 
generally regarded as among the greatest Secretaries of State in the United States’ history.18 
Adams had served as minister to the Netherlands, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom, 
and in the U.S. Senate, by the time he took up his position at the head of the State 
Department. Adams was intellectually gifted, supremely industrious, and deeply religious, 
though he could be pugnacious and argumentative, and was known to be fiercely 
independent.19 Monroe, Calhoun, and Adams were the key leaders in the capital who would 
be dragged unwittingly into the conquest of all of Spanish Florida. 
 The Seminole War would begin with yet another expulsion.20 In early November 1817, 
U.S. Army Brevet Major General Edmund P. Gaines ordered the Creek inhabitants of 
Fowltown, a village just north of the Florida border in Georgia, to vacate the area under the 
terms of the Treaty of Fort Jackson. When they refused, the village was attacked, four 
Creeks, including one woman, were killed, and Fowltown was burnt to the ground.21 In 
retaliation, the Creeks ambushed a U.S. Army transport boat on its way up the Apalachicola 
 
17 John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1988), pp. 5-6, 70. 
18 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 138; Nugent, Habits of Empire, p. 125; Weeks Cambridge History of 
American Foreign Relations, p. 104. 
19 William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1992), pp. 10-21. 
20 Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings, pp. 125-126; Weeks, Building the Continental Empire, p. 41; Howe, What 
Hath God Wrought, p. 98. 
21 “Extract of a Letter from General Gaines to Major General Andrew Jackson, Fort Scott, Georgia, November 
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River through Florida, killing 41, including several women on board.22 News of the attack 
shocked and infuriated officials from the frontier to the capital. Andrew Jackson, who was 
monitoring events from southern division headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee, wrote on 16 
December that it was time “that the wolf be struck in his den.”23 The Seminole War had 
begun. 
Washington & the Florida Frontier 
Washington faced serious principal-agent problems with respect to its frontier agents in the 
south, such as Jackson. These were due to information asymmetries favoring those on the 
frontier and a divergence of preferences between leaders in the capital and their frontier 
agents. First, as a result of the highly-rudimentary transportation and communications 
technology of the time, there were stark information asymmetries in favor of the periphery. 
This was still the pre-rail and -telegraph era, and it took approximately one month for a letter 
to travel from Washington to Spanish Florida on horseback, meaning that it would take at 
least 60 days to receive a reply.24 The long travel times from capital to frontier meant that the 
administration in Washington was at the informational mercy of its frontier agents, and had 
to rely heavily on the official reports they sent back. 
 Second, there was a divergence of preferences between leaders in Washington and their 
agents on the Spanish frontier. Both sides ultimately wanted Florida for the United States, 
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and Washington had been in negotiations with Madrid over them since the beginning of the 
War of 1812.25 Yet, they differed as to when and how they would be achieved. Leaders in the 
capital felt that time was on their side and they were certain that the Floridas could ultimately 
be achieved through negotiation with Spain, without the need to risk war to acquire them 
immediately. Their agents on the periphery, and particularly Major General Jackson, were 
considerably less cautious in their approach. Jackson felt that, so long as the Floridas were in 
Spanish hands, and so long as the Seminoles were able to effectively have sanctuary there, 
the U.S.’s southern frontier would see no peace or stability. 
Florida 
Given these preferences in Washington, when the Seminole War broke out, the orders to the 
Southern Division of the Army were clear—if needed, they could enter Spanish territory in 
pursuit of the Seminoles, but under no circumstances were they to take territory or attack a 
Spanish fort. As Secretary of War John Calhoun wrote to the commander of U.S. forces in 
the war, Major General Gaines, on 16 December 1817, you should “consider yourself at 
liberty to march across the Florida line, and to attack them from within its limits, should it 
be found necessary, unless they should shelter themselves under a Spanish post. In the last event, you 
will immediately notify this Department.”26 Jackson, of course, saw things differently. After 
seeing Gaines’ orders, he penned a letter to Monroe on 6 January, arguing that “the whole of 
East Florida [should be] seized.” Jackson added: 
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“this can be done without implicating the Government; let it be signified to me 
through any channel, (say Mr. J. Rhea27) that the possession of the Floridas would be 
desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished.”28 
Jackson never received a response to this letter. In fact, when it arrived in Washington, 
President Monroe was seriously ill and bed-ridden, and happened to be without a secretary. 
The letter was apparently briefly skimmed by Calhoun and Treasury Secretary William 
Crawford, only to end up in a pile of Monroe’s other papers, not to be seen by the President 
until there was a Congressional investigation of the Seminole War a full year later.29 What 
Jackson hadn’t been aware of when he wrote the letter was that General Gaines was to be 
diverted to another theater, and that Jackson would be appointed as commander of U.S. 
forces in the Seminole War. Secretary Calhoun wrote to Jackson on 26 December 1817 that 
he should “repair, with as little delay as practicable, to Fort Scott, and assume the immediate 
command of the forces in that section,” and that he should “adopt the necessary measures 
to terminate [the] conflict”—though this order wouldn’t arrive in Nashville until 11 January 
1818—five days after Jackson had sent his provocative letter to the president.30 
While Calhoun’s new orders didn’t explicitly place the same limitations on Jackson that 
had been placed on Gaines with regards to respecting Spanish sovereignty, it is clear from 
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his 6 January letter that Jackson had seen Gaines’ orders. And on 30 January 1818, President 
Monroe wrote to Calhoun, asking him to instruct Jackson “not to attack any post occupied 
by Spanish troops, from the possibility, that it might bring the allied powers upon us,” 
though for reasons that remain unknown, this order was never transmitted to Jackson.31 
Calhoun later claimed, with substantial justification, that he had assumed “that the orders in 
this case to Genl Gains [sic] are obligatory on Genl Jackson,” adding that “there is no 
military principle better established.”32 In any case, the administration seems to have believed 
that its instructions for Jackson were clear. As President Monroe assured Congress on 25 
March 1818, over two months after Jackson had departed for Florida, “Orders have been 
given to the general in command not to enter Florida, unless it be in pursuit of the enemy, 
and, in that case, to respect the Spanish authority wherever it is maintained.”33 
Upon receipt of his orders, Jackson quickly readied his force of 1,100 and prepared for 
the 775-kilometer journey southbound to the Florida frontier in Georgia, reporting to 
Calhoun on 20 January 1818 that they were ready “to inflict speedy and merited 
chastisement on the deluded Seminoles.”34 Conditions would prove difficult for the 46-day 
journey, with heavy rains, flooded and washed-out roads, multiple crossings of swollen 
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rivers, and ration and supply shortages.35 Jackson’s forces crossed the Florida border around 
13 March, and on 16 March they arrived at the ruins of the old British fort at Prospect Bluff 
(also known as “Negro Fort”), where he ordered it rebuilt and renamed Fort Gadsden, after 
his aide-de-camp. This was a first territorial claim Jackson wasn’t supposed to make. 
After ten day’s rest and resupply, Jackson and his forces left Fort Gadsden on 26 March 
headed for St. Marks, a Spanish fort approximately 110 km to the southeast. Jackson had 
written to Calhoun the previous day, reporting that he had “no doubt but that St. Mark’s is 
in possession of the Indians,” and that he would “take possession of the garrison as a depot 
for my supplies.” 36 On his way, Jackson was reinforced on 1 April by Tennessee militia 
members as well as 2,000 Creek allies, bringing his total forces to nearly 5,000.37 With this 
larger force, Jackson engaged in what historian and Jackson biographer Robert Remini has 
referred to as a “thoroughgoing campaign of terror,” killing and capturing Seminoles, seizing 
their cattle and foodstuffs, and burning their villages to the ground.38 A few days later, 
Jackson proudly reported to Calhoun that the “duty was executed to my satisfaction; nearly 
three hundred houses were consumed.”39 Jackson’s forces then took the fort of St. Marks 
without resistance on 7 April, justifying the conquest to the Spanish commandant there on 
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“the immutable principle of self-defence.”40 With this, his second unauthorized territorial 
acquisition had been carried out. 
Jackson and his forces then headed east for Bowleg’s Town, a Seminole village 160 km 
from St. Marks on the Suwannee River. Jackson’s forces razed the town when they arrived 
on 16 April, and in skirmishes in and around the town they killed 49 Seminole warriors and 
took over one hundred men, women, and children prisoner.41 At St. Marks and then in 
Bowleg’s Town, Jackson happened upon and arrested two British nationals—a Scottish 
trader from the Bahamas, Alexander Arbuthnot, and a former Royal Marine, Robert 
Ambrister—on the dubious charge of instigating the war and aiding the Seminoles.42 Jackson 
then returned to St. Marks, put his two British captives on trial, and had them executed on 
the morning of 29 April 1818—Ambrister being shot, and Arbuthnot being hung from the 
yardarm of his own ship.43 In reporting these events to Calhoun, Jackson wrote on 5 May: 
“I hope the execution of these two unprincipled villains will prove an awful example 
to the world, and convince the Government of Great Britain, as well as her subjects, 
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that certain (if slow) retribution awaits these unchristian wretches, who, by false 
promises, delude and excite an Indian tribe to all the horrid deeds of savage war.”44 
However, Jackson’s work in Florida wasn’t quite complete. He claimed to have received 
intelligence that as many as five hundred Seminole warriors had congregated in the capital of 
Spanish West Florida, Pensacola, some 275 km west of Fort Gadsden.45 On 10 May, Jackson 
gathered a force of approximately 1,200 personnel and set out across the Apalachicola for 
Pensacola.46 Two weeks later, on 24 May, Jackson’s forces took the city without resistance, 
with Jackson warning the Governor before storming the city that “the blood which may be 
shed by a useless resistance on your part to my demand will rest on your head.”47 After 
taking Fort Barrancas on 28 May, a Spanish fort just 10 km outside Pensacola, Jackson 
issued a proclamation appointing a U.S. territorial governor, seizing the royal archives, and 
establishing tax collection procedures, while shipping the Spanish governor and garrison off 
to Havana, Cuba.48 As Jackson would report to Calhoun on 2 June 1818, the articles of 
capitulation “amount to a complete cession to the United States of that portion of the 
Floridas.”49 
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With much of Spanish Florida under the control of his forces, Jackson finally saw his job 
as complete—though he was always ready for more. As he prepared to head back to 
Nashville on 2 June, he wrote to President Monroe, telling him that with some minor 
reinforcements, “I will insure you Cuba in a few days.”50 However, along with Jackson’s 
brashness were notable undertones of diffidence. On “our Southern frontier, I have 
established peace and safety” Jackson wrote to the president, “and hope the government will 
never yield it[;] should my acts… be disapproved, I have this consolation[:] that I exercised 
my best exertions and Judgt. and that sound national policy will dictate holding Possession 
as long as we are a republick.”51 Andrew Jackson had, without orders, taken control of much 
of Spanish Florida in 80 days, and at a cost of just seven of his forces killed.52 His fait accompli 
was complete. The question that now seemed to be on his mind was how the administration 
in Washington would react. 
Washington Reacts 
News of Jackson’s exploits in Florida began to filter back to Washington through unofficial 
channels in late April and early May 1818. The first dispatches the administration received 
from Jackson directly were on 4 May, reporting on his conquest of St. Marks. Though it was 
a clear violation of his orders, the administration’s reaction to this first acquisition was fairly 
muted.53 With the exception of Secretary of State Adams, who worried that Jackson was 
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acting “without due regard to humanity,” no one in Monroe’s cabinet raised significant 
concerns.54 For the time being, the administration was content to await further information 
from the frontier. 
 However, the Florida issue began to heat up in June. Once the Spanish learned of what 
had transpired there, minister to Washington Luis de Onís lodged a formal complaint on 17 
June, referring to Jackson’s actions as “monstrous acts of hostility.”55 The following day, the 
president and his cabinet became aware of the storming of Pensacola and the execution of 
the two British subjects.56 This was clearly a more serious turn of events, as not only had a 
major Spanish city been taken, but Jackson risked bringing the United Kingdom into the 
conflict as well. As Secretary Adams noted in his diary that day, “This, and other events in 
this Indian war, makes so many difficulties for the administration.”57 Yet Monroe preferred 
to await Jackson’s official correspondence, and prepared to head to his farm in Loudoun 
County, Virginia, on 26 June. Adams was astounded by his superior’s nonchalance. As he 
wrote in his diary, “though the moment is very critical, and a storm is rapidly thickening, he 
has not read many of the papers that I left with him, and he puts off everything for a future 
time.”58 
 Matters would come to a head in July. On the seventh, Secretary of State Adams was 
awoken in the middle of the night by Minister Onís, demanding a meeting the following 
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day.59 There he would deliver a second diplomatic protest, this time for the conquest of 
Pensacola, referring to Jackson’s conduct as “excessive aggression, unexampled in the 
history of nations.”60 On 9 July, Monroe received official documents from Jackson at his 
farm in Loudoun County, and he quickly prepared to return to the capital. The following 
day, in a letter to former President James Madison, Monroe foreshadowed the debate that 
would take place in his cabinet by pointing out that “There are serious difficulties in this 
business, on which ever side we view it.”61 The president arrived back in Washington on 13 
July, as Adams put it, “in the midst of the storm.”62 
 The Monroe cabinet held six separate hours-long cabinet meetings from 15 to 21 July 
1818, to discuss the Florida crisis. The basic initial stance of most cabinet members was of 
opposition to Jackson’s conduct in Florida. There were a number of reasons for this, but 
important among them was the geopolitical risk involved in backing Jackson and retaining 
the Floridas. Secretary of War Calhoun and President Monroe held this view, seeing Jackson 
as having committed what amounted to an unauthorized act of war against Spain.63 On 13 
July, Calhoun told Secretary of State Adams that he was “extremely dissatisfied with General 
Jackson’s proceedings in Florida,” and that he thought that “we shall certainly have a 
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Spanish war.”64 President Monroe agreed. As he noted in a letter to Andrew Jackson on 19 
July, if they retained Spanish Florida, it would not be “improbable that war would 
immediately follow… The war would probably soon become general; and we do not foresee 
that we should have a single European power on our side. Why risk these consequences?”65 
In the view of Calhoun and Monroe, promptly returning Spain’s territory and disavowing the 
actions of Major General Jackson seemed the surest way to avoid war with Spain. As 
Calhoun argued in the cabinet meeting of 20 July, by putting the responsibility squarely on 
Jackson’s shoulders, the administration “would take away from Spain all pretext for war, and 
for resorting to the aid of other European powers.”66 
 Yet, it wasn’t quite so simple. For the very act of Jackson’s conquering Spanish territory 
in Florida activated two mechanisms that would make it extremely difficult to simply cut the 
major general loose and withdraw. First, the conquests drastically drove down the perceived 
costs of acquisition of these territories. The ease with which Jackson’s forces acquired most 
of East and West Florida put Spain’s inability to protect and defend these territories in stark 
relief. Secretary of State Adams, having been in negotiations with Spain over the Floridas 
from almost the time he took office in September 1817, was quick to grasp this, and pushed 
for approval of Jackson’s actions and retention of the territories on these grounds.67 And 
Adams’ position wasn’t without foundation. The French minister, who was acting as 
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something of an intermediary between the U.S. and Spain in negotiations, reported to 
Adams on 10 July that Spain was ready to cede the Floridas to the U.S.68 The following day, 
Spanish minister Onís himself told Adams that they were willing to give up the Floridas “for 
nothing.”69 George Erving, U.S. minister to Spain, wrote to Washington on 13 July, noting 
that Jackson’s actions were forcing the hand of Madrid with respect to the Florida cession 
and broader border negotiations.70 President Monroe too, began to recognize this as the 
cabinet debate progressed. As he wrote in his letter to Andrew Jackson of 19 July, recent 
events in Florida “show the incompetency of Spain to maintain her authority,” and that 
Jackson’s actions “will furnish a strong inducement in Spain to cede the territory.”71 Thus, it 
was difficult to deny that Jackson’s fait accompli had significantly strengthened the U.S.’s hand 
in border negotiations with Spain, essentially overnight, making arguments for a blanket 
withdrawal more difficult to sustain. 
 Second, Jackson’s unauthorized conquest helped generate significant domestic political 
pressure on the administration to support one of their own nationals, rather than siding with 
Spain. Jackson was the most popular military figure in the country—a veritable national 
celebrity—and the administration perceived significant domestic political costs associated 
with repudiating him.72 And Jackson’s notoriously fierce temper and his vengeful disposition 
likely only strengthened these perceptions. Secretary of State Adams, again, came to this 
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realization fairly early on in the debate. On 16 July, Adams argued that to disavow the major 
general would create the appearance that the administration was trying “to put down Jackson 
in the public opinion; [and] that he would immediately resign, and turn the attack upon the 
Administration, and would carry a large portion of the public with him.”73 “It would be 
said,” Adams argued in the cabinet debate of 18 July, that “after having the benefit of his 
services, he was abandoned and sacrificed to the enemies of this country.”74 In the 
penultimate cabinet meeting, on 20 July, Adams summed up his view more generally, noting 
that if one’s own agent’s actions were “dubious, it was better to err on the side of vigor than 
of weakness—on the side of our own officer, who had rendered the most eminent services 
to the nation, than on the side of our bitterest enemies, and against him.”75 
The rest of the administration would come around to this point of view.76 Two months 
later, looking back on the cabinet debates, Secretary of War Calhoun noted in a letter to 
Senator Charles Tait that, “from the popularity of the General, it was inexpedient to punish” 
Jackson.77 Monroe, too, would ultimately agree, writing in a September 1818 letter to 
Virginia politician and friend George Hay that turning on Jackson would have created 
“internal feuds of the most pernicious character.”78 Monroe expanded on these views in a 
letter to former President Madison some seven months after the cabinet debates:  
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“Had Genl Jackson been ordered to trial I have no doubt that the interior of the 
country would have been much agitated, if not convulsed, by appeals to sectional 
interests, by imputations of subserviency to the views of Ferdinand, of hostility to the 
cause of the colonies, &c.”79 
Thus, the administration perceived significant domestic political costs associated with cutting 
Jackson loose and disavowing his actions altogether. 
 This combination of perceived geopolitical risk associated with retaining the Floridas and 
domestic political costs associated with relinquishing them created something of a dilemma 
for the administration.80 If they stood firm and kept the territories, they risked war with 
Spain, and possibly even the United Kingdom. If they backed down and relinquished them, 
they risked severe domestic political consequences, potentially bringing down the 
administration itself. Secretary of State Adams summed up the administration’s precarious 
position in a diary entry on 21 July 1818: 
“The Administration were [sic] placed in a dilemma from which it is impossible to 
escape censure by some, and factious crimination by many. If they avow and approve 
Jackson’s conduct, they incur the double responsibility of having commenced a war 
against Spain, and of warring in violation of the Constitution without the authority of 
Congress. If they disavow him, they must give offence to all his friends, encounter the 
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shock of his popularity, and having the appearance of truckling to Spain. For all this I 
should be prepared.”81 
Washington Decides 
To get out of this dilemma, President Monroe ultimately decided to split the difference, 
settling on a partial rebuke of Jackson as well as a partial withdrawal from Florida.82 With 
respect to his decision on Jackson, the president decided to make it clear that the major 
general had acted without prior authorization, absolving the administration of complicity in 
his actions. Yet Monroe also emphasized that Jackson was acting from principled motives 
and in the national interest, aiming to avoid the wrath of Jackson’s domestic political 
supporters. The administration’s policy on Florida would be published in an article, 
ghostwritten by Attorney General William Wirt, in the Daily National Intelligencer on 27 July 
1818.83 In it, the administration made clear that “In attacking the posts of St. Mark and 
Pensacola, with the fort of Barrancas, General Jackson… took these measures on his own 
responsibility.” Yet the article was quick to add that Jackson’s “operations proceeded from 
motives of the purest patriotism.”84 This formulation—of Jackson having acted on his own 
 
81 “July 21st, 1818,” in Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, p. 113. See also: Weeks, John Quincy 
Adams, p. 115. 
82 Ammon, James Monroe, p. 423; Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, p. 367; Niven, John C. 
Calhoun and the Price of Union, pp. 70-71; Howe, What Hath God Wrought, p. 103. 
83 “July 18th, 1818” and “July 21st, 1818,” both in Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. IV, pp. 112, 
114-115; Cunningham, The Presidency of James Monroe, p. 61. 
84 Daily National Intelligencer, Vol. VI, No. 1729, Washington, Monday, July 27, 1818, p. 2. 
105 
 
accord but with noble intent—would be repeated in Monroe’s letters to Jackson himself,85 in 
his communications with Congress,86 as well as in diplomatic correspondence with Spain.87 
 With respect to Florida, the administration decided to conduct a partial withdrawal, 
planning to pull out of Pensacola expeditiously, of Fort St. Marks only once Spain was 
prepared to garrison it sufficiently, and retaining Fort Gadsden indefinitely.88 There were 
three reasons the administration settled on a partial withdrawal. First, it is clear the 
administration wanted to avoid what was viewed as an unnecessary war with Spain. In a 
letter to former President Thomas Jefferson on 22 July 1818, Monroe explained that central 
to his Florida policy was to avoid “giving to Spain just cause of war.”89 The president 
repeated this rationale in later communications with Andrew Jackson and with James 
Madison, arguing that one of his primary goals in Florida had been “to deprive Spain and the 
allied powers of any just cause of war.”90 Thus, withdrawal from Pensacola was seen as an 
important way to avoid backing Spain into a corner from which war would be its only 
option. 
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However, the administration felt that St. Marks and Fort Gadsden could be safely 
retained without similar attendant risks. Secretary of State Adams had suspected this early 
on, but it became clearer as the Florida crisis progressed.91 It was obvious that Spain 
wouldn’t be clamoring for war with the United States.92 For much of the past decade, it had 
either been fighting Napoleon in the Peninsular War (1807-14) at home, or struggling to put 
down Latin American revolutionaries abroad.93 At this point, Spain was clinging to its empire 
by its fingernails, and there was simply very little it could do to expel the United States from 
Florida. And perhaps more importantly, it became clear that Britain had no intention of 
coming to Spain’s aid.94 The War of 1812 had ended only three years earlier, and no one 
wanted another North American war. Britain and the United States had also just recently 
signed an arms limitation treaty for the Great Lakes, and were in the midst of negotiating 
their outstanding boundary issues. While the British press and public were outraged by the 
unlawful execution of two of their nationals, British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh 
refused to let the fate of the two adventurers disrupt the ongoing rapprochement with the 
United States.95 As Castlereagh would inform American minister to the U.K. Ricard Rush on 
7 January 1819, his government had decided that “the conduct of these individuals had been 
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unjustifiable, and therefore not calling for the interference of Great Britain.”96 Thus, it 
turned out that the United States could hold onto some of Spain’s territory, as there were 
few geopolitical risks associated with doing so. 
  The second reason the administration opted for a partial withdrawal is that there were 
important constitutional issues at stake.97 According to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress, not the executive, is vested with the power to declare war. Thus, by attacking 
Spanish holdings in Florida, Jackson had potentially usurped the power of Congress and 
violated the constitution. By retaining Pensacola in particular—as it was felt that the other 
conquests could be justified on the basis of self-defense—the administration risked having 
engaged in an extra-constitutional war. This was an argument made by Secretary of War 
Calhoun from the beginning, it clearly resonated with President Monroe, and despite some 
resistance, even Adams ultimately relented to it.98 As the president explained to Jackson in 
his letter of 19 July 1818, “If the Executive refused to evacuate the posts, especially 
Pensacola, it would amount to a declaration of war, to which it is incompetent. It would be 
accused of usurping the authority of Congress, and giving a deep and fatal wound to the 
Constitution.”99 Thus, at least some withdrawal was seen as necessary. 
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 The third and final reason the Monroe administration settled on a partial withdrawal from 
Florida had to do with coercive diplomacy. Over the course of the crisis, it became 
increasingly clear that Spain was in a highly vulnerable position. With the Americans in 
control of much of Florida, and Britain standing aside, Spanish leaders had few options 
beyond trying to strike the best deal with Washington they could.100 A partial withdrawal 
would allow Spain to come to the negotiating table with its dignity intact, but it would also 
allow the U.S. to retain coercive leverage for the purpose of the negotiations.101 As President 
Monroe explained in his same letter to Andrew Jackson on 19 July, “If we hold the posts, 
her government cannot treat with honor, which, by withdrawing the troops, we afford her an 
opportunity to do.”102 From this position of advantage, the administration could then 
pressure, even browbeat, Spain into giving up the Floridas. For instance, the Intelligencer 
article of 27 July closed by pointing out Spain’s “incompetency to maintain her authority in 
the Floridas” and advised that it would “be much wiser for her to cede those provinces at 
once.”103 Similarly, in a famously-tough-worded letter to the Spanish government, Adams 
wrote on 28 November 1818 that “the right of the United States can as little compound with 
impotence as with perfidy.” The Secretary continued: 
“Spain must immediately make her election, either to place a force in Florida adequate 
at once to the protection of her territory, and to the fulfillment of her engagements, or 
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to cede to the United States a province, of which she retains nothing but the nominal 
possession”104 
Spain would ultimately opt for the latter. 
*** 
A Congressional inquiry into the Seminole War opened in December 1818. It included a 
floor debate lasting nearly a month, at that point the longest single issue debated in Congress 
in the nation’s history.105 The high point was a three-hour speech delivered by Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Henry Clay of Kentucky.106 Warning of the risks of Jacksonian 
military despotism, Clay admonished his colleagues to: 
“Beware how you give a fatal sanction, in this infant period of our republic, scarcely 
yet two score years old, to military insubordination. Remember that Greece had her 
Alexander, Rome her Caesar, England her Cromwell, France her Bonaparte, and that 
if we would escape the rock on which they split, we must avoid their errors.”107 
But it would ultimately make little difference. All resolutions condemning Jackson’s actions 
would be defeated by wide margins.108 Jackson was simply too popular, and his recent 
exploits in Florida made him only more so. He was mobbed by adoring admirers wherever 
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he went, and was bestowed honors and awards by civil society organizations and local 
governments throughout the country.109 A future president was clearly in the making. 
 On 22 February 1819, John Quincy Adams and Luis de Onís signed the Transcontinental 
Treaty, which not only ceded the Floridas to the United States but defined the U.S.-Spanish 
border all the way to the Pacific.110 Adams would write in his diary that night that the 
“acknowledgement of a definite line of boundary to the South Seas form a great epocha in 
our history.”111 Although ratification would be delayed on the Spanish side, the U.S. would 
finally take possession of Florida in February 1821, with none other than Andrew Jackson as 
its inaugural territorial governor. 
 As part of the Adams-Onís Treaty, the United States, notably, agreed to relinquish its 
claims to the Spanish imperial province of Texas. President Monroe’s reluctance to add 
another slave-holding state to the Union was at the forefront of his mind in his decision to 
exclude the claim.112 As the president wrote to Thomas Jefferson in May 1820, “it is evident 
that further acquisition of territory, to the West & South, involves difficulties, of an internal 
nature, which menace the Union itself.”113 But it wouldn’t take long for Texas to once again 
burst onto the national scene. As the Spanish Empire continued to crumble, Texas would 
present the next major opportunity for American territorial expansion. 
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Jackson Stands Aloof: The United States and Texas, 1836-1837 
The United States refrained from acquiring the independent Republic of Texas114 between 
April 1836 and March 1837, in the aftermath of the Texas Revolution. The revolutionary 
overthrow of Mexican authority in Texas was independently planned and executed by recent 
American emigres, led by a former United States governor and member of congress.115 The 
theory of inadvertent expansion makes two arguments that are borne out in this case. First, 
that once a territory is acquired, a number of mechanisms are activated that make 
relinquishment difficult. In the case of Texas, the revolution, and particularly the brutal 
crackdown by Mexican forces, led to widespread sympathy and support for the cause, 
especially in the American south. And second, that the perception of significant geopolitical 
risk associated with acquiring the territory will discourage leaders in the capital from 
accepting it. In the case at hand, American leaders in the capital strongly suspected that 
annexing Texas would mean war with Mexico, an outcome they simply weren’t willing to 
risk. The U.S.’s failure to accept the Texan fait accompli would mean that the erstwhile 
Mexican state would remain an independent republic for the following ten years, until it was 
annexed as the 28th state of the Union in 1845. 
Historical Background 
Within just six months of the Adams-Onís Treaty having entered into force in February 
1821, Mexico declared its independence from Spain after a ten-year armed insurgency. 
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Texas, a territory of 678,000 km2 over which the U.S. had relinquished all claims, became 
part of the Republic of Mexico’s northernmost state of Coahuila y Tejas in 1824.116 Like the 
Spanish Empire before it, Mexico faced the problem of chronic underpopulation on its 
northern frontier.117 To deal with this, the Mexican government encouraged immigration to 
Texas by selling land at rates significantly lower than in the United States, and by authorizing 
colonization agents (or empresarios) such as Stephen F. Austin to facilitate settlement from 
across the border. And the immigrants—and their slaves—poured in. Starting with a local 
population of roughly 2,500 at independence, by 1830 over 20,000 Americans had settled in 
Texas, greatly outnumbering the Mexican population.118 Within just five years the total 
number of settlers from the north reached 40,000, outnumbering the Mexican population by 
a factor greater than ten-to-one.119 Along with those who came in under formal empresario 
contracts were thousands of illegal immigrants—“squatters, drifters, adventurers, smugglers, 
[and] conspirators”—who were attracted by the relative lawlessness of the Mexican-
American frontier zone.120 
 These demographic shifts alarmed Mexican officials, who began to make efforts to stem 
the flow of migrants, putting Mexico City on a collision course with its new Texan 
inhabitants. In April 1830 the Mexican government passed a law banning immigration from 
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the United States and the importation of slaves.121 In 1832, Mexican General Antonio López 
de Santa Anna launched a coup, resulting in the overthrow of the government in 1833 and 
the establishment of centralized authoritarian rule the following year.122 Uprisings emerged in 
several Mexican states, only to be crushed by Santa Anna’s forces. The migrant population in 
Texas chafed under the increasingly heavy hand extending from Mexico City. And when the 
Mexican government imposed customs duties on Texan trade, and sent its forces out to 
enforce its new edicts, matters reached a boiling point.123 
Washington & the Texan Frontier 
Among the migrants aggravated by the centralization of Mexican rule was Sam Houston. 
Born in Lexington, Virginia, near the Tennessee border, Houston would go on to represent 
Tennessee in the House of Representatives and serve as the state’s governor. Houston was 
also a veteran of the War of 1812, where he had served under the command of Andrew 
Jackson and was badly wounded in the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.124 Jackson and Houston 
remained lifelong friends, with Houston acting as a pall bearer for Rachel Jackson’s funeral 
in December 1828.125 After a failed marriage, a three-year sojourn with the Cherokee in 
Arkansas Territory, some very heavy drinking, and a conviction for battery against a sitting 
House member, Houston entered Texas at the suggestion of an old friend in December 
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1832.126 Houston had been told by this friend that “there will be some fighting there next 
fall, and that a fine country will be gained without much bloodshed.”127 Within weeks of 
arriving Houston was ushered into the elite of migrant Texan society. And within months he 
had begun plotting the overthrow of Mexican authority there. Sam Houston was the key 
peripheral actor who would attempt to drag the United States into the acquisition of Texas. 
 Monitoring events from Washington was Houston’s friend and former commander, 
President Andrew Jackson. While President Jackson had able support in his Secretary of 
State John Forsyth and his Secretary of War Lewis Cass, he dominated foreign-policy 
decision making in the administration.128 Jackson had long coveted Texas for the United 
States.129 He thought that relinquishing American claims to Texas in the Adams-Onís Treaty 
had been a mistake, and almost from the time he took office as president in March 1829 he 
set out to acquire it.130 As Jackson wrote to his friend John Overton in June 1829, “I have 
long since been aware of the importance of Texas to the United States, and of the real 
necessity of extending our boundary west of the Sabine… I shall keep my eye on this object 
& the first propitious moment make the attempt to regain the Territory…”131 Working 
through his minister in Mexico, as well as his chargé d’affaires there, Jackson made a series of 
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ham-handed attempts to purchase the northern state for as much as $5 million—all to no 
avail.132  
However, this was as far as Jackson was willing to go. In fact, he specifically wanted to 
acquire Texas, as he put it, “without any just imputation of corruption on our part.”133 
Everything had to be above board. Hearing early rumors of Houston’s plans to acquire 
Texas, Jackson referred to these as “deranged,” part of a “wild scheme,” and as the “mere 
effusions of a distempered brain.”134 If Jackson was to acquire Texas, he intended to do so 
through negotiation with the central government in Mexico City. “A revolt in Texas,” 
Jackson told his chargé in Mexico in February 1831, “may close the door forever to its 
advantageous settlement.”135 
Texas 
But a revolt is precisely what would eventually occur.136 A small skirmish between American 
settlers and Mexican military authorities in the town of Gonzales in October 1835 sparked a 
more general armed uprising, determined to drive the Mexican army out of Texas.137 The 
following month, the Texan revolutionaries created a provisional government, and named 
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Sam Houston commander-in-chief of their armed forces.138 By December, the revolutionary 
army had defeated all Mexican garrisons and was in control of the state. In response, 
Mexican President Santa Anna ordered a two-pronged counter-offensive, one of which he 
led himself, to take the state back from the insurgent army. Santa Anna’s armies slaughtered 
hundreds of Anglo-Texan revolutionaries after a two-week siege at the Alamo and the 
surrender at Goliad through February and early March 1836. As this was occurring, Anglo-
Texan political leaders gathered on 2 March 1836 and officially declared the independent 
Republic of Texas, drafting a constitution over the following two weeks. On 15 April 1836, 
former empresario and now-Texan revolutionary leader Stephen F. Austin sent President 
Jackson an impassioned plea for assistance, writing: “This people look to you, the guardians 
of their rights and interests and principles, will you, can you turn a deaf ear to the appeals of 
your fellow citizens in favor of their and your country men and friends, who are massacred, 
butchered, outraged in Texas at your very doors?”139  
However, immediate assistance wouldn’t ultimately be necessary. In their final push to 
drive the revolutionaries out of Texas, Santa Anna’s army was decisively defeated by Sam 
Houston’s forces on 21 April 1836 at San Jacinto, and Santa Anna himself was taken 
prisoner. With this victory, the Texas Revolution was over. In September, elections were 
held, and the constitution and the matter of annexation to the United States were put to 
referendum. Sam Houston was elected President of the Republic of Texas in a landslide, the 
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constitution was approved, and the voters supported annexation to the United States 3,277 
to 91.140 The question now was how leaders in Washington would respond. 
Washington Reacts 
There were some good reasons to support the Texas revolutionaries. The sparking of the 
revolution itself, and the bloody battles that followed, activated two mechanisms that made 
simply rejecting the Texan fait accompli difficult. First, the costs of acquiring Texas had been 
dramatically reduced. The revolution was over; the Texans had prevailed and had made their 
intentions unmistakably clear. The actual, on-the-ground costs associated with acquiring 
Texas had already been paid by the Anglo-Texan forces. All President Jackson had to do was 
agree to the request for annexation that was before him. And in light of Jackson’s 
demonstrated desire to acquire Texas for the United States, along with his close personal 
friendship with Sam Houston, the revolution presented a golden opportunity for the 
administration. 
Second, there was significant public support for the Texas revolutionaries in the United 
States. The outbreak of the revolution was accompanied by a flood of money and supplies 
across the Louisiana border in support of the Anglo-Texan insurgents. Young men from 
across the American south streamed across the border by the thousands to enlist and fight 
for the Texan cause.141 The national and regional press were strongly sympathetic with the 
rebels, portraying events in Texas in a sensationalist manner.142 Politicians from the south 
and the west put pressure on the Jackson administration, urging them to recognize Texan 
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independence and prepare the way for annexation.143 Aiming to take advantage of this 
groundswell of support, the Texas government dispatched a number of commissioners to 
Washington over the course of 1836, who lobbied members of congress and the 
administration for recognition and annexation.144 This broad public support is hardly 
surprising. After all, most of the revolutionaries were Americans, at least until very recently, 
and some, such as Sam Houston, had important ties to the U.S. political elite. And the idea 
of a scrappy, burgeoning republic casting off the yoke of distant tyranny to declare its 
independence clearly appealed to American sensibilities. 
However, not all of the American public supported annexation. For Texas at this time 
had a slave population of roughly 5,000, having been brought in by the American settlers.145 
And the Texas revolution was taking place in the wake of the “Missouri Compromise” of 
1820, as well as the more recent “Nullification Crisis” of 1832-33, both of which exposed 
and exacerbated the important sectional conflicts between free and slave-holding states.146 
Abolitionists, Whig Party members, and northerners more generally were strongly opposed 
to the annexation of Texas, horrified at the prospect of adding a large, slave-holding territory 
to the Union.147 While the opposition was initially quiet and on the fringes of political debate, 
it would grow in volume and importance as the months passed.148 
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However, while there were reasons to accept the Texan fait accompli, there were also 
reasons for caution. Besides the simmering political opposition, there was also potentially 
significant geopolitical risk involved in annexing the newly-independent republic. For one, 
Mexico, with a newly-installed leader, seemed to be intent on taking Texas back from the 
revolutionaries by force. As the local U.S. minister in Mexico City reported to Secretary of 
State Forsyth on 19 May 1836, less than a month after the Battle of San Jacinto, the Mexican 
“national congress has resolved to prosecute the war against Texas with the utmost vigor.” 
The minister added that “the alleged reason for entertaining such questions is the supposed 
interference of the United States in the war of Texas.”149 Similar observations were reported 
back to the capital in June, August, and October.150 
There was also at least some concern over the possibility of Mexico gaining the support 
of a European great power, such as the United Kingdom, in taking back the renegade state. 
On 25 June 1836, the U.S. minister in Mexico reported to Forsyth that the “application of 
this government to Great Britain for aid to restore her authority in Texas is a question of 
great magnitude.”151 Mexico was apparently using its opposition to slavery in Texas as a 
means to try to elicit British aid.152 And there was clearly concern over this in Washington. 
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For instance, in August 1836 the acting Secretary of State urged his minister in Mexico to 
“be vigilant as to the movements of the Mexican Government towards obtaining foreign aid 
for the subjugation of Texas, and give early information thereof to the Department.”153 
Thus, while Mexico would be ultimately disappointed in its efforts to enlist British 
support,154 the possibility clearly weighed on the minds of policymakers in Washington. 
Washington Decides 
Facing a combination of enthusiastic, though non-unanimous, domestic political support, as 
well as perceived geopolitical risk, President Jackson would ultimately opt for a rejection of 
Texas’ fait accompli. Despite the president’s considerable personal sympathy for the cause, and 
his own decades-long friendship with Houston, the downside risks seemed too great to 
consider annexation at this moment. Instead, the administration adopted a neutral stance in 
the Texas-Mexico conflict, and refused to get involved until it had been settled between the 
two parties.155 Jackson had earlier foreshadowed this position in his annual message to 
Congress of December 1835.156 However, his position became unmistakably clear when, in 
reacting to Austin’s request for assistance of 15 April 1836, Jackson coolly wrote: 
“The writer does not reflect that we have a treaty with mexico, and our national faith 
is pledged to support it. The Texians[,] before they took the step to declare themselves 
Independent, which has aroused and united all mexico against them[,] ought to have 
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pondered well, it was a rash and premature act[;] our nutrality must be faithfully 
maintained.”157 
This position, which would be repeatedly referred to as one of “strict neutrality,” defined the 
Jackson administration’s response throughout the course of the crisis.158 
 The Jackson administration had a number of motivations in deciding to reject the Texan 
fait accompli. To the extent that there is a conventional wisdom on this matter, it is that 
concerns over the domestic political repercussions of annexation, particularly with regards to 
Texas’ slave-holder status, scared the Jackson administration off.159 These fears were 
particularly acute, the argument goes, in the context of an impending federal election in 
November 1836, where Jackson hoped his vice president, Martin Van Buren, would be 
elected president.160 There is a lot of evidence to support this argument, and it was clearly an 
important part of what guided the president’s decision making. In a 5 December 1836 
message to Congress, Jackson made reference to the “reconcilement of various and 
conflicting interests” as a prerequisite for the annexation of Texas.161 And using almost 
identical language, Secretary of State Forsyth reportedly told a Texan commissioner in early 
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January 1837 that “various conflicting sectional interests in Congress would have to be 
reconciled before annexation would be agreed to.”162  
 However, for three reasons, this “sectional conflict” hypothesis, while not wrong, is at the 
very least incomplete. First, it is somewhat difficult to make sense of Jackson’s years of 
efforts to purchase Texas from Mexico if his primary concern was sparking a sectional 
conflict over slavery. As late as 1834, Jackson was still actively seeking to acquire Texas 
through his chargé in Mexico via negotiation and purchase,163 and in January 1837, in a 
meeting with former Mexican President Santa Anna, Jackson, again, offered to buy the state 
for $3.5 million.164 It seems, to an important extent, that Jackson was more concerned with 
the way Texas was acquired than the simple fact of its acquisition. Second, the victory of Vice 
President Van Buren in the November election, of which the administration was assured by 
the beginning of December 1836,165 should have allayed at least some of these domestic 
political concerns, but it seemed not to. The administration still had three months of 
annexation opportunities until the end of its term in March 1837, which it elected not to 
avail itself of. In meetings with Texas commissioners from December through February, 
Jackson and other members of the administration exhibited the same reluctance toward 
annexation they had all along.166 
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The third and most important reason the sectional conflict hypothesis appears to be 
incomplete is that there is a lot of evidence that the Jackson administration had other 
concerns; namely, the geopolitical risk associated with annexing Texas.167 This concern over 
the possibility of war can be seen clearly in two episodes that occurred during the crisis over 
Texas. First, in January 1836, as the revolution was heating up, Major General Edmund 
Gaines was dispatched by Secretary of War Cass to establish a defensive position near the 
Louisiana border with Texas. Gaines was explicitly reminded, in line with administration 
policy, that it was “the duty of the United States to remain entirely neutral.”168 In late March 
and early April, Gaines reported back to Washington that he had intelligence that several 
tribes of Native Americans were preparing to attack the American frontier from within 
Texas, and requested permission to cross the border if necessary.169 Secretary Cass replied on 
25 April, clarifying that it was “not the wish of the President to take advantage of present 
circumstances, and thereby obtain possession of any portion of the Mexican territory,” but 
that Gaines was, indeed, “authorized to take such position on either side of the imaginary 
boundary line as may be best for your defensive operations.”170 Perhaps out of concern that 
he had given the major general too much discretion, Cass followed up with dispatches on 4 
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and 12 May, reminding Gaines to “act cautiously,” to not cross the border “unless 
circumstances distinctly show this step is necessary,” and, if so, to “return as soon as the 
safety of the frontier will permit.”171 
In June 1836, Gaines crossed the Sabine River into Texas and occupied the town of 
Nacogdoches, some 80 km from the border.172 The major general then called up militia 
forces from Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Louisiana to provide additional 
personnel, which their governors were only-too-eager to provide.173 When President Jackson 
learned of the occupation and the militia requisition in early August, he was “much 
astonished.”174 Within a few days, he had contacted the state governors in question and had 
countermanded Gaines’ requisition, ordering the militia forces to be discharged.175 In a 12 
August letter to Amos Kendall, Jackson’s Postmaster General and a key member of his 
“kitchen cabinet,” Jackson explained his reasoning, arguing that Gaines’ action “was a 
violation of that nutrality which we had assumed, and was in fact, and which Mexico might 
have viewed as[,] an act of war upon her if it had been carried into effect.” Thankfully, Jackson 
continued he had “stopped it in the bud.”176 In a letter to Gaines himself on 4 September, 
Jackson reminded the major general that “ours is a state of strict neutrality,” and that Gaines, 
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“as the commander of our forces on that frontier[,] must religiously observe and maintain 
it.”177 Thus, it is clear that Jackson’s reversal of what was, frankly, a golden opportunity to 
gain territory in Texas was motivated, in important part, by the desire to avoid war with 
Mexico. 
There was a second episode that makes clear the administration’s concerns over 
geopolitical risk. In June 1836, President Jackson dispatched an agent by the name of Henry 
R. Morfit to gather “detailed information of the civil, military and political conditions of 
Texas.”178 The results of Morfit’s reports would play an important role in shaping the 
thinking of the Jackson administration. As Secretary of State Forsyth told the Texan 
commissioners in July 1836, the president “would not act definitely upon the subject of 
Texas until the report of a Confidential Agent sent to that country should be received.”179 In 
his first, detailed report of 9 September, Morfit cast doubt on Texas’ prospects, and his 
primary reason for doing so was that “the Mexicans it is said are preparing to invade Texas 
during this winter.”180 In his second report the following day, Morfit emphasized the vast 
imbalance of power that Texas faced vis-à-vis Mexico, noting that the Mexican population 
was “about 8 million” and that of Texas “between 40 and 50 thousand,” so, in his view, it 
could not “be supposed that under ordinary circumstances the issue of this war would 
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remain long undecided.” In closing this second report, Morfit argued that Texas’ “future 
security must depend more upon the weakness and imbecility of her enemy then upon her 
own strength.”181 
President Jackson seemed to take these findings to heart. Annexation would be 
definitively off the table, and he even decided to refer the matter of diplomatic recognition 
to Congress. Jackson’s reasoning for doing so is also telling. As he wrote to Amos Kendall 
on 8 December 1836, with “the Constitutional power of declaring war being vested in 
Congress, and [as] the acknowledgment of the Independence of Texas might lead to war with Mexico,” 
the subject should be referred to that body.182 In a special message to Congress on 21 
December, Jackson noted that a “premature recognition under these circumstances, if not 
looked upon as justifiable cause of war, is always liable to be regarded as proof of an unfriendly 
spirit.” Jackson added that there was, “in appearance at least, an immense disparity of 
physical force on the side of Mexico.” Thus, Jackson argued, the United States “should still 
stand aloof and maintain our present attitude.”183 For the time being, Texas was on its own. 
After contemplating the matter for two months, Congress would pass a series of 
resolutions appropriating the funds necessary for the diplomatic recognition of Texas in late 
February 1837. In his very last day in office, on 3 March, Jackson formally recognized the 
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independence of Texas by nominating a chargé d’affaries to the republic.184 Texas would 
continue to unsuccessfully press for annexation after the inauguration of President Martin 
Van Buren. A Texas diplomatic official explained the U.S.’s continued reticence to consider 
annexation in January 1838 by pointing, among other things, to a fear “of involving this 
country in a war, in which they are now doubtful whether they would ever be supported by a 
majority of their own citizens, and which would be at once branded by their enemies at 
home and abroad as an unjust war, instigated for the very purpose of gaining possession of 
Texas.”185 Texas would remain a ramshackle independent republic until March 1845, when it 
would be formally annexed to the United States during the transition period between 
Presidents John Tyler and James K. Polk. This annexation of Texas would, of course, spark 
the war with Mexico that Jackson had so feared. 
*** 
In closing, it is worth reflecting on the sea change observed in the perceptions and behaviors 
of Andrew Jackson across the two cases. Jackson, as a field commander in the case of 
Florida, argued that “the whole of East Florida [should be] seized,” and that he would 
happily do it himself. In the course of carrying out the conquest, Jackson also rashly put to 
death two British subjects for little more than being in the wrong place at the wrong time, 
and whose execution, he hoped, would “prove an awful example to the world.” Yet his 
behavior as president was strikingly different. In the case of Texas, Jackson characterized the 
revolution as a “rash and premature act,” decided that his government would maintain 
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“strict neutrality” in the conflict, and urged the U.S. Congress to “stand aloof.” And when 
he heard that the Texans had captured Mexican President Santa Anna and were considering 
putting him to death, he argued vehemently against it. In a letter to Sam Houston on 4 
September 1836, Jackson argued that “nothing now could tarnish the character of Texas 
more than such an act at this late period,” and urged his friend to “preserve his life and the 
character you have won… this is what I think, true wisdom and humanity dictates.”186 And 
this was Santa Anna, who had, just a few months earlier, ordered the slaughter of hundreds 
to Texan (and American) revolutionaries at the Alamo and Goliad. It is difficult to imagine a 
more fitting illustration of the difference between the “view from the capital” and the “view 
from the frontier,” discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
Three alternative arguments that might explain the cases of Florida and Texas are strategic 
expansion theory, state institutional weakness, and leader interests. First, it is clear that 
neither the case of Florida nor of Texas are characterized by strategic expansion. In Florida, 
Andrew Jackson was acting in direct contravention of orders from the capital that his 
predecessor had received only weeks earlier, and in Texas, Sam Houston’s revolution was 
sparked without any foreknowledge or support from Washington. While the ultimate 
decision by Monroe in the case of Florida and Jackson in the case of Texas was strategic in 
nature—a cost-benefit calculation based on domestic political pressure and perceived 
geopolitical risk—these leaders had no control over the process whatsoever until it was 
thrust into their laps. And their ultimate decisions were strongly conditioned by the twin 
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forces of the conquest-generated incentives to retain the territories and the perceived 
geopolitical risks associated with doing so. In short, there is little “strategic” about these 
instances of territorial expansion. 
 Second, state institutional weakness doesn’t appear to be a sufficient explanation for the 
unauthorized peripheral expansion in the cases of Florida and Texas. While the American 
state was clearly relatively weak, particularly as compared to its more centralized European 
counterparts, this fact doesn’t seem to have produced abundant inadvertent expansion 
overall.187 As presented in Table 3.4 in the previous chapter, fewer than 10 percent of 
American cases of territorial expansion overall were inadvertent in nature, whereas 
institutionally stronger states such as France and the United Kingdom experienced 
considerably more.188 Thus, in the United States, as in other cases, state institutional capacity 
played little role in its inadvertent expansion. 
 Third, leader interests don’t appear to explain why leaders in the capital subsequently 
authorized the expansion in the case of Florida, but not in Texas. The problem here is that 
leader interests were relatively constant—both the Monroe administration in Florida and the 
Jackson administration in Texas wanted the territories in question—but the outcomes varied. 
Monroe was able to relatively-safely authorize the fait accompli because he perceived the 
geopolitical risk in Florida to be manageable. Jackson, on the other hand, was unable to 
authorize the Texan fait accompli, despite his strong desire for the Mexican state, because he 
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saw the risks of war to be too great. The perceived geopolitical consequences of acquisition 
were a far more important determinant of the choices these leaders made than a simple 
reference to their narrow interests. 
*** 
This chapter has presented comparative case studies of inadvertent expansion and non-
expansion by the United States in Florida and Texas. Both cases strongly support the theory 
of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. First, the case of Florida showed how 
unauthorized peripheral expansion is enabled by a lack of adequate control by the capital—
that it is a manifestation of a principal-agent problem. Second, both cases support the 
argument that unauthorized peripheral expansion activates mechanisms that make a simple 
withdrawal significantly more difficult. In both Florida and Texas, peripheral expansion 
dramatically drove down the perceived costs of acquisition for leaders in the capital, and 
generated domestic political pressure in favor of acquisition. And third, in both cases the 
decision of whether to accept or reject the territorial fait accompli was crucially determined by 
the perceived geopolitical risk associated with doing so. In the case of Florida, the Monroe 
administration deftly retained partial control of the Spanish province, without fear that this 
would lead to war with Spain. In the case of Texas, President Jackson feared that accepting 
the Texan fait accompli would mean war with Mexico, which led to its rejection. In both cases, 
what I referred to in Chapter 2 as the “view from the capital” and the “view from the 
frontier” was powerfully illustrated—showing Andrew Jackson to be the hot-blooded 





INADVERTENT EXPANSION ON THE EURASIAN STEPPE: RUSSIA 
 
“Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. 
The United States of America, France in Algeria, Holland in her Colonies, England in 
India—all have been irresistibly forced, less by ambition than by imperious necessity, 
into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know when to stop.” 
Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov1 
 
“It can hardly be said that the Russians have a fixed policy in Asia. The government at 
St. Petersburg has been always sincerely desirous of refraining from conquests and 
extension of dominion, in Central Asia, but circumstances have compelled them often 
to take the aggressive, and conquests having been once made, it has been found to be 
impossible to give them up, without a certain loss of prestige. One general after 
another has seen himself obliged to keep up the credit of Russian arms, and attack a 
native government. The reasons which led him to this course have at last been found 
good at St. Petersburg, although it was regretted that such necessity had arisen, and the 
conquests which he made were retained. The policy has thus been a floating one, 
subject entirely to circumstances.” 
Eugene Schuyler2 
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This chapter examines inadvertent expansion in two cases from the Russian Empire in 
Central Asia. The first case focuses on the Russian acquisition of territory in the Khanate of 
Kokand in 1864-66. The second case examines the Russian Empire’s non-acquisition of the 
Ili Region of western Qing Dynasty China in 1871-81. The purpose of this chapter is to 
present the dissertation’s second pair of comparative, theory-testing cases, showing how 
varying perceptions of geopolitical risk helped produce the divergent outcomes observed. 
Russia in the Khanate of Kokand and in the Ili Region is a useful comparison in that the two 
cases hold many factors fixed—the same great power, operating in the same region, with 
most of the same leaders in the capital, and separated by only five years—while the 
outcomes vary. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the case of Russia in 
the Khanate of Kokand, where a local military officer defies St. Petersburg’s orders and 
independently conquers the cities of Chimkent and Tashkent, resulting in their incorporation 
into the Russian Empire. Second, I move onto the case of Russia in the Ili Region, where 
another military officer orders the conquest of the Ili River Valley without authorization 
from St. Petersburg, and his territorial claim is ultimately relinquished. Third and finally, I 
conclude with a brief consideration of alternative arguments, as well as a discussion of the 
importance of these cases for the theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Russia in the Khanate of Kokand, 1864-1866 
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The Russian Empire acquired the Khanate of Kokand’s cities of Chimkent3 and Tashkent4 
between July 1864 and August 1866. The conquest of these cities was independently planned 
and executed by a local officer of the Imperial Russian Army, disregarding the orders of his 
civilian and military superiors in the capital, St. Petersburg. The theory of inadvertent 
expansion makes three central arguments that are borne out in this case. First, that 
peripheral expansion is the result of a principal-agent problem; that a combination of a 
divergence of preferences between leaders in the capital and their agents on the periphery 
and information asymmetries favoring the agents lead to a loss of control over the agents’ 
actions. In the case of Russia in Kokand, there was a significant divergence of preferences 
between leaders in the capital and members of the Imperial Russian Army on the Central 
Asian frontier, and the vast distances separating the two led to dramatic information 
asymmetries in favor of the army. Second, that once a territory is partly or wholly acquired, a 
number of mechanisms are activated that make it difficult for leaders in the capital to simply 
withdraw. In the case at hand, the frontier army’s striking successes in acquiring these cities 
helped convince some of the more reluctant leaders in the capital, and broader concerns for 
Russian national honor meant backing down seemed out of the question. And third, that a 
lack of perceived geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will encourage leaders in the 
capital to accept the fait accompli, resulting in territorial expansion. In the case of Russia in 
Kokand, the Central Asian khanates were relatively weak, and concerns over a potentially-
adverse reaction by the British were quickly alleviated by their muted response. These facts 
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strengthened the case for central authorization, which would occur when Tashkent was 
formally annexed to the Russian Empire in August 1866. 
Historical Background 
The Russian Empire began to advance deep into the Kazakh Steppe of Central Asia in the 
1840s. From its base in Orenburg, at the southern tip of the Ural Mountains, a string of forts 
was established through the late 1840s and early 1850s, culminating in the conquest of Ak 
Mechet and the founding of Fort Perovsk there in 1853.5 Further to the east, from Omsk in 
Western Siberia, a similar southward advance ensued, which itself would culminate in the 
founding of the town Vernyi in 1854.6 These two lines each penetrated over 1,000 km 
southward into the Kazakh Steppe, fully enveloping it. Yet they themselves were separated 
by over 1,000 km of uncharted territory.7 To the south of the Russian lines were the three 
Uzbek khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand.8 Established at the turn of the previous 
century, these Islamic kingdoms were fairly populous, harshly autocratic, militarily weak and 
prone to warfare amongst themselves, and often internally divided in ways that made them 
vulnerable to outside influence and attack.9 The Khanate of Kokand sat further north than 
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the other two, and its affluent urban centers of Chimkent and Tashkent made it an enticing 
target for the expanding Russian Empire. 
 With the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-56) in October 1853, the Russian Empire 
would slow its advance in Central Asia for the following decade. Russia’s humiliating defeat 
starkly revealed its technological and military inferiority as compared to its European great 
power rivals, and sparked a period of introspection and dramatic domestic reform.10 
Economically bankrupt and internally focused, there was little money, manpower, energy, or 
interest to devote to acquiring new territory in Central Asia. However, as the recovery from 
Crimea progressed, and as Russia’s multi-generational conquest of the Caucasus began to 
wind down, attention once again turned toward Central Asia in the early 1860s. 
 The central question of Russian imperial policy that would emerge in Central Asia was 
when—and, more importantly, where—to connect Russia’s two strings of forts and establish 
a defensible southern border for the empire.11 The foreign minister at the time was the 
esteemed diplomat, Prince Alexander Gorchakov. An unusually cautious and circumspect 
advisor to the tsar, Gorchakov tended to cast his gaze westward, toward Europe and the 
balance-of-power politics that prevailed there, and was averse to the use of Russian force to 
achieve interests he deemed peripheral.12 The minister of war was Dmitry Miliutin, a brilliant 
military historian and strategic thinker who tended to be somewhat more forward-leaning in 
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his advocacy for the use of force.13 Their principal role in imperial policy was to inform and 
advise the tsar, Alexander II. A progressive leader in 19th century Russian terms, Alexander, 
like Gorchakov, tended to be judicious when it came to the use of force, and focused more 
on domestic reform than imperial expansion. Yet the tsar was also prone to be tempted by 
notions of glory, grandeur, and Russian national prestige.14 These three individuals—
Gorchakov, Miliutin, and Alexander II—were the leaders in the capital that were primarily 
responsible for Russian imperial policy. It is they who would be dragged unwittingly into 
more territorial acquisitions than they had bargained for in Central Asia. 
In February 1863, a special committee on Central Asian policy was held in the capital, St. 
Petersburg, and it was agreed that reconnaissance between Russia’s two lines was a necessary 
first step.15 The individual tasked with this reconnaissance would be a lieutenant colonel in 
the Imperial Russian Army, Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev. Cherniaev came from venerable 
Russian military lineage—his grandfather had served Catherine the Great and his father 
fought Napoleon’s armies at Austerlitz and in the invasion of Russia.16 Cherniaev himself 
spent his entire adolescent and adult life in military service, entering a military preparatory 
school at the age of 12 and enlisting in the imperial army at 19.17 A decorated veteran of the 
Crimean War, Cherniaev also served in Russian Poland and the Caucasus before landing in 
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Orenburg on Russia’s Central Asian frontier in the early 1860s.18 Cherniaev was said to be 
charming, ambitious, deeply religious, and profoundly conservative. He was open, direct, and 
accessible, traits that made him well-loved by those under his charge. Yet Cherniaev also had 
a strong independent streak and was often impatient, quarrelsome with his superiors, and 
highly sensitive to criticism. He was also paranoid and prone to conspiratorial thinking, and 
would defy orders from above almost as a matter of course.19 Lieutenant Colonel Cherniaev 
was the key actor on the Russia’s imperial periphery who would independently launch the 
conquests in the Khanate of Kokand. 
Cherniaev began his reconnaissance of the territory separating Fort Perovsk and the town 
of Vernyi in the spring of 1863. The instructions given to him by the governor-general of 
Orenburg were to “display the greatest peaceableness, and use arms only in case of extreme 
necessity.”20 However, Cherniaev’s actions on this exploratory mission would be a strong 
indication of what was to come. On 30 May, he came upon the town of Suzak, some 400 km 
down the Syr-Darya River from Fort Perovsk. Cherniaev was then fired upon, and he 
ordered a retaliatory bombardment of the town, leading to its prompt surrender. News of 
the acquisition of Suzak shocked the governor-general of Orenburg, but was met with praise 
in St. Petersburg. Even the usually-cautious Foreign Minister Gorchakov noted in July 1863 
that the “successful actions of Colonel Cherniaev, without special expenditures and sacrifices 
have brought us closer to the goal [of closing the lines] which we had in view originally.”21 
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The following month, Gorchakov and War Minister Miliutin agreed that the lines should be 
connected expeditiously, and their unification was officially ordered by Tsar Alexander II on 
20 December 1863.22 The key question was where they would be connected. 
It was agreed in early 1864 that an initial line would be drawn north of the Syr-Darya and 
Arys Rivers, which would be connected from Suzak through the town of Aulie-Ata.23 The 
line could then, according to Miliutin, be moved further south and connected through 
Chimkent “when the time is favorable.”24 On 9 February 1864, Cherniaev was appointed 
commander of the Western Siberian detachment based in Omsk, and was given orders to 
occupy and fortify Aulie-Ata.25 In late April, Cherniaev departed Vernyi with 2,500 
personnel, 800 horses, and 4,000 camels, and he reached Aulie-Ata, some 450 km away, on 2 
June.26 After a two-day siege, Cherniaev and his forces stormed the town and easily took it, 
inflicting approximately 300 deaths upon the Kokandian forces and suffering only three 
slightly wounded of their own.27 In late June, the lines between Orenburg and Vernyi were 
connected, and Cherniaev was promoted to Major-General.28 His orders had been fulfilled 
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with striking success. As he wrote in a letter to his parents on 28 June 1864, the capture of 
Aulie-Ata “comprised the final goal set this year for the detachment”29 
St. Petersburg & Russian Central Asia 
St. Petersburg suffered severe principal-agent problems with respect to Cherniaev and its 
other agents on the Central Asian frontier, due to a divergence of preferences between the 
two parties and information asymmetries strongly favoring the periphery. First, there was a 
divergence of preferences between the leaders in St. Petersburg and actors on the Central 
Asian frontier when it came to Russian imperial policy there. In general, leaders in St. 
Petersburg were not in favor of significant expansion in the region.30 Perhaps, in the 
relatively near future, Chimkent could be added to Russian holdings, but Tashkent, further 
to the south and one of the largest cities in Central Asia, was seen as off limits by most. 
While there had been regular calls from within the Russian government for Tashkent’s 
acquisition since the late 1850s,31 those whose opinions mattered most—Alexander II, 
Gorchakov, and, to a lesser extent, Miliutin—were opposed. They preferred to consolidate 
existing Russian gains in the region rather than add to them, were concerned about the 
potential for sparking conflict with Britain, and thought it better to influence these territories 
as independent entities from without rather than directly controlling them from within.32 In 
sum, leaders in the capital embodied what I referred to in Chapter 2 as the “view from the 
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capital”—the responsibilities of rule were weighty, the dangers were distant, and the 
incentive to act quickly was absent. 
In contrast, many actors near and on the Central Asian frontier advocated for a more 
expansionist policy for Russia there.33 Cherniaev, in particular, had long argued for a more 
forceful policy in the region, and had come to see Chimkent and Tashkent as particularly 
enticing possibilities. As he wrote while posted on the Central Asian frontier in the late 
1850s, advocating for an advance beyond Fort Perovsk, “We have the resources for this, but 
they are being kept under wraps… We need this region to extend our influence over Central 
Asia.”34 Hardened frontier agents such as Cherniaev exemplified what I referred to as “the 
view from the periphery”—their responsibilities were narrow, the dangers were near, and, 
therefore, their temptation to act was high. 
Second, the vast distance between St. Petersburg and Russian Central Asia and the 
rudimentary state of transportation and communications technology meant that there were 
important information asymmetries favoring the periphery. While Orenburg had been 
connected to St. Petersburg by telegraph since the 1850s, Russian territory deep in Central 
Asia, such as Suzak and Aulie-Ata, would not see a telegraph station until 1873,35 and the 
region wouldn’t be fully accessible by rail until 1898.36 It took a full month’s difficult journey 
to travel the approximately 1,500 km from Orenburg to the front lines in Russian Central 
Asia, and, therefore, communications sent from St. Petersburg would take at least two 
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months to receive a reply.37 According to historian David MacKenzie, this distance 
“stimulated initiative and independent judgment but encouraged ambitious commanders 
seeking decorations and promotion to commit their government to a course contradicting its 
general policy.”38 It also meant that frontier agents such as Cherniaev were often the only 
source of information on happenings in the region, and they could (and did) distort events in 
their favor, exaggerating the severity of local threats and downplaying or glossing over their 
own mistakes and misdeeds.39 Thus, as a result of a divergence of preferences and 
information asymmetries, leaders in St. Petersburg had a very difficult time controlling the 
actions of agents on the periphery, and this opened the door to a great deal of independent 
action. 
Chimkent 
Within just days of taking Aulie-Ata and connecting the Russian lines, Cherniaev began 
eyeing Chimkent, a Kokandian city roughly 260 km to the southeast, on the south side of the 
Arys River. In the first week of July 1864, Cherniaev resolved to advance on the city, writing 
to the governor-general of Western Siberia that because “Kokanese concentrations grow 
daily… I have decided to protect Aulie-Ata and nearby nomads by advancing toward 
Chimkent and operating there according to circumstances.”40 Cherniaev then set out from 
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Aulie-Ata with a force of 1,400 towards Chimkent.41 He received peace overtures en route 
from the Kokandian warlord Alimqul, but he quickly brushed these aside, arriving at the 
Chimkent city walls on 19 July. There he was met by Kokandian cavalry forces and a battle 
ensued, resulting in a clear Russian victory, with as many as 400 Kokandian forces killed and, 
again, just three Russians wounded.42 However, Cherniaev soon realized that his own force 
was likely insufficient to capture the city outright, and after three days they returned to Aulie-
Ata. 
 This initial, abortive attempt didn’t dissuade Cherniaev from his goal of acquiring the city. 
In an August 1864 letter to the Imperial Army’s general staff, Cherniaev wrote that by 
“taking Chimkent we shall deliver a decisive blow to Kokand,” and argued that the city’s 
“seizure before winter is not only beneficial but essential for the region’s peace.”43 Cherniaev 
then pointedly asked, with characteristic threat-inflation, “Should we wait until, with the help 
of Europeans, military science in Kokand compares with our own, or should we now 
remove their power to resist?”44 The Major-General summed up his message by declaring: “I 
have decided to conquer Chimkent on my own responsibility,” and this is precisely what he 
would do.45 
 On 12 September 1864, Cherniaev once again set out from Aulie-Ata, this time with a 
force of 1,700.46 The concentration of Kokandian forces at Chimkent had subsided in the 
 
41 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 39. 
42 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 40n25. 
43 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” p. 292; MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 42. 
44 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” pp. 292-293. 
45 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” p. 293; MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, pp. 41-42. 
46 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 42. 
143 
 
preceding weeks, and the prospects for a successful attack looked much improved. 
Cherniaev’s forces arrived at Chimkent on 19 September, and after a two-day siege, they 
stormed the city. The invasion itself reportedly took place through a 60-foot water pipe 
extending through the city wall, with Cherniaev audaciously plunging into the pipe before 
any of his subordinates.47 Within a few hours, Chimkent had fallen and Cherniaev was in 
control of the city. He had pulled off his fait accompli and the Russian Empire had gained a 
new territory. 
 When news of the march on Chimkent began to filter back to St. Petersburg, reactions 
were mixed. When he heard of Cherniaev’s decision to attack the city, Minister of War 
Miliutin grumbled that such “an extension of our frontiers never entered into our plans; it 
lengthens our lines unduly and requires considerable increases of forces.” The problem they 
faced, the War Minister added, was that “communications are so slow that any instructions 
arrive too late.”48 However, this wouldn’t stop him from engaging in the largely futile 
exercise of telegraphing the governor-general of Western Siberia the following day, ordering 
him to instruct Cherniaev “in no case… to go further than was proposed.”49 A few weeks 
later, when he learned of Chimkent’s successful acquisition, an exasperated Miliutin asked, 
“who will guarantee that after Chimkent Cherniaev won’t consider it necessary to take 
Tashkent, then Kokand, and there will be no end to it.”50 Foreign Minister Gorchakov felt 
similarly, and was ultimately in favor of withdrawal.51  
 
47 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 43. 
48 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” p. 293. 
49 MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent, p. 43. 
50 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” p. 293. 
51 MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia,” p. 295. 
144 
 
 However, the very fact of Cherniaev’s successful acquisition activated two mechanisms 
that would make Chimkent very difficult to readily relinquish. The first was the simple fact 
that the territory had already been acquired, and at minimal cost. While leaders may not have 
wanted it to be taken just then and there, there had been longer-term plans to add Chimkent 
to the empire, and so Cherniaev was largely insubordinate with respect to the timing of the 
conquest rather than the conquest itself.52 And once it was in Russian hands, some in St. 
Petersburg, such as many in the War Ministry, saw it as too strategically valuable to give up.53 
The second were concerns over Russian national honor, particularly those of the tsar, 
Alexander II. He was far more enthusiastic regarding the whole venture, awarding Cherniaev 
with the St. George’s Cross, Third Class, and referring to the conquest as “a glorious 
affair.”54 As noted above, Alexander II was prone to fall prey to concerns over Russian 
national prestige, and given that it was his opinion that mattered most, his enthusiasm meant 
that reversal was not an option. Chimkent was to be part of the Russian Empire. Cherniaev 
would get his way. 
Tashkent 
After the fall of Chimkent, history would repeat itself with the next major Kokandian urban 
center, Tashkent. Sitting just 120 km from the walls of Chimkent, and being the largest and 
most prosperous city in Central Asia, it would prove to be an even more enticing target for 
Cherniaev and his forces. Again, just days after the successful conquest of Chimkent, 
Cherniaev decided to move on Tashkent. Citing rumors of a threat from the neighboring 
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Khanate of Bukhara, Cherniaev informed the governor-general of Western Siberia on 25 
September 1864 that he was advancing on Tashkent, “not to occupy it, but if circumstances 
prove favorable, to forestall the plans of the emir of Bukhara.”55 Two days later he departed 
Chimkent, heading south toward Tashkent with 1,500 personnel.56 Cherniaev and his forces 
arrived at the Tashkent city walls on 2 October, and initiated a preparatory barrage. Thinking 
the walls had been breached, Cherniaev’s force advanced, only to find the wall intact and 
themselves in a highly vulnerable position. Cherniaev ultimately ordered a retreat, but only 
after suffering sixteen dead and 62 wounded, including the deaths of two of his top 
commanders.57 While not an enormous number in an absolute sense, with no gains, and in 
terms of Russia’s wars of empire in Central Asia, this was seen as an unmitigated disaster. 
 When news of Cherniaev’s march on Tashkent reached St. Petersburg, leaders there were 
infuriated. In a memo to the emperor on 31 October, Foreign Minister Gorchakov argued 
that such a move was “extremely dangerous and not only would place no limits on our 
advance into the heart of Central Asia but would… involve us directly in all the wars and 
disorders there.”58 That same day, Gorchakov memorialized that “we have firmly resolved 
not to occupy additional lands,” and recommended that Tashkent be promptly evacuated if 
it were occupied.59 A few weeks later, Gorchakov and War Minister Miliutin penned a joint 
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memorandum, arguing that every “new conquest, by lengthening our frontiers, requires a 
considerable increase in military resources and expenditures… and weakens Russia,” and 
recommended drawing the line at Chimkent.60 While Cherniaev would deliberately drag his 
feet in filing the report on the disastrous results of his attack, details of his failure and the 
associated loss of life reached the capital in late November, and it only made matters worse.61 
When the tsar finally heard of Cherniaev’s failed attack on 2 December, he wrote: “I greatly 
regret that he decided upon a useless assault costing us so many men.”62  
Foreign Minister Gorchakov was particularly worried about the reactions of the other 
great powers, and especially that of the United Kingdom. In an effort to allay any concerns, 
he wrote a memorandum on 21 November 1864 to be circulated among Russia’s European 
embassies and presented to local counterparts.63 In what has become known, simply, as “The 
Gorchakov Memorandum,” the foreign minister justified recent Russian expansion by 
pointing to the difficult position in which Russia found itself in Central Asia. This position, 
in Gorchakov’s words, “is that of all civilized states which are brought into contact with 
half-savage nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.” In order to ensure 
the security and prosperity of its frontier regions, he argued, the state is forced to choose 
between two unwelcome alternatives: to “abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance” or 
to “plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses 
increase with every step in advance.” “In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier,” 
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Gorchakov claimed, it was necessary to lay down a borderline definitively, “so as to escape 
the danger of being carried away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive measures 
and reprisals, into an unlimited extension of territory.” This line had been drawn at 
Chimkent, he argued. And, going forward, they would make every effort “to prove to our 
neighboring states… that Russia is not their enemy, [and] that she entertains towards them 
no ideas of conquest.”64 While some scholars have dismissed the memorandum as merely a 
“smoke screen” for further expansion,65 the evidence suggests that Gorchakov’s message 
was sincere.66 The plan in Central Asia, as far as St. Petersburg was concerned, was for 
Russia to expand no further. 
But Cherniaev, predictably, had other ideas. Cooling his heels for the winter at Chimkent, 
he itched for another shot at Tashkent. As he complained in a letter to a friend on the 
Russian general staff on 22 January 1865, “the attack on Tashkent was not as pointless as my 
friends in St. Petersburg claimed. Had it not been for my instructions, by now I would have 
driven the Kokanese from that little town… but in St. Petersburg, of course, they know 
better.”67 But his orders were clear. On 2 February, Minister of War Miliutin dispatched a 
message to Orenburg, reminding them that Cherniaev should “undertake nothing” without 
specific orders and reinforcements,68 and in a separate dispatch on 24 February, Foreign 
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Minister Gorchakov noted that “we have decided not to include [Tashkent] in the Empire 
believing it to be much more advantageous to exert indirect influence over it.”69  
However, even these most direct of instructions would not deter the major-general. Once 
again citing a Bukharan threat to Tashkent, Cherniaev set out from Chimkent in late April 
1865 with a force of 1,300 personnel and twelve cannons.70 He sent a message to the 
governor-general of Orenburg on 2 May, arguing that he “could not remain indifferent to 
the [Bukharan] Emir’s machinations and was compelled, without awaiting the arrival of 
reinforcements on the line, to advance now along the road to Tashkent.”71 Cherniaev’s force 
stopped first at Niazbek, a Kokandian fortress that controlled Tashkent’s water supply from 
the Chirchik River. Despite its being defended by a force of roughly 7,000, Cherniaev 
managed to compel its surrender at a cost of only seven Russian forces wounded.72 Having 
cut off the water supply to Tashkent, Cherniaev and his forces then laid siege to the city 
itself on 7 May. Cherniaev’s sieging army was attacked by Kokandian warlord Alimqul with a 
force of 6,000, but made easy work of them, inflicting 300 deaths on the Kokandians, 
including Alimqul himself, and losing only twenty wounded of their own.73 
By early June, the effects of the siege were beginning to bite. Hunger and drought were 
affecting the populace, and a Bukharan army had surreptitiously slipped into the city one 
night to take over its defenses. Cherniaev saw his window of opportunity closing and, at this 
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point, backing down was not seen as an option. As he wrote to the governor-general of 
Orenburg on 11 June, to “withdraw from the city would give the [Bukharan] Emir vast 
prestige in Central Asia and strengthen him with all the sinews of war concentrated in 
Tashkent. Consequently, I [have] decided to seize the city by open force.”74  
With a reinforced army of 1,950 personnel, Cherniaev launched the assault on Tashkent 
in the early morning of 15 June.75 Despite being surrounded by a moat, 26 km of twelve-to-
fifteen-foot walls, twelve fortified gates, and 63 cannons, Cherniaev’s forces were able to 
penetrate the city with the aid of internal collaborators.76 Tashkent’s much larger Kokandian 
and Bukharan force of 30,000, it would turn out, was no match for the Russian army, and on 
17 June the city surrendered.77 Tashkent, the largest city in Central Asia, has been acquired at 
a cost of 28 Russians killed and 85 wounded.78 
On the day of the surrender, Cherniaev reportedly rode quietly through the city under 
minimal guard, drinking tea offered by locals without hesitation and relaxing in a traditional 
Uzbek bath. From this point onward, some in Tashkent referred to Cherniaev as “Shirnaib,” 
or lion commander.79 He triumphantly reported to Orenburg that, with Tashkent’s 
occupation, “we have acquired in Central Asia a position corresponding to the interests of 
the empire and the power of the Russian people.”80 The fait accompli was complete. 
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The reaction from St. Petersburg was, again, mixed. On the one hand, official policy was 
still guided by the Gorchakov Memorandum—Russia’s Central Asian border was to run 
through Chimkent, and Tashkent was to remain firmly outside the bounds of the empire. 
Gorchakov and Miliutin agreed that Cherniaev should ultimately withdraw and that 
Tashkent should be independent, in line with this policy.81 On the other hand, many leaders 
in the capital found it difficult to not get swept up in the excitement of the moment. Tsar 
Alexander II, employing the same language he did after the acquisition of Chimkent, referred 
to Cherniaev’s actions as “glorious,” and ordered the presentation of “rewards to those who 
distinguished themselves.”82 The Russian interior minister captured the mood of many in St. 
Petersburg when he summed up the situation on 20 July 1865: “General Cherniaev took 
Tashkent. No one knows why or to what end… There is something erotic about our goings 
on at the distant periphery of the empire.”83 
Cherniaev’s successful acquisition of Tashkent, as with Chimkent, activated mechanisms 
that made withdrawal appear very difficult. The most important of these was the 
engagement of Russian national honor and prestige, and the Bukharan Emir’s demand that 
the Russians withdraw only strengthened these pressures. On 29 July, in a memo to the 
Governor-General of Orenburg, Miliutin argued that “the dignity of the Empire and the 
interests of Russia do not allow us even to consider the possibility of retreat or concession to 
the Emir of Bukhara’s arrogant demands. Our whole future in Central Asia depends on 
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[it].”84 Even the congenitally-cautious Gorchakov raised such concerns. In a memo to 
Miliutin on 23 July, he complained about Cherniaev’s insubordination but affirmed that, 
“We cannot retreat now. It is unthinkable to bow before the emir.”85 The need to defend 
Russian honor, and to not appear weak before Central Asian rivals, was a powerful 
motivating force in this instance.86 
 And, besides, there were few geopolitical risks associated with retaining Chimkent and 
Tashkent. The Kokandian armies had shown themselves to be no match for the Russian 
forces, and the armies or Bukhara and Khiva, too, were poorly equipped, trained, and 
disciplined, and tended to fight amongst themselves.87 The khanates were highly unlikely to 
be able to mount an effective collective defense. There were also few rival great power 
interests at stake. Chimkent and Tashkent were at least 350 km from the Afghan border and 
nearly 600 km from British India. During Russia’s conquests, Kokandian leaders sent envoys 
to Calcutta, requesting aid and protection against the expanding Russian Empire, but the 
British were unwilling to get involved.88 The United Kingdom, in this period, embraced a 
policy in Central Asia known as “masterly inactivity,” a strong commitment to avoid 
potentially entangling alliances and interventions in the region.89 Once Tashkent fell, 
London, for its part, was willing to accept Russian assurances and largely acquiesced to the 
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conquest.90 The lack of adverse reaction by Britain weakened arguments made within the 
tsarist cabinet for withdrawal from Tashkent, and strengthened arguments for its retention.91 
It would take two more decades of steady Russian gains for the British to push back, as they 
did with the Russian annexation of Penjdeh in 1885, nearly sparking a war between the two 
great powers.92 This is where Russian expansion in the region would come to an end. As 
David MacKenzie notes, “What eventually set limits to Russian expansion in Central Asia 
were… mountain barriers and British power.”93 Both were conspicuously absent in this case. 
*** 
Cherniaev, it would turn out, was a much better warrior than administrator. He not only 
continued to routinely defy the orders of his superiors in Orenburg and St. Petersburg, he 
badly mismanaged the finances of the occupation as well.94 By November 1865, St. 
Petersburg had had enough, and the emperor ordered Cherniaev recalled. As Miliutin later 
explained the decision, Cherniaev’s “willfulness, disobedience, and petty tyranny amounted 
to clear violations of the basic rules of the military service.”95 However, it turned out that 
removing so popular a major-general was not totally straightforward, and it would take until 
the end of April 1866 for Cherniaev to finally arrive back in the capital, where he was 
received at the Winter Palace. After prickly exchanges with both Gorchakov and Miliutin, 
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Cherniaev was brought in for an audience with the emperor. While the Cherniaev was 
apprehensive at first, Alexander II’s warm welcome and affectionate embrace moved the 
major-general to tears.96 It is noteworthy that official War Ministry accounts written soon 
after Cherniaev’s dismissal largely exonerated the major-general, and placed the blame 
squarely on the shoulders of Bukhara.97 St. Petersburg, it seemed, was eager to put the past 
behind it. 
Tashkent was formally annexed to the Russian Empire by the governor-general of 
Orenburg in August 1866. Renewed conflict with Bukhara that had bubbled up since 
Cherniaev’s conquest put an end to any idea of its independence.98 In July 1867, after much 
discussion, the area was organized as the governate-general (krai) of Turkestan, with 
Tashkent as its political and administrative center.99 Chimkent, Tashkent, and their 
surrounding areas wouldn’t see true independence until the collapse of the Soviet Union 
over 120 years later. 
The individual who would be given the difficult task of administering this new Russian 
territory was a lieutenant general in the Imperial Russian Army, Konstantin Petrovich von 
Kaufman. Unlike Cherniaev, Kaufman was not expected to engage in insubordination. As he 
personally told Tsar Alexander II before departing for Tashkent, “I do not fear supervision 
over me and my activities…, nor do I seek to escape it.”100 However, things would be 
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different once he was on the ground in Russian Central Asia. And Kaufman would prove to 
be just the latest peripheral agent to nearly drag his superiors in St. Petersburg into an 
unplanned territorial acquisition. 
 
Russia and the Ili Region, 1871-1881 
The Russian Empire refrained from acquiring the Ili Region of western China101 between 
June 1871 and February 1881. The conquest of this area was planned and ordered by the 
governor general of Russian Turkestan, acting without orders from his superiors in St. 
Petersburg. The theory of inadvertent expansion makes three central arguments that are 
supported in this case. First, that unauthorized peripheral expansion is the result of a 
principal-agent problem, combining a divergence of preferences between the capital and the 
periphery and information asymmetries favoring the latter. In the case of Russia in the Ili 
Region, there was a divergence of preferences between those in St. Petersburg and those on 
the Chinese frontier, and the absence of rapid communications hampered central control. 
Second, that once territory is acquired, a number of mechanisms are activated that make it 
difficult to readily relinquish it. In the Ili Region case, concerns over domestic-political 
pressure and Russian national honor gave leaders in St. Petersburg pause before agreeing to 
withdraw. And third, that perceptions of significant geopolitical risk associated with 
acquisition of a given territory will discourage leaders from subsequently authorizing their 
peripheral agents’ faits accomplis, leading to relinquishment. In the case of Russia in Ili, China’s 
clear willingness to fight over the territory, and a locally-adverse balance of power in China’s 
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favor, pressed Russian leaders to return the territory, which they did with the Treaty of St. 
Petersburg in February 1881. 
Historical Background 
On the eve of the Russian invasion in 1871, the Ili Region was an area of roughly 3,200 km2 
in the northwest of Qing Dynasty China’s protectorate of Xinjiang, right on the Russian 
border.102 Xinjiang was a vast region that had been a Chinese protectorate since the mid-18th 
century, with China proper to its east, the Russian Empire to its north and west, and to the 
south, the Chinese protectorate of Tibet, and beyond that, British India.103 It was inhabited 
by a wide variety of mostly-Muslim, Turkic-speaking peoples—including Dungan, Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, Sibe, Taranchi, Uighur, and Uzbek—as well as Mongols, Manchus, and Han 
Chinese.104 The Ili Region itself was lush and fertile compared to its more arid surroundings, 
consisting of the Ili River and its valley, which flowed from its source in the Tian Shan 
Mountains westward to the border with Russian Turkestan.105 According to a knowledgeable 
contemporary observer, the Ili River Valley was “by far, in every respect, the richest, best, 
and most beautiful part of Central Asia.”106 It was also remote, sitting nearly 3,000 km from 
Beijing and over 3,800 km from St. Petersburg. Qing China’s presence in the Ili Region—
and Xinjiang more broadly—was light, and its hold over the region, precarious, and the 
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region experienced regular unrest and rebellion from the time it was conquered.107 One such 
rebellion would eventually serve as a precipitating cause of the Russian invasion. 
 In 1862, a major Muslim rebellion broke out in the northern Xinjiang region of 
Dzungaria.108 The compounding effect of years of onerous taxes, administrative corruption, 
official discrimination, and heavy-handed Sinicization policies led local populations to rise up 
and try to overthrow the Qing authorities.109 At this point, Beijing was still heavily 
preoccupied with the Taiping Rebellion, a fifteen-year civil war that was concentrated in the 
south, and thus, the Muslim rebellion was able to spread largely uninterrupted, reaching the 
Ili River Valley in mid-1864.110 The rebellion began to cause problems all along the Russo-
Chinese border, including the interruption of trade, cross-border raids, the destruction of 
Russian property, and massive refugee flows.111  
Prominent among the rebel leaders was a Kokandian general by the name of Yaqub Beg. 
Yaqub had, in fact, been the commander of Kokandian forces that had held off Mikhail 
Cherniaev’s first attack on Tashkent in October 1864.112 That year he traveled to Kashgar, in 
southern Xinjiang, and by 1867 he had begun to carve out his own independent khanate 
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there.113 By 1870, he dominated all of southern Xinjiang, and parts of the north as well.114 
Russian leaders on the frontier and in St. Petersburg were not pleased with this turn of 
events. They far preferred a weak and distant China to a strong, unified Muslim khanate on 
their border, which might serve as a rallying cry for their own recently-conquered Muslim 
territories.115 Even more alarming was the close relationship Yaqub Beg was developing with 
Russia’s rival, the Ottoman Sultan, and the United Kingdom in India and beyond.116 Both 
London and Constantinople officially recognized Yaqub’s khanate, and provided him with 
significant amounts of military aid.117 
Observing events from across the Russian border in Turkestan was its governor-general, 
Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman. Kaufman was of noble German descent, and the son of 
a Russian general who had participated in the defense of Russia against Napoleon’s invasion. 
After completing his studies at Russia’s Imperial Military Academy, Kaufman entered the 
army and began an esteemed military career, serving in a variety of posts and participating in 
the conquest of the Caucasus and the Crimean War. Kaufman also spent a few years at the 
War Ministry’s chancellery, and had been a personal aide to War Minister Dmitry Miliutin, 
which won him the minister’s friendship and confidence—and, eventually, his 
recommendation for the governor-generalship in 1867.118 This would be a difficult 
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assignment for Kaufman: the territory had just recently been conquered, he had no regional 
experience, and he needed to establish an administrative structure from scratch, all while 
being overseen by superiors some 3,500 km away in St. Petersburg.119 But Kaufman had their 
every confidence, being granted broad economic, political, and military powers to enable him 
to organize the new governate-general as he saw fit.120 
Kaufman was, by all accounts, very smart, dedicated to his duties, and eminently 
reasonable in his decision making and dealings with others.121 He was also very skilled, 
combining, in the words of a successor at the chancellery, “brilliant military and fighting 
capacities with outstanding administrative talent.”122 Kaufman also had a reputation for 
being kind, patient, and even fatherly and affectionate with his subordinates, which won him 
their devoted loyalty. Yet combined with these traits was a strong sense of Russian 
nationalism, an ardent devotion to the empire and its expansion, and an abiding faith in what 
he saw as Russia’s civilizing mission in Central Asia.123 And, contrary to expectations, 
Kaufman would show an independent streak once he was on the ground in Tashkent, 
effecting the conquest of the Khanate of Bukhara in June 1868 without authorization from 
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St. Petersburg.124 Kaufman was the frontier agent who would nearly drag the leaders in the 
Russian capital into acquiring the Ili Region. 
The cast of characters in St. Petersburg had changed little from the conquests of 
Chimkent and Tashkent just a few years earlier. Alexander II was still tsar and Dmitry 
Miliutin, still Minister of War. Alexander Gorchakov was technically still Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, however, the director of the ministry’s Asiatic Department, Nikolay K. Giers, was 
increasingly acting in that role, partly due to Gorchakov’s health and, later, partly due to his 
political sidelining after Russia’s embarrassing defeat at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.125 
These were the leaders in the capital who would be dragged unwittingly into nearly acquiring 
the Ili River Valley from China. 
St. Petersburg & Turkestan 
St. Petersburg faced serious principal-agent problems with respect to its agents on the 
Chinese frontier in Russian Turkestan. First, there was a divergence of preferences between 
the leaders in St. Petersburg and their frontier agents such as Kaufman, with leaders in the 
capital tending to be more defensively-oriented and the frontier agents more expansionist. 
This was put in stark relief with Kaufman’s unauthorized conquest of the Khanate of 
Bukhara in 1868, where, when ordered by the capital to return the territory, Kaufman flatly 
refused to “commit such sacrilege against the prestige, honor and rights of Russia.”126 With 
respect to China in particular, leaders in the capital, and the Foreign Ministry in particular, 
didn’t want to disturb Russia’s good relations with the Qing Empire, and therefore were 
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opposed to any territorial acquisitions there.127 When Kaufman suggested in 1870 that 
Russian forces should occupy the Ili River Valley, the idea was summarily rejected by the 
government in St. Petersburg.128 
 Beyond the divergence of preferences, there were also stark information asymmetries in 
favor of the frontier agents such as Kaufman. The region wouldn’t see a telegraph 
connection with St. Petersburg until 1873, when Tashkent and Vernyi extended 
connections.129 The closest existing telegraph station to the Ili River frontier with China was 
in Omsk, nearly 1,400 km away. Under these circumstances, it was incredibly difficult to 
communicate with, and thereby potentially control, wayward peripheral agents. According to 
a contemporary member of the Russian Finance Ministry, due to “the remoteness of the 
region and the lack of telegraph, [Kaufman] was compelled by force of circumstances… to 
take measures for which under normal conditions he would have needed to ask 
permission.”130 Even after the installation of a number of telegraph stations in the region, it 
was still widely known that the government in St. Petersburg was “very badly informed as to 
what actually goes on” in Russian Central Asia.131 Thus, a preference divergence between the 
capital and the periphery, and information asymmetries favoring the latter, made 
unauthorized peripheral expansion a distinct possibility in this case. 
The Ili Region 
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By 1870, the turbulence along the Sino-Russian border had only gotten worse. Russian cattle 
continued to be raided, trade with China had been all but entirely wiped out, and conflicts 
among rebel factions drove waves of refugees across the Russian border.132 And Yaqub Beg’s 
regime seemed to only strengthen with time. This was all viewed with concern in St. 
Petersburg, and with alarm in Tashkent, and in April 1871 the central government decided it 
was time to develop a plan to work collaboratively with the Chinese government in order to 
put down the uprisings.133 
However, Kaufman was a few steps ahead of his metropolitan superiors. Since August 
1870, after having had his formal request denied in the capital, Kaufman had been working 
on a plan to occupy the Ili River Valley on his own accord.134 And when he received 
intelligence that Yaqub Beg’s armies were moving on the Ili Region, Kaufman decided he 
could wait no longer.135 In May 1871, he ordered the military governor of Semirechye, Major 
General G. A. Kolpakovskii, to conquer the Ili Region. On 24 June 1871, with a force of 
1,850, Kolpakovskii crossed the Chinese border and began to move rapidly up the Ili River, 
eventually creating a Russian occupation area that extended roughly 400 km up the valley.136 
While there were armed clashes with local rebel forces, they were ultimately no match for the 
Russian army, and on 4 July 1871, Kolpakovskii declared the Ili Region annexed to the 
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Russian Empire “in perpetuity.”137 This had all been accomplished without the knowledge or 
authorization of leaders in St. Petersburg.138 Kaufman’s fait accompli had been successfully 
executed. 
St. Petersburg Reacts… and Delays 
It took about three weeks for news of the conquest to begin to filter back to St. Petersburg, 
and even longer to Beijing.139 In his report back to the capital, Kaufman justified his action 
based on the danger associated with Yaqub Beg’s advance and the risk of his being 
supported by the British.140 Once most of the facts had become clear, the Russian minister in 
Beijing was instructed to inform the Chinese government of the conquest, which he did on 1 
September 1871. China’s control over, and communications with, its western territories was 
so weak that this was when its government first became aware that the Ili River Valley had 
come under foreign occupation.141 However, to their relief, from the get-go Russian officials 
were interested in discussing when and how they would retrocede the territory back to 
China. The Russian position was that the occupation was a necessary, but temporary, 
expedient to protect their border from Muslim rebels. Once China had suppressed the 
rebellion and retaken control over Xinjiang, the Russians argued, they would be prepared to 
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return the territory.142 According to a report from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the return of 
the Ili Valley “can only take place in the event that the Chinese Government presents us 
with adequate guarantees of an enduring reestablishment of its authority there.”143 This 
policy was made official in December 1872, when Tsar Alexander II issued orders requiring 
the return of the Ili Region once China had reestablished control in Xinjiang and the Russian 
border was secure.144 And having lost control of most of its western territories, China was 
hardly in a position to resist. 
 The Chinese took these conditions seriously—perhaps more seriously than Russian 
leaders expected.145 The government entrusted the recovery of Xinjiang to the famed 
Chinese general, Zuo Zongtang.146 General Zuo had spent decades suppressing the Taiping 
Rebellion, and then various Muslim rebellions in the west, and so was the perfect person for 
the job.147 After many months of preparation, Zuo began his campaign in March 1876 with 
an enormous force, which would ultimately number upwards of 100,000.148 Within a matter 
of months, Zuo was making good progress, defeating rebel armies and retaking rebel-held 
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cities as he moved westward.149 In May 1877, the rebel leader Yaqub Beg was killed under 
mysterious circumstances, and his khanate, centered in Kashgar near the Russian border, 
soon began to disintegrate.150 By the first few days of 1878, General Zuo had pacified the 
rebellion and was in control of all of Xinjiang, with the exception of the Russian-occupied Ili 
River Valley.151 Chinese leaders felt they had accomplished what the Russians had required of 
them, and were ready to negotiate Russia’s withdrawal. 
 In March 1878, Tsar Alexander II constituted a committee under War Minister Miliutin 
to discuss the Ili problem. The committee, again, recommended the return of the Ili Region 
to China, but had moved the goalposts in the intervening years. According to Miliutin, the 
committee “came to the conclusion that national dignity demanded of us the honest 
fulfillment of the promise” to return Ili, “but not before concessions had been secured from 
the Chinese.”152 These concessions would prove to be onerous. China’s newly-constituted 
foreign office, the Zongli Yamen, sent an envoy to St. Petersburg who would arrive in late 
1878 to negotiate the return of the Ili Region.153 For reasons that remain a matter of 
historical debate, the envoy effectively agreed to all of Russia’s terms and came to an 
agreement, against the explicit orders of the Zongli Yamen.154 The result was the Treaty of 
Livadia of 2 October 1879, which granted to Russia the Ili Region’s most strategic territory, 
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a five-million-ruble indemnity, the right to establish seven new consulates in Xinjiang, and 
substantial new trading privileges, among other benefits.155 It was an overwhelming 
diplomatic victory for St. Petersburg, and an outright disaster for Beijing. 
 The Qing court was thrown into turmoil by news of the treaty’s signing.156 The territorial 
cessions in the Ili River Valley were particularly alarming, including key strategic passes 
through the Tian Shan Mountain range, which would have given Russia effective military 
control of the entirety of Xinjiang.157 China’s leaders were furious, and Empress Dowager 
Cixi, China’s de facto ruler, was said to have burst out in exasperation that their envoy “must 
die!”158 In February 1880, a conference established by the Qing court officially renounced 
the Treaty of Livadia, disavowed the actions of the envoy, and threw him in prison with a 
sentence of death by beheading.159 The court then appointed another envoy to renegotiate 
the settlement of the Ili crisis, who would arrive in St. Petersburg in July. The envoy carried 
with him a document of seven principles for the negotiations, and was under strict orders to 
follow them precisely.160 
St. Petersburg’s Calculus 
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After hearing the demands of the Chinese envoy, the tsar convened another grand 
conference on 13 August 1880, which was attended War Minister Miliutin and acting 
Foreign Minister Giers, among others.161 The committee, which would meet several times 
over the coming months, was tasked with making a final decision on the fate of the Ili 
Region. Despite Chinese demands for a prompt withdrawal from the territory, it wasn’t quite 
so simple from the Russian leaders’ perspectives. This is because the conquest itself, and the 
now-nine-year occupation that followed, had activated mechanisms that made relinquishing 
the Ili River Valley somewhat difficult. The first and most straightforward of these was that 
the costs of the conquest had already been paid. Kaufman had acquired the Ili River Valley 
at minimal cost, in terms of lives and treasure, and the territory was effectively theirs for the 
keeping. Over the course of the occupation, Russian properties and businesses had also been 
established in the area, and abandoning these would come at a cost for St. Petersburg. 
 A second mechanism that encouraged leaders in St. Petersburg to retain the Ili Region 
were concerns over domestic politics in Russia. Despite the harsh autocracy of the tsarist 
regime, Alexander II’s program of domestic reform in the 1860s had helped create a 
modicum of space for popular dissent, and this was recognized by leaders at the time.162 For 
instance, in the run-up to the signing of the Treaty of Livadia, acting Foreign Minister Giers 
showed regular concern over what newspapers were printing about the possibility of 
returning the Chinese territory.163 In the spring of 1880, after China had renounced the 
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treaty, Russian leaders agreed, regarding the return of Ili, that in view of “our public opinion, 
it was desirable that this restitution was not carried out purely and simply.”164 Acting Foreign 
Minister Giers was of this mind as well, writing to one of the Russian negotiators in 
September 1880 that Russia needed serious concessions from the Chinese in the Ili 
negotiations, “so as not to hurt public opinion.”165 Thus, Russian leaders were clearly 
concerned about the public’s reaction to any return of the Ili River Valley.166  
 A third reason Russian leaders had difficulty relinquishing the territory and turning it back 
over to the Chinese were concerns over Russian national honor, prestige, and reputation.167 
Some, for instance, argued that conceding too much would only invite further demands and 
challenges, from the Chinese and others in the region. In September 1879, War Minister 
Miliutin opposed the return of China’s territory on the grounds that “the Asiatics will 
attribute generosity, or even justice, solely and simply to incapacity to retain what had been 
taken.”168 A government committee held in the spring of 1880 agreed, arguing that if Russia 
returned the territory outright, “we would appear to have claimed an excessive territorial 
extension only to renounce it following threats from the Chinese,” an unacceptable 
outcome.169 And acting Foreign Minister Giers shared these concerns, writing in October 
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1880 that “it is to be feared that [Russian] moderation only serves to encourage” the Chinese 
to ask for more.170 
 There is also a striking number of references to Russian “prestige” and dignity” in 
correspondence between leaders in these months. For instance, the spring 1880 committee 
cited Russian “prestige” as a reason to avoid promptly returning the territory.171 In 
September of that year, an exasperated Giers wrote, “We want to emerge with dignity from 
this detestable affair.”172 Giers reiterated these concerns the following month, writing in mid-
October that Russia would “not be able, without compromising our dignity, to submit to 
Chinese demands and give in on all points.”173 In some cases, Russian leaders almost seemed 
to take these honor concerns personally. For instance, Giers wrote on 14 October that “We 
will have to show them our teeth, because it is impossible to allow us be scoffed at by these 
wretches.”174 A few days later Giers claimed that the Chinese envoy’s attitude “revolts me,” 
and argued that “the more we show ourselves to be conciliatory and polite towards him—
the more arrogant he will become.”175 Thus, for reasons of reduced costs, domestic political 
pressure, and concerns over national honor, it appeared difficult for Russian leaders to 
simply and straightforwardly return the Ili Region to China. 
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 However, as the crisis unfolded, it became increasingly clear that there were serious 
geopolitical risks associated with standing firm and refusing to withdraw from Ili. China 
appeared to be willing to wage war over the territory, and as Russian leaders would learn 
over the course of the crisis, they were not.176 After China’s rejection of the Treaty of Livadia 
in February 1880, many in and around the Qing court began to call for a campaign to retake 
the territory by force.177 In March, the Chinese government put General Zou in charge of 
defense of the northwest, with orders to raise new forces, reenlist veterans of the 
pacification campaigns, and to develop a plan to invade Ili.178 In May, Zou moved his 
headquarters to Hami, in eastern Xinjiang, and dramatically carried a coffin with him in 
order to show his willingness to die for his country.179 He believed, as he reported to his 
superiors in Beijing, that the military preparations would coerce the Russians into granting 
them concessions in negotiations in St. Petersburg.180 Beijing also began to acquire large 
number of guns and other munitions from the United States and other European 
countries.181 Russia, too, would begin preparing for war in April 1880, with Kaufman shifting 
his headquarters from Tashkent to Vernyi, near the Chinese border, and St. Petersburg 
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sending a powerful naval fleet of 26 ships to the Chinese coast.182 In late October and into 
November 1880, the negotiations became tense, involving open talk of the possibility of 
war.183 As the Chinese negotiator said to his Russian counterpart on 5 November:  
“China does not want there to be war. Should this misfortune come to pass, the… 
Chinese can endure difficulties imposed by others and work long hours. Even if China 
were not to win the first battle, as China is the largest country in the world, were it to 
go on for a decade or more, they could still endure it. I think that your honorable 
country definitely would not be able to avoid losses.”184 
 However, despite their preparations, Russian leaders had little real interest in fighting over 
the Ili River Valley. This was so for three key reasons. First, the local balance of power 
strongly favored the Chinese.185 While Russia had a relatively-large and powerful military, the 
Ili Region was a long way from St. Petersburg, and transport and supply were slow and 
incredibly costly. Russia had only approximately 5,000 military personnel in the area, and 
would be hard-pressed to produce many more. The Chinese, by contrast, had been waging 
pacification campaigns in the west for years under General Zou, and were believed to have 
as many as 180,000 troops in the vicinity.186 These numbers, and China’s preparations more 
broadly, were sobering for Russian leaders.187 As a Russian negotiator wrote to acting 
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Foreign Minister Giers in October 1880, “Of course, [the Chinese] don’t want war and they 
fear it. But they have convinced themselves that we want it even less and that we are hardly 
in a state to wage it.”188 
 Second, the balance of resolve also favored the Chinese in Ili. From the perspective of St. 
Petersburg, the territory was small, distant, incredibly difficult to administer and defend, and 
without much intrinsic value. For Beijing, in contrast, it was highly strategically valuable. As 
noted above, the Ili River Valley contained key mountain passes in the Tian Shan range, and 
was critical to its military control of Xinjiang as a whole. And Xinjiang itself was viewed as 
an important strategic buffer with which to defend Beijing and the Chinese heartland from 
the west.189 This, too, was recognized by Russian leaders at the time. As the Russian 
negotiator wrote to acting Foreign Minister Giers in August 1880, referring to Ili, “this 
territorial concession, so precious to the Chinese… so worthless to us.”190 This sentiment 
was reiterated by this same negotiator, who pointed out to Giers in October 1880 that the 
“final possession of [Ili]… would hardly compensate for our expenses” in any war over it.191 
  Third, Russia had only recently finished waging a major war in the Balkans, the Russo-
Turkish War (1877-78), having mobilized 934,000 personnel and suffering 118,000 deaths in 
its victory.192 This had two effects on the Ili crisis. First, many of Russia’s best and the most 
experienced military personnel were still tied up in the Balkans, with few left to spare for a 
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distant, Far Eastern contingency.193 And second, the Ottoman War had been very hard on 
Russian finances, and Russia was simply in no position to wage another costly war.194 And its 
leaders were keenly aware of this. As the Russian negotiator wrote to acting Foreign Minister 
Giers in October 1880, “only a good beating can bring [the Chinese] to their senses. But I 
admit that while this is necessary, it would be very hard on our poor finances!”195 Chinese 
leaders were also aware of the dire state of the Russian treasury, and this increased their 
confidence that their coercive diplomacy would soon bear fruit.196 
 All of this meant that time was clearly on China’s side.197 As the negotiations dragged on, 
the perception among leaders in St. Petersburg was that it only redounded to China’s 
advantage, giving them more time to increase their troop numbers, import arms from 
Russia’s European rivals, and put further strain on the Russian treasury. From early on in the 
negotiations, Russian officials showed concern that the Chinese might be “dragging us along 
so they can complete their armaments.”198 They also saw great importance in “putting an end 
to current expenses as quickly as possible.”199 Similar views were present among key Russian 
leaders. For instance, as acting Foreign Minister Giers wrote on 23 September 1880, “what 
matters most to us is to carry out the negotiations as quickly as possible so that we can recall the fleet 
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and put our troops back along the Chinese border on a footing of peace.”200 An important 
reason for this haste was a concern that the conflict with Turkey might reignite—a far less 
peripheral concern—and that the Russian navy would be tied up thousands of kilometers 
away in the East China Sea.201 As Giers wrote on 25 September, they needed “a good 
solution as soon as possible—because all our attention must be directed towards Turkey 
where one can foresee great complications.”202 
 This clash of incentives put Russian leaders in something of a bind. On the one hand, 
they had incentives to retain the Ili River Valley, based on reduced acquisition costs, 
domestic political pressure, and concerns over Russian national honor and prestige. On the 
other hand, there were severe geopolitical risks associated with retaining the territory—
namely, the risk of war with China over a concern that was, at best, peripheral to Russia’s 
interests. A key Russian negotiator described the position as an “inextricable dilemma,” 
lamenting that he did “not forgive those who put us here by protesting last year against the 
outright restitution of the territories which we had temporarily occupied with the promise to 
return them!”203 The problem, he wrote a few days later to acting Foreign Minister Giers, is 
that the Russian government was rapidly approaching a point at which it would have “no 
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choice but between a risky war, onerous and dangerous, or an evil and precarious peace.”204 
It was an unenviable position, to be sure. 
St. Petersburg Decides 
The determination to avoid war with China would ultimately be St. Petersburg’s primary 
political aim, necessitating the relinquishment of the Ili Region. The central importance of 
avoiding war had been present in the writing of Russian leaders over the months of the 
negotiations. The key Russian negotiator, for instance, wrote on 1 October that “war would 
be a deplorable end. It would be ruinous, endless, and of no benefit to us.”205 This sentiment 
was echoed by acting Foreign Minister Giers, who wrote that same month that “it is to avoid 
war that we enter into negotiations” with the Chinese.206 Even War Minister Miliutin—who 
had strongly opposed returning Ili a year earlier—would agree. By mid-October, he 
reportedly saw a potential war with China as “a misfortune without any possible 
compensation” and argued that it was “necessary to absolutely avoid it.”207 For nearly a 
decade, the Chinese and the Russians had stood toe-to-toe over the Ili Region, and, in the 
end, Russia would blink. 
Tsar Alexander II called a final conference in December 1880 to settle the Ili crisis, 
attended by Giers, Miliutin, and other key Russian leaders.208 All present agreed that, in order 
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to avoid war with China, the return of the Ili Region was necessary.209 After a few days of 
discussion, the Russian negotiators approached the Chinese with a compromise, the core of 
which would result in the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 12 February 1881.210 Under the terms 
of this treaty, the Ili Region would be returned to China, Russia would receive minimal trade 
and political concessions, and their shared border would remain almost entirely 
unchanged.211 While Russia was awarded a rather large nine-million-ruble indemnity, and a 
small strip territory west of Ili was ceded to Russia to settle refugees of the rebellion, this was 
a clear diplomatic victory for China, and a complete reversal of fortunes from the Treaty of 
Livadia less than two years earlier.212 After the treaty was ratified in the respective capitals, 
the Ili River Valley was returned to China in February 1882, nearly 11 years after Lieutenant 
General Kaufman had independently ordered its occupation.213  
*** 
One month after the Treaty of St. Petersburg had been signed, an assassin’s bomb detonated 
and killed Tsar Alexander II on 13 March 1881.214 The news of the tsar’s death badly shook 
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Kaufman, who himself would suffer a massive stroke only three weeks later, leaving him 
paralyzed and without speech.215 He would technically remain governor-general of Turkestan 
for the following 13 months as his health deteriorated, until he died on 16 May 1882.216 
Kaufman’s dying wish, as a true Russian nationalist and imperialist, was to be buried in 
Tashkent, “so that everyone will know that here is true Russian ground where it is no 
dishonor for a Russian to lie.”217 And in a final twist of irony, Kaufman’s replacement as 
Turkestan’s governor-general would be none other than Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev.218 
 
Alternative Explanations 
Three alternative explanations that might account for the cases of Russia in the Khanate of 
Kokand and the Ili Region are strategic expansion theory, state institutional weakness, and 
leader interests. First, it is clear that neither Russian case is an example of strategic 
expansion. In both cases, Russian agents in the periphery were acting against explicit orders 
to the contrary from their superiors in the capital. While the decisions ultimately made by 
Alexander II, Miliutin, Gorchakov, and Giers were strategic in nature—weighing domestic 
political and honor concerns against perceptions of geopolitical risk—they were only in a 
position to make these decisions as a result of agents and processes that were almost-entirely 
out of their control. In short, these two cases of Russian expansion were obviously 
inadvertent in nature. 
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 Second, the two cases are somewhat indeterminate as to whether state institutional 
weakness might explain unauthorized peripheral expansion. Among the great powers, 
Russia’s state institutions were clearly on the weaker side. Universal military conscription was 
only introduced in 1874, three years after the conquest of the Ili Region and nine years after 
the conquest of Tashkent.219 While Russia had a statistical agency as early as 1810, its first 
census was run in 1897, and its first civil registration was only inaugurated in the early Soviet 
years, allowing it scant detailed information about its own population and territory.220 It is 
certainly possible that Russian state institutional weakness played a role in unauthorized 
peripheral expansion in these cases. However, the fact that state institutional weakness was 
found to have little relationship with inadvertent expansion overall (see Chapter 3), and that 
that Russia experienced very little inadvertent expansion once the telegraph became 
widespread (see Table 3.3), suggests communication and control may be a more powerful 
explanation.  
 Third, leader interests don’t seem to be a sufficient explanation for subsequent central 
authorization in these two cases. Leaders such as Miliutin and Gorchakov were dismayed by 
Cherniaev’s actions in Kokand, and initially favored a return of the claimed territories. In 
contrast, Russian leaders tried to get away with retaining the most strategic territory in the Ili 
River Valley, but were forced by their geopolitical concerns to turn it back to the Chinese. 
Thus, while not entirely irrelevant, leader interests are an insufficient explanation for these 
two Russian cases. 
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This chapter has presented the comparative case studies of inadvertent expansion and non-
expansion by Russia in the Khanate of Kokand and the Ili Region of western China. Both 
cases strongly support the theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. Both 
cases showed how inadvertent expansion is a manifestation of a principal-agent problem, 
based on divergent preferences and information asymmetries. Divergent preferences for 
expansion between St. Petersburg and Central Asia, as well as the lack of a telegraph 
connection in Kokand or the China border region hampered central control and enabled 
unauthorized peripheral expansion to take place. Second, both cases showed how 
unauthorized peripheral expansion can activate mechanisms that make it difficult for leaders 
in the capital to easily withdraw. In Kokand and the Ili Region, unauthorized peripheral 
expansion dramatically drove down the costs of acquisition and generated concerns over 
prestige and national honor in St. Peterburg. In the Ili Region case, there were also some 
domestic political concerns weighing on the minds of Russian leaders as they navigated the 
crisis. And third, in both cases the decision of whether to accept the territorial fait accompli 
was importantly conditioned by perceptions of geopolitical risk. The absence of such risks 
cleared the way for acceptance of Cherniaev’s fait accompli in Kokand, whereas the risk of war 





INADVERTENT EXPANSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: FRANCE 
 
“in this Indo-Chinese enterprise… events have more often shaped our policy than our 
policy has directed the course of events.” 
Jules Ferry1 
 
This chapter examines inadvertent expansion through two examples from the French 
Empire in Southeast Asia. The first, a shorter case study, focuses on the French Empire’s 
non-acquisition of the northern Vietnamese region of Tonkin in 1873-74. The second, a 
more detailed case, examines France’s eventual acquisition of that territory in 1882-83. The 
primary purpose of this chapter is to present the dissertation’s third pair of comparative 
theory-testing cases, illustrating how varying perceptions of geopolitical risk produced the 
divergent outcomes observed.  
The two Tonkin cases provide a unique inferential opportunity for comparison, in that 
they are strikingly similar in nearly all respects. History, in these two cases, seems to repeat 
itself in a way it very rarely does. As historian of the French Empire Raymond Betts puts it, 
referring to the two key peripheral actors from the Tonkin cases: 
“One can find, in the annals of French colonial history, no better examples of this sort 
of individualized behavior than those afforded by François Garnier and Henri Rivière. 
As if in tandem, these two men performed similar military actions in the same setting, 
 
1 Note that this and all other translations in this chapter were carried out by the author. Jules Ferry, “Speech of 
26 November 1884 in the Chamber,” in Paul Robiquet, ed., Discours et Opinion de Jules Ferry: Publiés avec 
Commentaires et Notes, Tome V: Discours sur la Politique Extérieure et Coloniale (Paris: Armand Colin, 1897), p. 416. 
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with the same disregard for orders, with the same disastrous personal results and in 
the same geographical situation—almost exactly a decade apart.”2 
What Betts doesn’t add here is that while Garnier fails to have his fait accompli accepted by 
the French government in Paris in 1874, Rivière succeeds in his venture just ten years later. 
This chapter will trace the processes of these two cases, showing the crucial role played by 
varying perceptions of geopolitical risk. 
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the case of France’s 
non-acquisition of Tonkin in 1873-74, where Francis Garnier exceeds his orders from the 
capital in conquering Tonkin, but Paris ultimately returns the territory to local authorities. 
Second, I present the case of France’s acquisition of Tonkin in 1883, where Henri Rivière 
similarly exceeds his orders in conquering the territory, ultimately leading to its retention by 
the French government. And third and finally, I conclude with a consideration of alternative 
arguments and a brief discussion of the importance of these cases for the theory of 
inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. 
 
L’Affaire Garnier: France and Tonkin, 1873-1874 
France refrained from acquiring the northern Vietnamese region of Tonkin3 between 
October 1873 and March 1874. The ultimately failed conquest of Tonkin was independently 
planned and executed by a young French naval officer and explorer, with the support of the 
governor of the French colony of Cochinchina. This case supports two of the central 
arguments of the theory of inadvertent expansion. First, that inadvertent expansion is a 
 
2 Raymond Betts, Tricouleur: The French Overseas Empire (London: Gordon & Cremonesi, 1978), p. 25. 
3 The contemporary 25 provinces making up the Northern region of Vietnam. 
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manifestation of a principal-agent problem, combining a divergence of preferences between 
leaders in the capital and their agents on the periphery, and information asymmetries 
favoring the agents. In the case at hand, peripheral actors in Saigon and Tonkin were far 
more open to conquest than leaders in the capital, and the vast distances separating the two, 
and the lack of telegraphic communications to Tonkin itself, meant that their behavior was 
very difficult to monitor and control. And second, that the perception of significant 
geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will discourage leaders in the capital from 
retaining the territory, leading to a rejection of the fait accompli. In this first case of France in 
Tonkin, French military weakness in the wake of its catastrophic loss in the Franco-Prussian 
War, as well as its fear of sparking a crisis with Germany or Britain in Europe, led leaders in 
the capital to precipitously withdraw from the newly-conquered territory. 
Historical Background 
On the eve of the French invasion in 1873, Tonkin comprised the northern region of the 
Vietnamese Empire, ruled by the Nguyen Dynasty Emperor Tu Duc, out of Hue, in the 
central region of Annam. Southern Vietnam, known to the French as “Cochinchina,” had 
been colonized between 1862 and 1867, after the invasion of French Emperor Napoleon 
III.4 At over 116,000 km2 and containing a few million people, Tonkin bordered the Chinese 
provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi to the north, the Thai vassal state of Luang Phrabang5 to 
 
4 See: Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (New York: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 76-
78; Frederick Quinn, The French Overseas Empire (Westport: Praeger, 2000), pp. 138-141. 
5 Contemporary northern Laos. 
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the west, and the Gulf of Tonkin to the east.6 With the French annexation of Cambodia in 
1863, Annamese leaders in Hue began to feel the French noose tightening around them.7 
 After its acquisitions of Cochinchina and Cambodia, France began to look to the Chinese 
provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi as potentially rich sources of trade and investment. In 
June 1866, a two-year expedition was launched to chart the Mekong River from its mouth in 
Saigon to its source, with a keen interest in its possibility as a trade route to southern China.8 
While the Mekong proved to be unsuitable for this purpose, the Red River,9 which ran 
through Tonkin, was found to be a very promising alternative. In 1871, a French arms dealer 
based in Hankou, Jean Dupuis, began transporting cargo up and down the Red River with 
the knowledge, though not the official backing, of the French Ministry of the Navy and 
Colonies. 10 After having completed several successful missions, Dupuis was detained by 
authorities in Hanoi in June 1873, the capital of Tonkin, being told that his trade activities 
were in violation of the Franco-Annamese Treaty of Hue of 1863. Dupuis had an official 
arms commission from Chinese authorities in Yunnan and a crew of approximately 300, and 
was incensed at being detained. Being at an increasingly tense impasse, both Dupuis and 
 
6 Area data from: Statistical Yearbook of Viet Nam, 2019 (Hanoi: Statistical Publishing House, 2019), p. 97. 
Population data is very hard to come by for this period. French imperial actors in 1873 would offhandedly 
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local Vietnamese officials reached out to the governor of French Cochinchina in order to 
resolve the conflict.11 
The Governor of Cochinchina at this time was Admiral Marie Jules Dupré, a career naval 
officer and veteran of the Crimean War (1853-56). To help him deal with the Hanoi conflict, 
Dupré would call upon fellow French naval officer, Captain Marie Joseph François Garnier. 
Garnier was the son of an army officer and had entered France’s naval academy at 15. He 
had participated in a series of voyages around the South American coast, the conquest of 
Saigon in 1860, and had served as a native affairs officer in Cochinchina.12 From 1866 to 
1868, he was second-in-command in the above-referenced Mekong River expedition, and 
wrote a widely-acclaimed report on the journey.13 He had served in the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71), and was disgusted with what he saw as France’s capitulation in its aftermath.14 At 
just 34 on the eve of the French conquest, Garnier was a young, ambitious, and courageous 
naval officer of considerable talent.15 He was also hot-headed, an ardent believer in France’s 
mission civilisatrice, and an advocate of a more aggressive French colonial policy.16 When 
Garnier received a note from the Admiral in early August 1873, saying “I have to talk to you 
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about important matters, so please come as soon as you can,” Garnier wasted little time.17 
Admiral Dupré and Captain Garnier were the key peripheral actors who would aim to drag 
their superiors in Paris into the acquisition of Tonkin. 
Paris & Tonkin 
Leaders in Paris faced severe principal-agent problems with respect to their subordinates in 
the Southeast Asian periphery. First, there were stark information asymmetries in favor of 
the peripheral agents. While, by this time, telegraph technology was becoming established 
globally, and there was a telegraph connection between Paris and Saigon, communication 
with Tonkin itself remained slow, being carried by boat along the Vietnamese coast and up 
the Red River. The fastest a letter from Saigon could be delivered to Hanoi was eleven days, 
and therefore it would take, at the very least, three weeks to get a response to a message sent 
from Paris to Hanoi.18 Under these conditions, monitoring—and thereby controlling—the 
behavior of any potentially-wayward agents was incredibly difficult. 
 Second, there was a sharp divergence of preferences between the leaders in Paris and 
their agents in Saigon and Tonkin. Dupré had long pushed for a more aggressive colonial 
policy in the region.19 Since taking up his position as governor in Saigon in 1871, he had 
been aiming to get Hue to recognize France’s annexation of Cochinchina, and he thought 
 
17 Norman, Tonkin, p. 97. 
18 This figure is inferred from the fact that it took eleven days for news of Hanoi’s capture (20 November-1 
December 1873) and thirteen days for news of Garnier’s death (21 December 1873-3 January 1874) to reach 
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1874,” in M. Dutreb, L’Amiral Dupré et la Conquête du Tonkin (Paris: E. Leroux, 1924), pp. 82-83. 
19 Virginia Thompson, French Indo-China (New York: MacMillan Company, 1937), pp. 62-63; McLeod, The 
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this could be facilitated by a more coercive approach.20 As he wrote to the Naval and 
Colonial Minister in Paris in December 1872, “the time for talks and reasoning has 
passed”—it was time for “the occupation of Kécho [Hanoi], the capital of Tonkin, and the 
mouth of the Song Koi [Red River].”21 Dupré followed these letters with similar appeals to 
Paris in March and May of 1873, arguing that France’s “establishment in Tonkin is a matter 
of life and death for the future of our domination in Cochinchina.”22 
However, winning over the cabinet in Paris would be no small feat. In the wake of 
France’s loss in the Franco-Prussian War, and the civil war with the Paris Commune (1871), 
there was little appetite in the capital for imperial adventures. The Naval and Colonial 
Minister at the time, Louis Pothuau, responded to Dupré’s appeal of December 1872 by 
pointing out that the foreign minister “does not think (and I share this view) that the present 
circumstances allow us to resort to violent means against Emperor Tu Duc.”23 Upon reading 
another of Dupré’s letters of March 1873, a cabinet minister penciled in the margin: “He 
absolutely insists on waging war and we will have great difficulty in preventing him from 
moving forward. However, it is important to do so and in the most formal way.”24 These 
views were shared by the French prime minister, Jacques-Victor Albert, the 4th duc de 
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Dupré, p. 22. 
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Broglie. As he plainly put it in a dispatch to Dupré in July 1873, “Under no circumstances, 
for any reason whatsoever, should you engage France in Tonkin.”25 
Despite this resounding message coming out of Paris, the conflict between the French 
arms trader Dupuis and local officials in Hanoi seemed too good an opportunity for 
Governor Dupré to pass up. This could finally allow France to squeeze the Vietnamese into 
recognizing the annexation of Cochinchina, and possibly even coughing up Tonkin in the 
process. A few days after he had summoned Captain Garnier to Saigon, Dupré sent yet 
another appeal to the new Naval and Colonial Minister, Admiral Charles de Dompierre 
d’Hornoy on 28 July 1873. Dupré reported that the Tonkin “question has just taken a new 
and decisive step,” and argued that, under the circumstances, he deemed “it necessary to 
occupy the citadel of Kécho or Hanoi (the capital of Tonkin) and points along the coast.”26 
The governor added that he was ready “to assume all the responsibility of the consequences 
of the expedition,” which he knew would expose him “to disavowal, recall, or the loss of 
rank.” Dupré added that he wasn’t “asking for approval or reinforcements,” he was simply 
asking Paris to be allowed to proceed.27 
On 8 September 1873, Dupré received a brief telegraphic reply, stating only that he 
should “do nothing that would expose France to dangerous complications”—not a flat veto, 
but certainly not a ringing endorsement either.28 However, a few days later, Naval and 
Colonial Minister d’Hornoy wrote a longer response to the governor’s plea. He began by 
pointing out that he was put “on guard” by the “bold” and “adventurous” nature of Dupré’s 
 
25 Norman, Tonkin, p. 93. 
26 “Marie Jules Dupré to Paris, 28 July 1837,” in Dutreb, L’Amiral Dupré, p. 33. 
27 “Dupré to Paris, 28 July 1837,” in Dutreb, L’Amiral Dupré, pp. 33, 34. 
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proposal. He further noted that “at any other time than the sad time we are in, I would have 
admired and perhaps even pushed for these grand ideas of conquest.”29 However, these 
weren’t normal times, d’Hornoy pointed out, and the circumstances “prevent the 
government from agreeing to any aggressive measures” in Tonkin. “It is necessary to wait,” 
the minister continued, “prepare for more prosperous times, leave France to regain its 
strength, [and to] reconstitute itself militarily, fundamentally and politically.”30 Thus, while 
Governor Dupré would receive authorization to negotiate with Hue in October, any sort of 
armed conquest was definitively off the table.31 
But mere orders wouldn’t suffice to deter the governor. Captain Garnier arrived in Saigon 
in late August 1873, and Dupré and Garnier immediately set about planning the expedition. 
What was discussed between Dupré and Garnier in these weeks is not fully known, and the 
evidence is somewhat contradictory.32 Garnier seems to have been initially wary of Dupré’s 
plans, writing to his brother on 8 September that the governor “was embarking on a very 
dangerous path, that of an armed expedition.”33 And the official instructions Dupré gave to 
Garnier, on 10 October, were remarkably cautious in tone, especially given the governor’s 
past arguments and Garnier’s later actions.34 Garnier was ordered to investigate the conflict 
between Dupuis and local authorities, to insist on the merchant’s prompt departure, and to 
 
29 “Admiral d’Hornoy, Ministry of Marine and the Colonies to Admiral Dupré [Private Letter], Versailles, 12 
September 1873,” in Taboulet, La Geste Française en Indochine II, p. 699. 
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32 Osborne, River Road to China, p. 199. 
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negotiate the opening of the Red River to trade, but also to “abstain from any intervention” 
and “reserve all of our freedom of action so that we can choose… the line of conduct most 
in accordance with humanity, justice, and our interests.”35 However, it seems likely that these 
official orders may have been something of a smoke screen for private verbal instructions,36 
for Garnier later claimed he had complete freedom of action, writing to his brother that, “As 
for instructions, carte blanche! The Admiral is relying on me! Forward then for our beloved 
France!”37 And Dupré also wrote, just nine days after issuing his instructions for Garnier, 
that the “occupation of a military position in the heart of Tonkin will very probably be a 
necessary step toward the conclusion of the treaty, which must be equivalent to the 
protectorate of France over the entire kingdom.”38 Thus, Paris’ inability to readily monitor 
Garnier’s behavior once he had left Saigon, as well as the divergence of preferences between 
Paris and its peripheral agents, helped set the stage for the unauthorized conquest that 
followed. 
Tonkin 
Garnier set off from Saigon on the evening of 11 October 1873, with a force of about 80 
personnel and two small gunboats. A second, slightly larger reinforcement force, which 
would meet them in Hanoi, was set to depart two weeks later. Garnier ominously signaled 
his intentions when he wrote to a friend en route on 20 October that things “must be in a 
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very bad state in Tonkin for the Annamese to so kindly welcome the wolf into the 
sheepfold.”39 He arrived in Hanoi on 5 November. 
It was evident from the beginning that Garnier had little interest in fairly adjudicating the 
dispute between the arms trader Dupuis and the authorities in Tonkin.40 Garnier quickly 
established friendly relations with Dupuis and his associates while throwing his weight 
around in his dealings with Hanoi officials. When negotiations opened the day after his 
arrival, it was clear that leaders in Tonkin weren’t open to discussing trade along the Red 
River, and simply wanted Dupuis expelled.41 All of this frustrated Garnier, who wrote to his 
brother Léon only five days after arriving that he had made up his mind: “On 15 November, 
I will attack the citadel with my eighty men: I will arrest the Marshal and send him to 
Saigon,” and “I will officially declare… the country open to trade.”42  
By this point, Garnier’s reinforcement force of 88 troops had arrived with two more 
gunboats from Saigon.43 Combined with Dupuis’ accompanying guard, with whom Garnier 
was now openly collaborating, their total force was approximately 450 personnel.44 On 16 
November, Garnier decided to try to force the issue, putting forth a proclamation that 
declared the Red River open to trade and referring to himself as the “Great Mandarin 
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Garnier.”45 A few days later, on 19 November, Garnier sent Marshal Nguyen an ultimatum: 
disarm the citadel and comply with Garnier’s decree or face attack. The Marshal had until 
6:00 PM to decide.46 At 10:00 PM, having heard nothing from the Marshal, Garnier wrote to 
his brother: “‘The die is cast’… I attack tomorrow, at dawn, 7,000 men behind the walls, 
with 180 men.”47 
The attack on the Hanoi Citadel—a Vauban-style fortress complex and the center of 
Annam’s military power in the area—opened at 6:00 AM on 20 November 1873. The citadel 
was shelled by French gunboats from the Red River while Garnier’s forces streamed to a 
number of the complex’s weakly fortified gates, managing to shell and batter them open with 
relative ease. The Vietnamese forces were soon in disarray, for while the garrison was 
numerous, they were abysmally armed—carrying only swords, spears, even stones—and the 
attack caught them largely by surprise. One-by-one, each of the citadel’s five fortified gates 
was taken by Garnier’s forces in rapid succession. By 8:00 AM, the French Tricolor was 
flying over the complex.48 Two thousand Vietnamese forces were taken prisoner and 
thousands of others fled. Marshal Nguyen was gravely wounded by the shelling, and would 
later succumb to his injuries. The French had no wounded and only a single soldier killed, 
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likely the result of friendly fire.49 The capture of the heart of Hanoi’s military power had 
been executed in fewer than two hours. 
The very next day, on 21 November, Garnier and his small army began the systematic 
conquest of the entire Tonkin region. They took Hung Yen and Phu Ly on 23 and 26 
November.50 Then Hai Duong and Nam Dinh on 4 and 11 December.51 Finally, Nin Binh 
was seized on 17 December by a force of fewer than a dozen personnel.52 With each 
acquisition, Garnier’s forces installed pro-French authorities and a small French garrison, 
and then moved onto the next. They received significant support from Vietnamese Catholics 
and other anti-Hue forces within Tonkin, in the form of intelligence, supplies, administrative 
support, and even combat power.53 On 13 December, when the conquest was nearly 
complete, Garnier wrote to Governor Dupré from Nam Dinh, putting forth his view “that a 
General Protectorate of the entire Empire of Annam would be the best result to draw from 
the current situation.”54 
On 18 December 1873, Garnier was forced to rush back to Hanoi. Chinese river pirates 
known as the “Black Flags,” who operated and controlled territory in the upper reaches of 
the Red River, were massing alongside Vietnamese provincial forces at the town of Son Tay, 
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some 40 km upriver of Hanoi.55 Annamese authorities in Hue had simultaneously sent 
envoys to the Tonkin Citadel in order to negotiate an end to the conflict with Garnier.56 On 
21 December, the day peace negotiations were set to commence, approximately 600 Black 
Flags and 2,000 Vietnamese provincial forces began to move toward the citadel. After a very 
brief attack by the Black Flags, they withdrew upon contact with French artillery.57 Garnier, 
aiming to seize the moment, told his men that “We must make a sortie; we cannot leave such 
an enemy a thousand yards away.”58  
With only 18 personnel and some light artillery, Garnier led a column up the road in the 
direction the Black Flags had withdrawn. Garnier ordered his forces to divide into smaller 
groups as they pursued the enemy, and conditions on the road meant the artillery had to be 
abandoned.59 During the pursuit, Garnier accidentally tripped in a drainage ditch near where 
some Black Flags were hiding, just over a kilometer from the citadel. As they approached, 
Garnier managed to fire six shots from his revolver, but wasn’t able to reload as they 
pounced upon him, hacking and stabbing him to death. One of Garnier’s companions was 
shot and killed, and the others fled back to the citadel in disarray. In a grisly denouement, 
Garnier’s head was taken as a trophy by the Black Flag forces.60 The following day, on 22 
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December, Jean Dupuis, the French merchant whose expedition had initiated the whole 
conflict, went in to view Garnier’s body after it had been recovered and returned to the 
citadel: 
“I go in to see Mr. Garnier’s body. He is between the two sailors. Nothing is quite as 
horrible as these headless corpses… Garnier’s clothing is in tatters, his body is covered 
in wounds made by sabers and spears, he is savagely mutilated… I strongly squeeze his 
cold right hand for the last time, swearing that he will be avenged.”61 
Paris Reacts 
News of Garnier’s initial conquest of the Hanoi Citadel on 20 November didn’t reach Saigon 
until the end of that month. Initially, Governor Dupré tried to use the conquest to bend Hue 
to his will, writing to the court on 1 December that “If you do not hurry to make the treaty, 
our stay in Tokin will be extended; we will be forced to complete the occupation to directly 
administer the country.”62 However, as more news filtered back to the governor, he became 
increasingly uneasy about what was transpiring in Tonkin. Then, on 3 January 1874, the 
news of Garnier’s death reached the governor, and he cabled Paris the very next day, 
reporting “the most painful news. On 21 December, Mr. Garnier, who had attacked the 
citadel of Hanoi, was struck dead.” Dupré tried to distance himself from the operation, 
making reference to the “excess of confidence” and “imprudence” with which Garnier had 
acted, and emphasizing that the situation in Tonkin was “imperfectly known” to him.63 But 
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the ball was now in the Paris cabinet’s court—what was to be done with their newly-
conquered territory? 
 The truth was that there were very few incentives to retain Tonkin from the cabinet’s 
perspective. While Garnier’s successful conquest had driven down the costs of acquiring 
Tonkin, there was very little domestic-political support for its retention, and news of the 
death of Garnier did little to ignite concerns over French honor and prestige.64 France had 
lost the war with Prussia and put down the revolt of the Paris Commune only two-and-a-half 
years earlier, and had just finished paying reparations to its newly-unified neighbor to the 
east.65 A bitter political contest between republican and monarchical factions would consume 
much of France’s energy for the first decade of the Third Republic, leaving little room to 
consider imperial activity abroad.66 
 However, a more specific reason for Paris’ reticence was the perceived geopolitical risk 
associated with retaining Tonkin. While some scholars have pointed to French concerns 
over conflict with China or Vietnam to explain this reticence, the evidence suggests that   
French concerns lay much closer to home.67 The risk of igniting geopolitical competition 
with Britain or Germany in this time of vulnerability is what primarily stayed the hands of 
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French leaders.68 The preeminence of the European threat in French leaders’ minds can be 
seen in many of the communications within and between both Saigon and Paris in the run-
up to the conquest of Tonkin. For instance, in his 11 September 1873 reply to Paris, 
Governor Dupré assured Colonial and Naval Minister d’Hornoy that he would “not lose 
sight of all the precautions imposed on us by the present situation in Europe.”69 On 22 
September, in a letter to a colleague in the navy, French Prime Minister Broglie pointed out 
that “what concerns me in particular with the occupation of the capital of Tonkin and the 
taking possession of the mouth of the river… [is that it] would excite the discontent of 
foreign powers, and England in particular. There is no doubt that the London cabinet… 
would not care to see us become masters of Tonkin”70 The prime minister similarly wrote to 
d’Hornoy on 6 November that “prudence advised us not to resort to arms” in Tonkin, since 
the “strengthening of our influence” would be “against the desires of the other powers.”71 
Even Garnier himself seems to have known of this potential source of opposition. In his 
letter of 10 November to his brother Léon, announcing his plans for conquest, he wrote that 
he hoped “that soon after, despite the fear we have of England, it will be recognized that I 
have rendered service to my country!”72 
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 However, the most detailed piece of evidence supporting the idea that France’s concerns 
were geopolitical and lay in Europe is Naval and Colonial Minister d’Hornoy’s 12 September 
letter to Dupré, forbidding him from engaging in conquest in Tonkin. In it, D’Hornoy 
points out to the governor that, in terms of foreign policy, “this is where we are. No allies! 
Our immediate neighbor, from whom we are no longer separated except by a frontier which 
no longer offers us any means of defense, is a powerful enemy.”73 D’Hornoy worried aloud 
that Bismarck was seeking some motive to, again, declare war on France, and that France’s 
relatively rapid recovery alone was making the Iron Chancellor wary. He pointed out that the 
conquest would be costly in terms of money and personnel. D’Hornoy also noted that the 
Chinese, “while not very formidable as combatants,” would have to be continually repressed. 
But “the most serious obstacle, in my opinion,” the minister emphasized, the “most 
dangerous would be the jealousy of England and Germany to see our power extend thus in 
the East, and I fear that the difficulties that would emerge would be the repercussions felt in 
Europe.”74 Given their relatively weak position in Europe, it was the reactions of the 
European great powers that French leaders most feared. 
Paris Decides  
Given these perceptions of geopolitical risk, and the lack of incentive to retain Tonkin, the 
decision for the leaders in Paris was relatively easy. The cabinet quickly ordered the 
immediate withdrawal from Tonkin and the return of conquered territories to local 
authorities.75 In an almost-lecturing tone, Naval and Colonial Minister d’Hornoy replied to 
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Dupré’s report on the death of Garnier on 7 January, noting that the “sad event you are 
announcing justifies the thoughts I expressed to you about the mission to Tonkin and whose 
departure I couldn’t prevent.” The minister ordered Dupré to hasten the evacuation of 
Tonkin, for, as he put it, “the government demands in the most absolute way that there is no 
question of a prolonged, let alone a permanent, occupation of any part of Tonkin.”76 
 This time, Dupré did as he was told. He ordered the immediate evacuation of French 
forces from Tonkin, and by February 1874, they had been withdrawn.77 France’s precipitous 
withdrawal led to the burning of hundreds of Catholic villages throughout the region as a 
reprisal for their cooperation with the French. It is estimated that as many as 20,000 may 
have been killed, and another 70,000 made homeless.78 On 15 March 1874, France and 
Annam signed the Treaty of Saigon, settling the conflict in Tonkin.79 Hue’s most important 
concession was the recognition of French Cochinchina whereas France’s was the recognition 
of the independence of Annam and its authority over Tonkin. Hue additionally pledged to 
protect the rights of Catholics, to open ports in Hue, Hai Phong, and Qui Nhon for 
commerce, to open the Red River for trade, and to not allow any other power, including 
China, to intervene in its territory. But none of these would be adhered to in practice.80 
Ultimately, little changed as a result of the French intervention in Tonkin. However, 
Garnier’s unauthorized conquest and the resulting 1874 treaty would itself set the stage for 
yet another French naval officer to follow in his footsteps just a few years thence. 
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L’Affaire Rivière: France in Tonkin, 1882-1883 
France acquired the northern Vietnamese region of Tonkin between April 1882 and August 
1883. The conquest of this region was independently carried out by an aging French naval 
officer and writer, exceeding the limits of his orders and defying his superiors in Paris and 
French-held Saigon. The theory of inadvertent expansion makes three key arguments that 
are supported by this case. First, that unauthorized peripheral expansion is the result of a 
principal-agent problem, combining diverse preferences between capital and frontier, and 
information asymmetries favoring the latter. In the case of France in Tonkin in 1882-83, a 
lack of telegraphic communication with Tonkin itself hampered control over actors 
operating there, and leaders in Paris were far less aggressive than their peripheral agents 
would ultimately prove to be. Second, that the acquisition of territory often activates a 
number of mechanisms that make it difficult to simply withdraw one’s troops and return the 
territory to local governing authorities. In the case at hand, the territorial acquisitions ignited 
concerns of French national honor and prestige that made backing down seem unthinkable 
to many, if not most, in the capital. Third, that a lack of perceived geopolitical risk associated 
with acquisition will encourage leaders in the capital to accept the fait accompli, resulting in 
territorial expansion. In this Tonkin case, there were no rival great power interests at stake, 
and French officials from Tonkin to Paris consistently ignored or downplayed the risks of 
impinging upon China’s interests. French leaders would be proven wrong in this regard, as 
French actions in the region would ultimately spark the Sino-French War in December 1883. 
But not before leaders in Paris authorized the acquisition of Tonkin, which was successfully 




With France’s withdrawal from Tonkin in February 1874, French expansion in the region 
was put on hold. The domestic political battle between monarchists and republicans raged 
on, and the economic effects of France’s war indemnity to Germany, though by this point 
fully paid off, continued to be felt.81 Furthermore, in their relatively weakened state, French 
leaders remained wary of antagonizing the other great powers of Europe.82 Under these 
conditions, the state of play in Vietnam returned to much as it was before the abortive 
French conquest of 1873. Catholics continued to be persecuted.83 French missionaries, 
traders, and consuls were harassed and hindered in their duties.84 Hue continued its 
subordinate relationship with the Qing Empire, sending tribute missions and requesting their 
assistance in putting down a domestic rebellion.85 And the Black Flags continued to operate 
in the upper reaches of the Red River, collecting customs and hindering the free passage of 
French exploration and trade.86 However, despite all of these challenges, France took little 
action. As French Foreign Minister Louis, duc Decazes said of Tonkin in September 1877, 
“we have renounced openly establishing a protectorate… [We are] not in a position to 
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undertake aggrandizement.”87 It was almost as if Garnier’s intervention had never happened, 
and the treaty of 1874 had never been signed. 
 The new French governor in Cochinchina was Charles-Marie Le Myre de Vilers, the first 
civilian to hold that position. A former naval officer with extensive diplomatic experience, 
Le Myre de Vilers saw a more active French role in the region as a solution to many of their 
predicaments there. The new commander of Saigon’s naval station was Captain Henri 
Laurent Rivière. Rivière was a career naval officer and a veteran of the Crimean War, the 
Mexican Expedition (1861-67), and the Franco-Prussian War. He was also instrumental in 
helping put down a revolt against French rule in New Caledonia in 1879.88 Arriving in Saigon 
in September 1881 at the age of 54, Rivière had a rather undistinguished military career 
which, at this point in his life, he seemed unlikely to improve upon.89 He was an imposing 
figure, being tall and barrel-chested with a penetrating gaze and a stolid disposition.90 Rivière 
had little interest in colonialism or empire, and was instead an esteemed writer of novels and 
plays and a brilliant conversationalist, who frequented Paris’ most exclusive salons.91 As a 
naval officer, he had a reputation for discretion and whose tact and judgment could be relied 
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upon.92 Henri Rivière was the key actor on France’s Southeast Asian frontier who would 
drag his superiors into the conquest of Tonkin. 
 The key leaders in Paris who were responsible for French imperial policy were the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of the Navy and Colonies. There was a great 
deal of turmoil in French domestic politics in these years, and over the course of the Tonkin 
expedition, the French prime ministership was held by five individuals (Léon Gambetta, 
Charles de Freycinet, Charles Duclerc, Armand Fallières, and Jules Ferry), the position of 
foreign minister was occupied by six (Gambetta, Freycinet, Duclerc, Fallières, Paul-Armand 
Challemel-Lacour, and Ferry), and the Naval and Colonial ministry changed hands four 
times (Bernard Jauréguiberry, François de Mahy, Charles Brun, and Alexandre Peyron). 
While some had much greater influence on the process than others, the individuals in these 
positions were the leaders in the capital who Henri Rivière would drag unwittingly into 
conquering Tonkin. 
Paris & Tonkin 
These leaders in Paris would face significant principal-agent problems in dealing with Rivière 
and other agents on the ground in Tonkin. First, there were important information 
asymmetries favoring their peripheral agents. While, as noted above, there was a telegraph 
connection between Paris and Saigon, Tonkin itself still lacked a telegraph station, with 
communications from Saigon continuing to be being carried upriver by boat. The fastest a 
message from Saigon could be delivered to Hanoi was approximately six days, and therefore 
it would take, at the very least, twelve days to get a response to a message sent from Paris to 
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Hanoi.93 These communication delays made monitoring—and thereby potentially 
controlling—the behavior of peripheral agents like Henri Rivière exceedingly difficult for 
leaders in Paris. 
 Second, there was a divergence of preferences between many leaders in the capital and 
their agents in Saigon and Tonkin. While there were advocates in Paris of a more aggressive 
approach to Tonkin—most notably, Naval and Colonial Minister Jean Bernard 
Jauréguiberry—the general posture of most leaders in the capital was one of aversion to 
intervention.94 And while there was one French cabinet that hoped, and even planned, to 
possibly acquire Tonkin by force—that of Charles de Freycinet—it didn’t last long enough 
to put its plans into action.95 In general, leaders in Paris wanted to avoid an entangling 
engagement in Tonkin. 
 Those on the periphery, by contrast, were often more aggressive in their orientation. 
Cochinchina Governor Le Myre de Vilers, for instance, was a proponent of an aggressive 
regional posture. In the summer of 1881, he personally advocated for a small armed 
expedition to the region, to clear the Red River of the Black Flags and to strengthen existing 
French garrisons there. The Governor’s plan was agreed to by the cabinet and approved by 
the Chamber of Deputies in July 1881, yet the government in Paris made the limitations on 
this mission unmistakably clear. In the cabinet’s instructions for Le Myre de Vilers in 
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September, he was told to “raise the prestige of French authority” in the region, and to 
“protect the interests and rights of Europeans in these parts,” but “above all, [to] refrain 
from embarking on adventures of military conquest.” This was to be, in their words, “a 
material demonstration which in no way has the character of a military operation.”96 
By late December, Governor Le Myre de Vilers saw the opportune moment 
approaching.97 On 16 January 1882, he notified Paris that he planned to double the garrison 
in Hanoi, but was quick to emphasize that there “will be no military operation; I will only 
take preventive measures.”98 The following day, the governor issued his orders for 
Commander Rivière, instructing him to double the Hanoi garrison, from 100 to 200 
personnel, and to clear the Red River of the Black Flags.99 And the very same constraints 
that Paris had placed upon Le Myre de Vilers were, in turn, placed upon Rivière. As the 
governor put it: 
“You know the views of the government of the Republic. It does not want at any cost 
to wage, four thousand leagues from France, a war of conquest that would drag the 
country into serious complications. It is POLITICALLY, PEACEFULLY, 
ADMINISTRATIVELY that we must extend and strengthen our influence in Tonkin 
and Annam… the measures we take today are essentially preventive. So, you will use 
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force only in case of absolute necessity and I am counting on your caution to avoid 
this eventuality.”100 
To hammer the point home, Le Myre de Vilers closed his orders by pointing out to 
Commander Rivière that the government’s wishes could “be summed up in this sentence: 
Avoid gunfire; it would serve no other purpose than to embarrass us.”101 The governor 
seems to have had confidence that his subordinate had gotten the message. In a note to the 
Colonial Minister in Paris the following day, he pointed out that Rivière had promised to 
strictly comply with his instructions and that they could “count on his prudence and 
moderation.”102 
However, there were obvious limits to Le Myre de Vilers’ ability to control Rivière once 
he had left Saigon, and the governor was sensitive to this. As he wrote in his 17 January 
orders for Rivière: “I don’t think I can give you more detailed instructions… most likely, 
things will happen and necessities will arise that I cannot foresee; but I count on your 
patriotism and your wisdom not to engage the government of the Republic in a way that it 
does not want to follow.”103 And while Rivière was known for his sound judgment—and was 
not known to have an aggressive streak—things often appeared different once one was on 
the frontier. And without telegraphic communications as a means of monitoring him, there 
was no telling what might unfold. 
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 Before Rivière had a chance to depart, the ruling ministry of Léon Gambetta fell on 30 
January, delaying the expedition’s departure by a few weeks.104 On 4 March, the returning 
Naval and Colonial Minister Admiral Jauréguiberry approved Rivière’s instructions, telling 
Le Myre de Vilers that by ordering the commander “not to use force except in the case of 
absolute necessity, you have followed exactly the intentions of my Department.”105 On 16 
March, returning prime minister Charles Freycinet also approved of the instructions, 
similarly reiterating that the mission “cannot include… the occupation of any neighboring 
territory.”106 With his orders approved in Paris, Rivière was ready to depart. 
Tonkin 
Henri Rivière left Saigon for Hanoi with a force of 233 personnel aboard two naval vessels 
on 26 March 1883.107 After a brief stop at Hai Phong, on the Tonkin coast, the expedition 
made its way up the Red River, arriving at Hanoi in the late afternoon of 2 April.108 For the 
commander’s first few days in Hanoi, everything seemed to be going relatively smoothly. He 
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met with local officials, exchanged gifts, was transparent about his plans and intentions, and, 
in contrast with Francis Garnier before him, was sensitive to, and accommodating of, their 
concerns regarding the expedition’s sudden appearance.109  
However, during the second week of their stay, concerns began to creep in. Local Tonkin 
officials, knowing from experience that the sudden appearance of a French expedition often 
spelled trouble, continued to reinforce their forces at the Hanoi citadel, which Rivière 
watched with increasing alarm.110 As the commander wrote to Governor Le Myre de Vilers 
on 18 April, “The citadel continues to fill with soldiers and to strengthen itself,” and that this 
“state of affairs can only continue at the expense of our influence” in the region.111 When 
Rivière received a force of 250 reinforcements from Saigon on 24 April, bringing his total to 
just shy of 600, he decided that it was time to take action. 
At 5:00 am on 25 April, Commander Rivière—like Garnier before him—sent the 
Governor of Hanoi an ultimatum.112 He gave the governor until 8:00 am to hand over the 
citadel or face attack.113 At 7:30 am, the Governor asked for a 24-hour delay, but Rivière 
simply ignored it, taking it as a sign of hostility.114 At 8:15 am, Rivière’s gunboats on the Red 
River initiated a two-and-a-half-hour preparatory bombardment on the Citadel’s north 
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face.115 Meanwhile, the assault force divided into two columns and got in position to move 
on the fortress. When the guns went silent at 10:45 am, one force feigned an attack on the 
citadel’s east gate, while the main assault force attacked where the barrage had taken place, 
the north gate. By 11:15 am, both forces were inside the citadel, finding that most of its 
defenders had fled. Before noon, the citadel was secured and the French tricolor was flying 
at its highest point. The conquest cost the French just four wounded, while at least 40 
Annamese defenders were killed, and an unknown but significant number of Annam’s 
soldiers were wounded. The citadel’s governor perished as well, having hung himself during 
the attack 116 
Rivière wrote to Le Myre de Vilers that very day, informing him of the conquest. 
However, without a telegraph connection in Hanoi, it would take nearly a week for his letter 
to arrive on the Governor’s desk. “I had to take the Hanoi citadel,” Rivière wrote, “It 
couldn’t go on.” He promised his superior that the new acquisition would be “all profit for 
us and no pain,” and begged the governor “to believe that I had to act as I did. The citadel 
openly fortified near us; it was a danger which we had to cut short.”117 On April 27, 
Commander Rivière sent a similar letter of notification to Naval and Colonial Minister 
Jauréguiberry in Paris, pointing out that, given the “preparations of defense” he observed at 
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the citadel, he simply “had to prepare to act.”118 The day after the conquest of the citadel, 
Commander Rivière issued a proclamation to the people of Hanoi, claiming that his 
intention was not to take over the country and blaming the conquest on the “reprehensible 
conduct” of the citadel’s governor.119 In an attempt to signal his good faith, the commander 
lowered the French tricolor on the 27 April and replaced it with the Annamese flag. In the 
days that followed, he also returned much of the citadel to local authorities, only retaining 
the Royal Pavilion, the military heart of the fortress.120 Even Rivière himself was stunned by 
the sudden turn of events and his place in them. “It is quite astonishing,” he wrote to a 
friend on 2 May, “I have thus become a man of war.”121 
Saigon & Paris React 
It took until 1 May for news of the citadel’s seizure to reach Saigon. It clearly came as a 
surprise to Governor Le Myre de Vilers, for just days earlier he had been assuring Minister 
Jauréguiberry that Commander Rivière was “too careful and too sane a man to engage lightly 
on a path contrary to the spirit of your instructions.”122 The governor was clearly irritated 
with his subordinate, and even considered recalling him.123 In his reply to Rivière on 2 May, 
the governor pointedly asked, “was this measure essential?” noting that “fortresses that are 
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taken without firing a shot are rarely to be feared.” However, from Le Myre de Vilers’ 
perspective, what was done was done, and he was willing to accept his share of the 
responsibility, though he reiterated his orders “not to use force against the regular authorities 
except when absolutely necessary.”124 In a series of cables and letters sent back to Paris, 
Governor Le Myre de Vilers stood behind Rivière, pointing to the “threatening attitude” of 
the Hanoi authorities, noting that there was “nothing to fear” in response, and assuring his 
metropolitan bosses that they were “not on a war footing.”125 In the meantime, the 
Governor continued to urge Rivière to expand no further, and to await instructions from 
Paris.126 
 For their part, leaders in Paris took the news in relative stride. On 20 June, Naval and 
Colonial Minister Jauréguiberry gave his approval for the steps taken thus far, though agreed 
that there was a “need to make our success effective by limiting our occupation.”127 France, 
in these months, was swept up in a crisis over Egypt that would precipitate a British invasion 
in July 1882, and had little time or attention to devote to Tonkin.128 In fact, the decision in 
Paris, for the time being, was to not make a decision. Rivière was to maintain his position, 
expand no further, and do nothing that would cause complications for France in the region. 
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In Le Myre de Vilers’ view, they could reopen diplomatic negotiations with Hue over the 
future of Tonkin from this new position of relative strength, possibly gaining a protectorate 
once they had come to an agreement.129 As he saw it, time was on their side.130 For the time 
being, he wrote to Rivière on 27 July, they had to “be patient” and “await the auspicious 
hour.”131 
Frustration in Tonkin & Paris 
For the first few weeks of the occupation, Rivière’s spirits were high, and he sent reports 
back to Paris in early May, pointing out that the situation was under control. However, as the 
weeks progressed, impatience began to set in. The commander began to resent being left in 
limbo, with his superiors deciding neither to withdraw nor to formally annex Tonkin. “I do 
not know how long these events in Tonkin will last,” Rivière wrote to a friend on 4 June, 
adding that the “Governor does not know what he wants and the Minister gives no sign of 
life.”132 He conducted a short reconnaissance mission up the Red River in early June, but 
otherwise remained in Hanoi. He complained in a letter to a friend on 17 July of the 
“intolerable heat” of the region and, referring to his conquest, added that he did “not know 
whether it will be approved or not; but it does not matter; I did what I had to…”133 The 
following month, Rivière seemed even more discouraged, complaining to a friend that, with 
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“a little energy, the day after taking Hanoi, we could have gotten what we wanted from 
Hué,” and disparaging Le Myre de Vilers’ approach as one of “procrastination and 
conciliation.”134 
 In Paris, Naval and Colonial Minister Jauréguiberry was similarly frustrated at the lack of 
progress in Tonkin.135 On 15 October he sent a letter to the new prime minister, Charles 
Duclerc, arguing that it was past time for a “solution to the Tonkin question” and 
concluding that France “must act to formally establish [a] protectorate.”136 He outlined a 
plan in which 3,000 French troops alongside 3,000 native troops would occupy the 
remainder of Tonkin and force Hue to agree to a protectorate. In late October the prime 
minister signaled his agreement with Minister Jauréguiberry, and on 14 November sent him 
his “full approval” of the proposal.137 However, the rest of the cabinet resisted 
Jauréguiberry’s plan, seeing no pressing need to take action.138 Instead, they settled for a 
compromise in which 700 troops were dispatched to the region in late December to 
reinforce Rivière’s forces.139 Then, for entirely unrelated domestic political reasons, the 
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Duclerc ministry fell in late January 1883, leaving the Tonkin question unresolved, yet 
again.140 
Back in Tonkin 
Rivière’s reinforcement force of 700 arrived in Hanoi on 24 February 1883. Their timing was 
impeccable, as the commander would soon receive intelligence from a reliable source that a 
Chinese company was in the process of gaining mining concessions near the port of Hon 
Gai on the Tonkin coast, alarmingly, with the apparent backing of mining interests in the 
United Kingdom. Rivière was also disturbed by a proposal recently put forward by the 
French Minister to China, Frédéric Bourée, to cede the port area to China in a broader 
division of spheres of influence in Tokin.141 Thus, on 12 March Rivière decided once again 
to take matters into his own hands, ordering the occupation of the port, which was carried 
out by one of his field commanders two days later.  
Rivière then set his sights on the citadel of Nam Dinh, about 100 km downriver from 
Hanoi. According to Rivière, the citadel’s governor and his army were displaying “the most 
hostile attitude” toward the French, and were apparently preparing to create barriers along 
their stretch of the Red River, potentially cutting off French access to the sea.142 This, 
according to Rivière, was an unacceptable risk. On 19 March he wrote to Le Myre de Vilers’ 
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recent replacement as governor of Cochinchina, Charles Thomson, announcing that the 
“situation is serious enough in Nam-Dinh for me to decide to attack the Citadel.”143  
On 26 March, Rivière arrived at Nam Dinh at the head of a force of 800, and sent the 
governor an ultimatum: hand over the citadel or be removed by force. When no surrender 
was forthcoming, the French forces initiated their attack at 7:00 the following morning. 
While the Annamese defenders put up a spirited resistance, they were ultimately no match 
for French firepower and tactics, and by nightfall the French tricolor was flying over the 
citadel. The attack cost the French just one dead and two wounded, while they inflicted as 
many as 1,000 casualties on their Annamese opponents. Once the citadel was in French 
hands, Rivière found and ordered the immediate execution of 49 Chinese Black Flag 
soldiers, who were summarily strung up and hung on the yardarm of one of the French 
naval vessels.144 The following day, on 27 March, Rivière wrote to Governor Thomson, 
proudly informing him he had taken the Nam Dinh citadel, and that between Hanoi and 
Nam Dinh, France was now in control of the Red River Delta.145 
It is clear that Rivière had motivations for these conquests beyond the case-specific 
factors he cited for each acquisition. The conquests of Hon Gai and Nam Dinh brought the 
Tonkin crisis, in his words, to “a new phase of action.”146 Reflecting on events a few weeks 
later, Rivière wrote to a friend, “I decided myself to do what [the Government] couldn’t 
 
143 No. 80: “Commander Rivière to Mr. Thomson, Governor of Cochinchina – Hanoi, 19 March 1883,” in 
Masson, ed., Correspondence Politique du Commandant Rivière, p. 208. 
144 Norman, Tonkin, pp. 205-206; Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, p. 68; McAleavy, Black Flags in Vietnam, p. 
200; Taboulet, La Geste Française en Indochine II, pp. 787-788. 
145 “Commander Rivière to Mr. Thomson, Governor of Cochinchina – Nam-Dinh, 27 March 1883,” in 
Masson, ed., Correspondence Politique du Commandant Rivière, p. 212. 




make up their minds to make me do.” With these acquisitions, he continued, the 
Government “will be forced to move on the Tonkin question… I do not yet know if they 
will be happy in France with what I did. [But] I have done the right thing…”147 The 
Commander was frustrated by his government’s inaction, and was aiming to force its hand. 
While Rivière was carrying out the conquest of Nam Dinh, Black Flags and Vietnamese 
armed forces carried out a large-scale attack on the Hanoi Citadel.148 They were repelled by 
the French garrison defending the fortress, but news of the attack alarmed Rivière, leading 
him to rush back upriver to Hanoi where he arrived on 2 April.149 In the weeks that 
followed, Commander Rivière became increasingly concerned about reports of large 
concentrations of Black Flags and Vietnamese troops gathered in the villages of Bac Ninh 
and Son Tay, each within 35 km of Hanoi. Contributing to the tension, a series of 
provocative placards were posted at the gates of the Hanoi Citadel, purportedly from the 
leader of the Black Flags, Liu Yong-fu, taunting and threatening the French occupiers.150 In 
what, it turned out, would be his final letter to Governor Thomson on 16 May, Rivière 
pointed out that the “situation is not without a certain gravity,” and argued that it was 
“necessary[,] to get out of the difficulties we are in, to capture Bac-Ninh and Son-Tay.”151 
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At 4:00 am on 19 May 1883, Rivière and a force of approximately 500 headed out from 
Hanoi toward Son Tay.152 Little did they know it, but a staff member of a local Hanoi hostel 
where some of the French soldiers were staying had caught wind of the planned attack, and 
informed the Black Flags in advance.153 Just four kilometers from Hanoi, the French force 
was ambushed and surrounded on three sides by a Black Flag army, forcing them into a 
disorganized fighting retreat.154 Amid the fray, one of the French light artillery pieces became 
stuck in the mud, and Rivière jumped out of his travel carriage to help retrieve it. In the 
course of its retrieval, the Commander was shot in the shoulder, where he collapsed—not 
far from where Francis Garnier himself was killed nearly ten years earlier. He was then 
dragged off alive by the Black Flags to a military base nearby, where he soon thereafter 
perished. And like Garnier before him, Rivière had his head removed after his death.155 This 
failed attack on Son Tay had cost the French 30 killed and 51 wounded.156 
Back in Paris 
When Rivière was engaging in the conquests of Hon Gai and Bac Ninh, the political winds 
were shifting back in the capital. After the three-week tenure of a brief, caretaker ministry in 
early February 1883, Jules Ferry formed his second ministry on 22 February, approximately 
three months before Rivière was killed in Tonkin. He named Paul-Armand Challemel-
Lacour as his foreign minister and Charles Brun as his Naval and Colonial Minister. From 
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the second day of his appointment, Challemel-Lacour got to work on the Tonkin crisis, 
finding it more serious and more urgent than he had supposed from the outside.157 He spent 
about a week going through the available documents, and then forwarded materials to Naval 
and Colonial Minister Brun and Prime Minister Ferry for consideration.158 After another 
week of study, the prime minister decided to hold a cabinet meeting on 5 March to decide 
the fate of the Tonkin question. 
 Effecting a prompt withdrawal would have been no small feat. It turned out that Rivière’s 
actions had activated mechanisms that made pulling out of Tonkin and relinquishing the 
captured territory exceedingly difficult. For one, Rivière had independently conquered much 
of the Tonkin Delta, and in doing so, had substantially reduced the costs to Paris of 
acquiring this territory. However, a second and more important reason it would have been 
difficult to retrench was the engagement of French national honor and prestige.159 French 
leaders in Saigon and in Paris clearly saw France’s honor as being at stake once Tonkin had 
been partially acquired. For instance, on 11 June 1882, just six weeks after Rivière’s seizure 
of the Hanoi Citadel, Governor Le Myre de Vilers wrote in a letter to Minister Jauréguiberry 
that if France didn’t take further action in the region, “we will lose our influence, because 
our abstention will be considered an act of weakness and cowardice.”160 In another report 
 
157 Albert Billot, L’Affaire du Tonkin: Histoire Diplomatique de L’Établissement de Notre Protectorat sur L’Annam et de 
Notre Conflit avec la Chine, 1882-1885 (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1888), p. 34; Edouard Krakowski, La Naissance de la IIIe 
République: Challemel-Lacour, Le Philosophe et L’Homme d’État (Paris: Éditions Victor Attinger, 1932), p. 298. 
158 Billot, L’Affaire du Tonkin, pp. 34-35. 
159 See: Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, p. 294; Power, Jules Ferry, pp. 159, 161, 193; C.M. 
Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, “Centre and Periphery in the Making of the Second French Colonial 
Empire, 1815-1920” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1988), p. 19. 
160 No. 125: “Mr. Le Myre de Vilers, Governor of French Cochinchina, to Admiral Jauréguiberry, Minister of 
the Navy and Colonies, Saigon, 11 June 1882,” in Documents Diplomatiques I, pp. 277-278. 
217 
 
from the governor, sent a week later, Minister Jauréguiberry penciled in on the margin: “We 
cannot go back now!”161 The Naval and Colonial Minister had made similar arguments when 
he requested additional troops to establish a protectorate in the fall and winter of 1882. In 
his letter of 15 October to Prime Minister Duclerc, he wrote that France in Tonkin was in “a 
state of affairs which, if continued, could compromise our honor.” He claimed it was “too 
late to abandon a country where our flag has been flying for eight years” and added that 
“what was possible without dishonor to the Republic at the beginning of 1880 is no longer 
[possible]…”162 The interim Naval and Colonial Minister François de Mahy agreed, writing 
in February 1883 to incoming Prime Minister Jules Ferry that the abandonment of Tonkin 
“may have, for our influence in the Far East… consequences such as I cannot call enough to 
your attention.”163 In short, concerns about French national honor and prestige made 
backing down in Tokin appear very difficult to leaders in Paris.164 
 Furthermore, the geopolitical risk associated with retaining the territories, and even 
pushing further into Tonkin, appeared to be manageable to most leaders in Paris. There were 
few great power interests at stake in Tonkin,165 and the threat of China forcibly resisting a 
French advance was consistently down played or ignored. In the view of many French 
leaders, China had acquiesced to the annexations of Cochinchina in the 1860s without 
protest, and similarly accepted the 1874 treaty with Hue, which stated that it was to be 
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“independent of all foreign powers,” including China.166 As contemporary chronicler of 
events in Tonkin Charles B. Norman put it, to most French leaders, “China was considered 
une qualité négligeable.”167 
 These views were present in the years and months preceding Rivière’s conquest of Hanoi 
as well. For instance, in July 1880, when Prime Minister Freycinet agreed to the plan to 
occupy Tonkin just before his ministry fell, he wrote to Naval and Colonial Minister that 
there “would be no complications to fear on the side of China, which perhaps would even 
gladly see that it is relieved of the intermittent policing that it is currently conducting” on the 
Red River.168 Cochinchina Governor Le Myre de Vilers similarly argued in a letter to Paris in 
December 1881 that, if they occupied Tonkin, the “government of China will abstain; we 
won’t provide it with a basis for intervention because we will make no declaration of 
war…”169 This argument was passed on almost verbatim from Naval and Colonial Minister 
Jauréguiberry to Prime Minister Freycinet during his second ministry on 4 March 1882.170 
 This downplaying of the China threat persisted in the aftermath of Rivière’s April 1882 
conquest of the Hanoi Citadel.171 For instance, in a letter from Governor Le Myre de Vilers 
to Minister Jauréguiberry on 22 May, the governor wrote, referring to the possibility of Hue 
seeking the aid of Beijing, that it “is possible even probable; but it is not dangerous, for the 
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moment at least…”172 In another letter on 19 July, reporting on Chinese troop increases on 
the Tonkin border, Le Myre de Vilers wrote, “I don’t think that… the Chinese 
demonstration is of serious importance,”173 and this message was passed on to Prime 
Minister Duclerc in September.174 In response, the prime minister wrote on 26 September 
that France had “every reason to hope that our good relations with China will not be 
seriously disturbed by our expedition on the Song-koi [Red River],” and added that the 
reported troop increase on the border was likely “a measure taken by the Government of 
Beijing to inspire the confidence in the Court of Hué, and to maintain in it the illusion of an 
intervention.”175 
 This isn’t to say that there were no concerns in the French government. Frédéric Bourée, 
the French minister to China, sent a series of letters and cables to Paris through the fall and 
winter of 1882, reporting on Chinese troop increases and infiltration into Tonkin.176 At one 
point he even claimed he saw war as essentially “inevitable,” which led him to initiate 
negotiations in late November and early December 1882.177 However, even Bourée had 
played a part in minimizing the China threat, claiming in an October 1882 letter to the prime 
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minister that he was “almost certain that the Chinese Government will not care to expose its 
soldiers to compete with ours and that the imperial forces will retreat everywhere at our 
approach.”178 This downplaying of the geopolitical risk posed by China led to some wildly 
optimistic views among leaders in Paris. For instance, Minister Jauréguiberry wrote to Prime 
Minister Duclerc in October 1882 that the Chinese “would have nothing to lose, but 
everything to gain, on the contrary, from recognizing our Protectorate.”179 In sum, while 
there were pockets and periods of concern, the general trend among government officials in 
Paris and Saigon was to perceive relatively little geopolitical risk posed by China’s interests in 
Tonkin. 
Paris Decides 
The cabinet of Prime Minister Jules Ferry decided, in their 5 March meeting, that France 
would establish a full protectorate over Tonkin, by military force if necessary. Minister 
Bourée in Beijing was recalled and the results of his negotiations, which had ceded a sphere 
of influence in northern Tonkin to China, were disavowed.180 Foreign Minister Challemel-
Lacour was tasked with explaining the cabinet’s decision to the French legislature, which he 
did on 13 March. In his remarks, the foreign minister leaned heavily on themes of French 
national honor, claiming that “France had obligations that it could not shirk,” and that 
prolonging the situation in the region would only cause “a deep attack on our authority in 
Annam, in Tonkin, and in Cochinchina.” He further argued that a “retreat” from Tonkin 
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322. 
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would result in “the certain ruin of our influence, and the loss of our prestige throughout the 
Orient.”181 And the government’s optimism with respect to the China threat continued 
apace. On 14 March, Challemel-Lacour wrote to the recently-recalled Minister Bourée (who 
wouldn’t leave Beijing until his replacement arrived a few months later) that the 
establishment of a French protectorate in Tonkin “can only be profitable to China itself, by 
ensuring order on its borders.”182  
The decision on Tonkin having been made, all that was left for the Ferry cabinet was to 
put forward a specific plan and to request the necessary funds from the Chamber of 
Deputies, which it did on 26 April. Along with the request, Foreign Minister Challemel-
Lacour included an explanatory statement for French legislators, where the government, 
again, heavily emphasized the importance of protecting French honor and prestige. France’s 
inaction, he noted, “could be considered as marks of indecision or weakness and have not 
been without damaging the reputation of France in Asia.” “A new abandonment of Tonkin,” 
the foreign minister continued, “would be considered an abdication in these regions of the 
Far East, where our flag appears with honor among those of the main trading powers…” 
Thus, Challemel-Lacour noted in closing, the government’s policy was to “establish 
ourselves firmly in Tonkin, and to affirm in the eyes of all our resolution to stay there.”183 
The Chamber of Deputies voted on a request of 5.5 million francs to cover 3,000 French 
soldiers, 1,000 locals, and nine additional gunboats for Tonkin on 15 May 1883. The 
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measure passed by the wide margin of 351-48.184 The bill was amended in the days that 
followed, and was returned to the Chamber for second vote on 26 May—the very day that 
news of Rivière’s killing and beheading at the hands of the Black Flags had reached Paris.185 
This time it passed unanimously, with Naval and Colonial Minister Brun writing to 
Cochinchina Governor Thomson that the legislature had “voted unanimously on credit for 
Tonkin. France will avenge its glorious children!”186 
French Minister Bourée finally left Beijing in mid-May 1883. This put an end to any 
consistent warnings of the risks of war with China for good. In his instructions to Bourée’s 
successor, Foreign Minister Challemel-Lacour casually noted that recent events had “cooled 
our relations with China” and asked the new minister to “facilitate a rapprochement between 
our two countries.”187 In a separate set of instructions, the foreign minister pointed out that 
China had “no valid motive to take umbrage with a project which it will naturally be called 
upon to take advantage [of]” and argued that China’s “military preparations… should only 
be considered as attempts at intimidation.”188 The new minister in Beijing, for his part, took 
an entirely more laid back approach than his successor had. He reported on 18 June that 
China’s military preparations “have been exaggerated,”189 and argued a few days later that a 
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“powerful maritime diversion made on the coasts of the Celestial Empire would suffice” to 
keep it from intervening.190 In early July, the French minister similarly argued in a letter to 
Foreign Minister Challemel-Lacour that the Chinese “will be careful not to declare war, 
because peace is too advantageous to them.” And even if it came to conflict, he continued, 
“China’s forces on land and sea are singularly overrated… poorly armed, most of them 
undisciplined, they would certainly not hold in front of six battalions supported by a strong 
artillery.” 191 Prime Minister Ferry had a similar impression. In a 21 June conversation with 
the Chinese minister in Paris, Ferry was told that “China has no thoughts of aggression; it 
knows that France is strong enough to do what it wants in the Kingdom of Annam,” and 
that China “will not consider [French] actions in Tonkin as a cause of war or rupture.”192 
This conversation, along with the messages he was getting from other members of his 
ministry, gave Prime Minister Ferry the impression that France’s “firm attitude and known 
resolve” was working—he saw China as backing down.193 
Conquest & War 
The initial French force of 3,000, along with its native recruits, reached the Tonkin shores in 
early July 1883.194 After taking a few a few coastal territories and working its way through the 
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Tonkin Delta, the determination was made in Paris in late July to bring the invasion to the 
heart of Annamese power, in Hue.195 On 16 August, French naval forces assembled in the 
harbor of Danang, and two days later initiated a bombardment of the Thuan-An fortresses, 
which protected the imperial palace at the entrance to the Hue River.196 On 20 August, an 
armistice was agreed to, and on 25 August 1883, France and Annam signed the Treaty of 
Hue, establishing a French protectorate over both Annam and Tonkin.197 The entirety of 
what is now Vietnam was in French hands, where it would remain until after France’s 
catastrophic loss at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. 
 France’s conquest of Tonkin and Annam would, indeed, spark the war with China that 
French leaders had seen as so unlikely. Beijing’s refusal to withdraw its forces from northern 
Tonkin, as well as its continued support for the Black Flags, led French forces to attack the 
Black Flag stronghold at Son Tay in December 1883, sparking the Sino-French War. At its 
peak, France had some 35,000 forces engaged in the war, which remained undeclared 
through its entirety for fear of antagonizing the other great powers.198 As the war progressed 
through 1884 and into early 1885, public opinion soured at home, and opposition 
politicians—most notably, future prime minister Georges Clemenceau—began attacking 
Prime Minister Ferry and his cabinet.199 On 30 March 1885 the Ferry ministry collapsed due 
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to widespread dissatisfaction with the handling of the war, as well as opposition to his 
radically-secular domestic agenda.200 Ferry was dubbed “Le Tonkinois” by his domestic 
political opponents, and the opposition had whipped up such a frenzy that the prime 
minister was threatened by a mob outside the Palais Bourbon in Paris.201 On the very day of 
the collapse of Ferry’s ministry, China and France signed an armistice in Vietnam that would 
ultimately hold. With the Treaty of Tientsin in June 1885, the war was formally brought to a 
close and China recognized France’s protectorate over Annam and Tonkin. Between the 
French conquest of Tonkin and Annam and the Sino-French War that followed, France lost 
4,222 killed and wounded in combat, as well as an additional 5,223 French and colonial 




Three alternative explanations that might account for the cases of Tonkin in 1873-74 and 
1882-83 are strategic expansion theory, state institutional weakness, and leader interests. 
First, neither of the Tonkin cases are characterized by strategic expansion. In both cases, 
actors on the periphery—Dupré and Garnier in 1873, and Rivière in 1882—engaged in 
territorial conquest in the face of clear and explicit orders from the capital to the contrary. 
While the decisions by Broglie to return Tonkin, and by Ferry to retain it and expand 
further, were strategic in nature—based on considerations of perceived geopolitical risk—
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these leaders were only in a position to make these decisions due to actors and processes 
that were entirely out of their control. And there is no obvious reason to assume that Ferry 
would have ordered the conquest of Tonkin had Rivière not gotten the process in motion 
first. In short, these are cases of inadvertent expansion, through and through. 
 Second, state institutional weakness doesn’t appear to explain the unauthorized peripheral 
expansion in the two Tonkin cases either. While France experienced a great deal of 
domestic-political instability in these years, its state institutions were relatively strong 
compared to those of the other great powers. France had introduced universal conscription 
with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1798, relied upon it throughout the 
Napoleonic Wars, and brought back selective conscription in the Franco-Prussian War.203 By 
this point in its history, France was also able to extract considerable amounts of revenue in 
the form of a variety of direct and indirect taxes, averaging around 11 percent of the value of 
its gross national product (GNP) between 1873 and 1883.204 France had also created a civil 
registry, a state statistical agency, and began to institute a regular census during the 
revolutionary period, giving it ample information about its populace.205 Thus, French state 
institutions were relatively strong, so a weak state clearly can’t account for France’s tendency 
to so regularly engage in inadvertent expansion. As presented in Table 3.4 in Chapter 3, 
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France was likelier than any other great power to do so, with over 40 percent of its 
expansion being inadvertent. 
 Third, the two cases are indeterminate with respect to leader interest serving as an 
alternative explanation for subsequent central authorization, for both leader interests and 
perceived geopolitical risk point in the same “direction” in each case. In 1873-74, the Broglie 
ministry didn’t want Tonkin, and their perceptions of geopolitical risk discouraged them 
from accepting it. In 1883, the Ferry cabinet was far more open to acquiring Tonkin, and 
they perceived few geopolitical risks associated with its acquisition. Thus, the adjudication of 
the interest-based alternative argument for subsequent central authorization is not possible 
with these cases. 
*** 
This chapter has presented comparative case studies of inadvertent expansion and non-
expansion by France in Tonkin in 1873-74 and 1882-83. Both cases strongly support the 
theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. First, both cases show how 
inadvertent expansion is a manifestation of a principal-agent problem—that divergent 
preferences and information asymmetries favoring the periphery enabled agents to engage in 
unauthorized conquest. Second, the 1882-83 case supports the argument that even partial 
conquest of territory can activate mechanisms that make withdrawal exceedingly difficult—
in this case, concerns over French national honor and prestige. And third, in both cases the 
decision in the capital of whether to accept or reject the fait accompli was crucially determined 
by the perceived geopolitical risk associated with doing so. In the 1873-74 case, French 
leaders were so concerned with how Britain and Germany would react to the acquisition of 
Tonkin, that, given their weak position in Europe, they opted for an expeditious withdrawal. 
In contrast, in the 1882-83 case, there were no other great power interests at stake, and 
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French leaders consistently downplayed the risk of China intervening, leading them to accept 
the fait accompli and establish a protectorate over Tonkin and Annam. It turned out, in this 
case, that they were wrong—China would fight over Tonkin and the war was ultimately quite 
costly for France. But the perceptions that informed the decision to accept the fait accompli 
are in line with the theory’s expectations. 
 Much of the power of this chapter’s evidence is in the striking similarity between the two 
cases. It presented the same great power, in the same region, dealing with the very same 
territory, in both cases involving an insubordinate French naval officer, who engaged in the 
same process of acquisition, and in which the officer was killed by the same enemy in largely 
the same manner on almost the very same spot, separated by fewer than ten years. While 
there is no such thing as a perfect comparative case, and, in reality, all else is never held 
equal, the similarities across these two cases should give us confidence that the important 
variation observed in perceived geopolitical risk played a critical role in the variation 




THE DILEMMA OF INADVERTENT EXPANSION: JAPAN & ITALY 
 
This chapter examines two of the dissertation’s more “modern” cases of inadvertent 
expansion: Japan and Italy. The first case presents the Japanese government’s acquisition of 
Manchuria in 1931-32. The second presents the Italian government’s decision to reject the 
territorial fait accompli presented by its peripheral agents in the port city of Fiume in 1919-20. 
The primary value of this pair of cases is threefold. First, it presents the dissertation’s fourth 
pair of comparative, theory-testing cases, showing the important role perceived geopolitical 
risk plays in enabling or preventing inadvertent expansion. Second, both cases occur well-
into the era of modern communications, showing how inadvertent expansion can occur even 
with all of the benefits of instantaneous communication. And third, the chapter highlights 
the painful dilemmas that inadvertent expansion can thrust upon leaders’ laps, what I 
referred to in Chapter 2 as the “dilemma of inadvertent expansion.” In both cases, leaders in 
the capital simultaneously perceived significant geopolitical risk associated with acquiring the 
territories in question and the threat of severe domestic political punishment for backing 
down. And while in both cases the leaders’ initial instinct was to reject the territorial fait 
accompli, the varying outcomes observed—expansion for Japan, non-expansion for Italy—
highlights the delicate balance leaders must strike in these circumstances, and how they 
periodically fail to do so. 
 This chapter presents the dissertation’s only direct cross-country comparison. However, 
for four reasons Italy and Japan in the early 20th century is a useful comparison to test the 
theory of inadvertent expansion. First, for most of their history, Japan and Italy were the 
“least of the great powers,” existing largely in the shadows of more powerful partners and 
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rivals in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.1 Second, both Japan and Italy were relatively 
late to modernize, and were therefore more recent entrants to the great power club, having 
to catch up quickly to contend with their more established peers.2 Third, politically, both 
were “mixed regimes,” experimenting with electoral democracy but soon taking sharply-
authoritarian turns—for Italy under Benito Mussolini in 1922, and for Japan under military 
dictatorship in 1932. Fourth, in both cases the territory in question was relatively close to the 
capital under conditions of rapid communications technology, ameliorating some of the 
more severe principal-agent problems on display in previous chapters. Therefore, while no 
comparison is perfect, Japan and Italy are highly-comparable along many important 
dimensions, holding a number of factors fixed while their outcomes vary. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the case of Japan in Manchuria, where 
leaders perceived significant geopolitical risk associated with accepting the territory, yet were 
ultimately proven wrong when no great power intervention occurred, resulting in the 
acquisition of Manchuria. Second, I move onto the case of Italy in Fiume, showing how a 
similar perception of risk led successive Italian leaders to reject the fait accompli, ultimately 
accepting the port city’s status as a “free state.” Third and finally, I conclude with a brief 
consideration of alternative arguments, as well as a discussion of the importance of these 
cases for the theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. 
 
“Ishiwara’s War”: Japan in Manchuria, 1931-1932 
 
1 This phrase is from: R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).  
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The Japanese Empire acquired Manchuria3 between September 1931 and March 1932. The 
conquest of Manchuria was independently planned and orchestrated by mid-ranking officers 
of the colonial Kwantung Army, defying the orders of their civilian and military superiors in 
Tokyo. The theory of inadvertent expansion makes three central arguments that are borne 
out in this case. First, that unauthorized peripheral expansion results from a principal-agent 
problem, combining a divergence of preferences between leaders in the capital and their 
agents on the periphery and information asymmetries favoring the peripheral agents. In this 
case, there was a strong divergence of preferences between civilian leaders in Tokyo and the 
Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and the Kwantung Army had access to, and was able to 
manipulate, information that would have been of value to its superiors in the capital. Second, 
that once a territory is partly or wholly acquired, a number of mechanisms are activated that 
make it difficult to quickly and easily relinquish the acquisition. In the case of Japan in 
Manchuria, the Kwantung Army’s early successes drastically drove down the costs of its 
acquisition, and there were some truly severe domestic political costs associated with 
withdrawal. 
And third, that the perception of significant geopolitical risk associated with acquisition 
will discourage leaders in the capital from acquiring the territory in question, leading to non-
expansion. This argument is, in some ways, doubly supported in this case. In the opening 
weeks of the conquest, concerns over the possibility of military intervention by the Soviet 
Union, as well as the reactions of the great powers, led civilian leaders in Tokyo to try to rein 
in the Kwantung Army and to withdraw from newly-acquired territories in Manchuria. 
However, these leaders’ perceptions and expectations were ultimately mistaken—the Soviets 
 
3 Contemporary China’s Northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, and the northeastern 
portion of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia. 
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refrained from intervening and the great powers’ reactions were largely muted. Once this 
started to become clear, resistance to the conquest by the central government began to 
weaken, and the case for subsequent central authorization became progressively stronger. 
This led to a fall of the government, its replacement with a more expansion-oriented 
leadership, and, ultimately, the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo on 
1 March 1932. 
Historical Background 
On the eve of the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, Japan had had a continuous 
presence on the Chinese mainland since its surprise victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 
1905. Under the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Russian Empire ceded to Japan its lease of the 
Liaodong Peninsula (which would be renamed the Kwantung Leased Territory) as well as the 
South Manchuria Railway, a 1,129 km rail system with lines running from Port Arthur to 
Changchun and from Mukden to Antung.4 Manchuria as a whole totaled roughly 985,000 
km2 in China’s northeast region, bordering the Korean Peninsula to the south and the Soviet 
Far East to the north and east.5 It had a population of 30 million, approximately 220,000 of 
which were Japanese migrants who had traveled there to work for the South Manchuria 
Railway or to pursue other opportunities.6 This was shortly after the “Warlord Era” in China 
(1916-1928), when Manchuria had been ruled by the influential warlord Zhang Zuolin. While 
 
4 There were a number of smaller, subsidiary lines as well. See: Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Imperialism in 
Manchuria: The South Manchuria Railway Company, 1906-1933,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark 
R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 
pp. 101-132. 
5 Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939, Vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 1. 
6 Ikuhiko Hata and Alvin D. Coox, “Continental Expansion, 1905-1941,” in Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 291. 
233 
 
China would be weakly unified after Chiang Kai-shek’s “Northern Expedition” in 1928, 
Manchuria still had a great deal of autonomy from the Nationalist regime in Nanjing.7 
 Stationed in the Kwantung Leased Territory, and all along the South Manchuria Railway, 
was the Kwantung Army, a colonial branch of Imperial Japanese Army, headquartered in 
Port Arthur.8 Totaling just 10,400 personnel, it was composed primarily of the 2nd Infantry 
Division and the Independent Garrison Unit, six battalions that were spread along the South 
Manchuria Railway.9 The Kwantung Army was commanded by a series of generals on two-
year rotations, and staffed by a few hundred mid-ranking officers, the most important of 
which was a 42-year old Lieutenant Colonel by the name of Ishiwara Kanji.10 
 Ishiwara had arrived in Manchuria to take up his position in the Operations Section of 
the Kwantung Army in October of 1928. A career army officer of samurai lineage, Ishiwara 
got his start in the Imperial Japanese Army at the Sendai Military Preparatory School at the 
age of 13. After attending a number of military prep schools and academies through his teen 
years, he served in a variety of posts, from rural Tohoku, Japan, to Japanese-occupied Korea, 
to the Central China Garrison in Hankow, to a three-year study tour in Berlin, Germany.11 
An intense and idealistic officer, Ishiwara was intellectually gifted, finishing second in his 
class at the Army Staff College in 1918 and being described by contemporaries as “the most 
 
7 Hata and Coox, “Continental Expansion,” pp. 285-286. 
8 See: Alvin D. Coox, “The Kwantung Army Dimension,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. 
Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 
395-428. 
9 Coox, Nomonhan, p. 27 (Table 2.1). 
10 Note that this and other names in this chapter are listed according to Japanese tradition, with the surname 
preceding the given name. 
11 Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975), pp. 21-25; Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963), pp. 137-143. 
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brilliant student in the history of the college.”12 He read widely in fields as diverse as military 
history, politics, religion, and philosophy, and would become one of the most popular 
instructors at the Army Staff College where he returned in the mid-1920s, lecturing on 
European military strategists such as Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Moltke, and 
Schlieffen.13 Yet he was also impulsive, often strident and argumentative, was known to 
bristle at authority, and to be deeply contemptuous of Japan’s Taishō-era political 
leadership.14 After converting to Nichiren Buddhism in his early thirties, Ishiwara also 
developed radical, apocalyptic views of a future world-changing clash between Japan and its 
enemies in the West, particularly the United States.15 Preparing Japan for such an eventuality 
became his life-defining mission, the first step of which was to take place in Manchuria. 
 Ishiwara was joined on the Kwantung Army staff in June of 1929 by his prep school 
friend and classmate, Itagaki Seishirō. Four years Ishiwara’s senior, Itagaki differed from him 
in many respects. While Ishiwara was eccentric and impulsive, Itagaki was conventional and 
deliberate. Ishiwara could be rigid and uncompromising, while Itagaki was flexible and open-
minded. And while Ishiwara was the grand strategizer, Itagaki was much more the practical 
implementer.16 However, despite these personal and stylistic differences, what they came to 
share in common was the deep conviction that Manchuria presented threats and 
 
12 Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” Translated by Marius B. Jansen in James William Morley, 
ed., Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 143. See also: Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 21. 
13 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 25, 49-50. 
14 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 23-25. 
15 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 37-83; Seki, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” pp. 148-149. 
16 On the comparison between these two individuals, see: Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 42-43, 134-143; 
Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 95; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 139; Hata and Coox, “Continental 
Expansion,” p. 294. 
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opportunities for Japan, and that outright occupation was the necessary response. Ishiwara 
and Itagaki were the actors on Japan’s imperial periphery who played a crucial role in the 
planning and execution of the invasion of Manchuria.17 
 The prime minister of Japan at this time was Wakatsuki Reijirō. His second stint at the 
premiership, he and many members of his cabinet tended to take a dovish view of Japan’s 
relations with China and Manchuria. Chief among these was the famed diplomat and foreign 
minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, whose very name came to be associated with the liberal views 
that defined Japanese foreign policy in the 1920s. Standing somewhat outside this more 
liberal consensus was War Minister Minami Jirō, an army general and former commander of 
the Korea Army, whose foreign policy views, naturally, hewed more closely to those of the 
Imperial Japanese Army. Finally, there was the head of state, the Shōwa Emperor Hirohito, 
who was only a few years into his reign but was proving to be a more activist emperor in the 
realm of politics than his recent predecessors.18 Japan did have a Colonial Ministry, 
established in 1929, though it was a weak institution with little real influence on foreign or 
imperial policy.19 These were the leaders in the capital Tokyo who would be dragged 
unwittingly, and mostly unwillingly, into further territorial acquisitions on the Chinese 
mainland. 
 
17 Obviously, Ishiwara and Itagaki didn’t act on their own. At least 26 officers are believed to have participated 
in planning for the invasion, or knew of it in advance. See: James Weland, “Misguided Intelligence: Japanese 
Military Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931,” Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, No. 3 (July 
1994), p. 446. 
18 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Perennial, 2001), pp. 207-208.  
19 And, in any case, Prime Minister Wakatsuki held the post of colonial minister when the invasion of 
Manchuria was launched in September 1931. The Ministry of Colonial Affairs would be abandoned after the 
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1942. See: Mark R. Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,” in 
Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6: The Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 244. 
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 In and around Manchuria, the Kwantung Army faced a number of important potential 
threats. Manchuria, on the eve of the Japanese invasion, was ruled by Zhang Xueliang, the 
son and successor of the warlord Zhang Zuolin. While the father, Zuolin, had been an ally 
of the Japanese in Manchuria against the government in Nanjing, his unauthorized 1928 
assassination by a member of the Kwantung Army would push his son, Xueliang, to 
cooperate more closely with Nanjing against the Japanese.20 Zhang Xueliang was the head of 
what was known as the Fengtian Army, a force of approximately 250,000 personnel.21 In 
addition, anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria was intensifying in these years, with clashes 
between Chinese, Korean, and Japanese soldiers and citizens occurring with increasing 
frequency. To the south, on the other side of the Great Wall, was the recently-established 
Nationalist Kuomintang regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, with its capital in 
Nanjing. And to the north of Manchuria was the Soviet Union, which had been established 
less than a decade earlier at the conclusion of the Russian Civil War. In any case of armed 
conflict involving the Kwantung Army, the key questions were what kind of resistance 
Zhang’s forces would put up, and whether the Kuomintang or the Soviet Red Army would 
intervene. 
Tokyo & Manchuria 
Leaders in Tokyo faced severe principal-agent problems vis-à-vis the Kwantung Army in 
Manchuria as a result of information asymmetries favoring the army and a preference 
divergence between the two organizations. In terms of information asymmetries, the 
Kwantung Army itself was the primary source of information coming out of Manchuria. 
 
20 Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932 (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 11-17; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 45-56. 
21 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 106; Coox, Nomonhan, p. 27. 
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While there were Japanese Foreign Ministry consulates in Mukden, Andong, Dairen, and 
other major cities in the region, they were lightly staffed and often had to rely on army 
sources themselves.22 There was also the South Manchuria Railway, however its management 
was generally sympathetic to the views of the Kwantung Army, and therefore willing to put a 
similar “spin” on information it sent to Tokyo.23 And while this was an era of rapid 
communications technology, and while Manchuria was relatively close to the Japanese 
capital, the modest distance from Tokyo still afforded the Kwantung Army some 
informational advantages. In these years, travel from Tokyo to Mukden in Manchuria still 
took place by boat and train, and took 60 hours at the very fastest.24 This meant that sending 
someone from the capital to investigate matters directly would take time, and risked creating 
new principal-agent problems to contend with. 
 Second, there was a sharp divergence of preferences between the leaders in Tokyo and 
the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Prime Minister Wakatsuki and much of his cabinet were 
highly cautious when it came to China policy. As noted above, this was the era of “Shidehara 
Diplomacy,” whose core tenets were international cooperation, economic diplomacy, and 
non-intervention in China’s domestic political affairs.25 Wakatsuki and Foreign Minister 
 
22 Emer O’Dwyer, “Japanese Empire in Manchuria,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 4. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.78. 
On Japan’s consulates in China more broadly, see: Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 
1895-1937,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 
1895-1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 188-189. 
23 The South Manchuria Railway’s research division would prove invaluable for Ishiwara and Itagaki’s planning 
for the invasion of Manchuria. See: Myers, “Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria,” p. 125. See also: Yoshihashi, 
Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 138-139; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” pp. 153-154. 
24 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 156n14. 
25 James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 102; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 7-9; Hata and Coox, “Continental 
Expansion,” p. 284. 
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Shidehara therefore advocated for maintaining the territorial status quo and solving any 
existing problems between the U.S. and China through negotiation. War Minister Minami’s 
policy views for Manchuria were more hawkish than his cabinet colleagues, though he did 
want to tread carefully, was concerned with discipline within the Kwantung Army, and was 
willing to restrain its more radical elements.26 And while Emperor Hirohito’s specific policy 
views with respect to Manchuria were not entirely clear or consistent, he did seem to favor a 
more conciliatory approach, and repeatedly argued for the need to maintain discipline within 
the army.27 
The Kwantung Army, in contrast, was much less cautious in its China policy. They were 
far less concerned about the possibility of a Soviet intervention, or of the reactions of the 
other great powers. Being away from the main islands, the Kwantung Army was largely 
isolated from the domestic politics of Japan.28 With little knowledge of, or experience dealing 
with, international trade and finance, they were far less concerned about the risk of 
economic sanctions.29 And many Kwantung Army officers were largely indifferent to the 
opinions of the other great powers and their publics.30 Thus, many members of the 
Kwantung Army, and most particularly, officers such as Ishiwara and Itagaki, advocated for 
 
26 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 149; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” pp. 173, 176, 202-203; W.G. 
Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 181. 
27 For instance, he clearly favored the more diplomatic Hamaguchi cabinet to the more hawkish Tanaka 
cabinet. See: Bix, Hirohito, pp. 208, 219, 228-232. 
28 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, p. 114. 
29 Hata and Coox, “Continental Expansion,” p. 293 
30 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 111-12; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 16; Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy in the 
Interwar Period (Westport: Praeger, 2002), p. 76. 
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the complete annexation of Manchuria.31 Manchuria was a rich source of valuable natural 
resources, which would be necessary in the approaching war of attrition with the West.32 
And invading Manchuria would forestall what Ishiwara saw as an inevitable Soviet 
occupation, preventing, in his terms, the “communization of Asia.”33 
In short, leaders in Tokyo embodied what I referred to in Chapter 2 as “the view from 
the capital.” Their responsibilities were broad and weighty, being concerned, not only with 
policy in and around Manchuria, but the well-being and defense of Japan, the interests of the 
empire as a whole, and relations with other regional states and global great powers. And 
being cloistered away in the capital Tokyo, they felt few of the daily effects of the nationalist 
upheaval in Manchuria, and saw little urgency to act.34 Ishiwara and many of his Kwantung 
Army colleagues, in contrast, clearly embodied the “view from the frontier.” Their 
responsibilities were relatively narrow, being concerned with defending the roughly 3,700 
km2 Japan possessed in Manchuria, rather than the empire as a whole.35 And their sense of 
urgency to take action in Manchuria was great, as they faced the Chinese nationalist upheaval 
daily and directly. As historian and Ishiwara biographer Mark Peattie puts it, “Ishiwara in a 
very real sense was stationed on a sort of Japanese ‘imperial frontier,’ a semi-colonial 
 
31 Ian Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931-33 (London: Kegan 
Paul International, 1993), pp. 25-27. 
32 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, p. 112; Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 51-52; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan 
Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 27, 
29. 
33 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 97. 
34 Y. Tak Matsusaka, “Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931-1934,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark 
R. Peattie, eds. The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 102n15. 
35 The Kwantung Leased Territory totaled 3,461 km2, and the South Manchuria Railway Zone totaled 233 km2. 
See: Peter Duus, “Japan’s Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark 
R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), xiii; 
Myers, “Japanese Imperialism in Manchuria,” p. 109. 
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environment in which the proximity of danger and opportunity served to reinforce the 
conviction that the clearest solution to national problems lay close at hand.”36 
However, the most important source of Tokyo’s inability to control the Kwantung Army, 
and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy more broadly, was its substantial institutional 
autonomy from civilian rule.37 According to Articles 11 and 12 of the Meiji Constitution of 
1889, the Army and Navy were overseen by the Emperor himself, not the Cabinet or the 
Japanese Diet (parliament). These same constitutional provisions formally institutionalized 
the military’s traditional “right of supreme command” (dokudan senkō), the principle allowing 
staff officers of field armies autonomy from civilian control in the areas of operational 
planning and execution.38 Japanese law also mandated that the military had to approve 
ministers of the army and navy for appointment, and that the resignation of either of these 
officers could lead to the dissolution of the cabinet.39 These legal and constitutional 
structures gave the Kwantung Army a high degree of institutional independence, greatly 
hampering civilian or even central military control. 
The “Mukden Incident” 
 
36 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 100-101. 
37 On the Kwantung Army, see: James E. Weland, “The Japanese Army in Manchuria: Covert Operations and 
the Roots of Kwantung Army Insubordination,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Arizona, 1977), Ch. 9. 
38 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, p. 115; Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status,” in Marius B. 
Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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While the idea of separating Manchuria from China by force had emerged within the 
Kwantung Army as early as 1916, planning in earnest for an invasion began in July of 1929.40 
Ishiwara organized a series of reconnaissance trips, in which he, Itagaki, and other members 
of the Kwantung Army staff traveled around Manchuria in civilian clothes to get a direct 
sense of the terrain, infrastructure, and the Fengtian Army forces and capabilities.41 The 
Kwantung Army was numerically and materially inferior to its adversaries, lacking 
mechanized forces and aircraft, and being lightly equipped in artillery, engineering, and 
transport.42 Thus, it was essential that the plans be meticulously organized, stressing the 
importance of intelligence, rigorous training, and the use of surprise, speed, and the 
concentration of force.43 The idea was to devise a series of tightly-interlinked operational 
plans that would trigger one-another in a sequential fashion, creating a process that, once set 
in motion, would be very difficult to stop or reverse. Then, all that would be needed was a 
crisis of a sufficient magnitude to light the fuse, which would be easy to orchestrate. As 
Ishiwara put it in May 1931, “When the military preparations are completed we do not need 
to go to great lengths to find the motive or occasion… [the Kwantung Army can] create the 
occasion for this with a plot and force the nation to go along.”44 Operational plans were 
finalized by the summer of 1931. 
 
 
40 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 138; Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 104; Coox, “The Kwantung Army 
Dimension,” p. 401. 
41 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, pp. 102-106. 
42 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 106; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 144; Coox, Nomonhan, pp. 26-27. 
43 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 106; Coox, Nomonhan, p. 27. 
44 Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji, p. 112. 
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Despite the information asymmetries favoring the army in Manchuria, it would prove 
difficult to keep the conspiracy a secret for long. In August and early September of 1931, 
rumors began to circulate in the capital that trouble was brewing in Manchuria, prompting 
reporters to regularly press the prime minister and foreign minister for more information.45 
On 18 August, a top advisor to Emperor Hirohito said to an aide, “I can’t help but think the 
imperial army is cooking something up in Manchuria, Mongolia, and China.”46 On 4 
September, the Foreign Ministry received a telegram from Manchuria warning that “a plot is 
afoot among young officers in the Kwantung Army to thrash the Chinese army.”47  
These rumors were taken so seriously that, on 11 September, the Emperor himself 
summoned Minister of War Minami to question him on the state of military discipline. While 
Minami assured him that things were under control, the Emperor admonished him to “be 
even more cautious.”48 On the fifteenth, Foreign Minister Shidehara received a telegram 
from the Consul General in Mukden, informing him that the “Kwantung Army [is] 
assembling troops and bringing out munitions[;] seem likely to start action in the near 
future.”49 That same day, the War Ministry dispatched General Staff Intelligence Section 
chief Major General Tatekawa Yoshistugu to Manchuria, to remind the Kwantung Army of 
the cabinet’s policy of non-intervention in China and to put a stop to any impending plots. 
Yet news of Tatekawa’s trip was cabled from an accomplice of Itagaki’s in Army 
 
45 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 57. 
46 Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 189. 
47 Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 201. 
48 Bix, Hirohito, p. 231. 
49 Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 205. 
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Headquarters in Tokyo, warning: “Plot discovered. Tatekawa coming; strike first to avoid 
implicating him.”50  
Ishiwara and Itagaki took this advice to heart. While the invasion of Manchuria had been 
planned for 27 September, they moved it up to the evening of eighteenth, the day that 
Tatekawa was supposed to arrive.51 On the day of his arrival, Itagaki met Tatekawa on the 
train a few stops before Mukden, where they disembarked together at 7:05 PM. From there, 
Itagaki had one of his staff officers whisk Tatekawa away to be wined and dined at a local 
restaurant, where Tatekawa would ultimately pass out.52 Just a few hours later, the invasion 
of Manchuria was launched. 
At 10:20 PM on 18 September 1931, there was an explosion on the southbound track of 
the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaokou, just north of Mukden. The charge had been set 
by a lieutenant in the Kwantung Army, with the aim of framing Zhang Xueliang’s army with 
the sabotage. Local Kwantung Army conspirators then rushed to the scene, claimed they 
were fired on by Chinese soldiers and that they returned fire, and pursued the enemy while 
calling for reinforcements.53 In accordance with Kwantung Army plans established by 
Ishiwara and Itagaki, a local battalion commander then ordered an attack on the Fengtian 
Army barracks at Mukden, which housed as many as 10,000 personnel. As Zhang had 
recently ordered his troops to under no circumstances resort to force in any confrontation 
with the Japanese, the barracks were overrun within a few hours and at minimal cost to the 
 
50 Bix, Hirohito, p. 232; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 205. 
51 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 152n4, 156-157. 
52 The extent to which Tatekawa may have been aware of the plot is not entirely known. See: Yoshihashi, 
Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 159; Seki “The Manchurian Incident,” p. 227; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 59. 
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Kwantung Army.54 Just four hours after the initial explosion, the Imperial Japanese Army in 
Korea received a request from the Kwantung Army to dispatch reinforcements, which began 
to mobilize immediately.55 By 1:00 PM the next day, Mukden as a whole was under 
Kwantung Army control, and by 3:00 PM, the South Manchuria Railway’s terminal city of 
Changchun, to the north, was occupied. Within less than 24 hours, the invasion of 
Manchuria was well under way. 
Tokyo Reacts 
The first meeting of Prime Minister Wakatsuki’s cabinet to deal with what became known as 
the “Mukden Incident” was held in Tokyo on 19 September at 8:00 AM, the morning after 
the explosion. It was agreed, in line with Wakatsuki’s, Foreign Minister Shidehara’s, and 
Emperor Hirohito’s preferences, that the crisis should be localized, the spread of hostilities 
contained, and the dispute settled as expeditiously as possible.56 As Wakatsuki put it that 
morning, the plan was to “immediately instruct the commanding officer of the Kwantung 
Army not to enlarge the theater of conflict nor to bombard and occupy government 
buildings and fortifications.”57 War Minister Minami was more sympathetic to the Kwantung 
Army’s position, but felt bound by the cabinet’s, and especially the emperor’s, wishes, and so 
he relayed these orders to the Kwantung Army at 6:00 PM that evening.58 The desire to 
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promptly settle the crisis, and to contain and even reverse the Kwantung Army’s expansion 
to the greatest extent possible, would be the Wakatsuki cabinet’s position for the remainder 
of its tenure. 
 The cabinet’s primary concern was the perceived geopolitical risk associated with 
expanding further into Manchuria. As noted above, the Soviet Union shared a lengthy 
border with Manchuria and had interests in northern Manchuria, operating the Chinese 
Eastern Railway there. While the Soviets only had approximately 100,000 military personnel 
east of the Ural Mountains,59 it was industrializing rapidly, being midway through its first 
five-year plan.60 In 1929, just two years earlier, the Red Army had intervened and routed 
Zhang Xueliang’s Fengtian Army when it threatened the Chinese Eastern Railway.61 Thus, 
the Soviet Union seemed to have both the capabilities and the will to intervene effectively 
when its interests in the region were threatened. While many military planners saw the risks 
of Soviet intervention to be relatively low, Tokyo’s position was one of caution regarding 
this possibility.62 This was especially the case when it came to the possible extension of 
hostilities north of the South Manchuria Railway.63 To try to head off this potential, the 
cabinet issued a resolution on 23 September, ordering the Kwantung Army to stay out of the 
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north.64 These concerns were enunciated repeatedly by Prime Minister Wakatsuki, Foreign 
Minister Shidehara, and even War Minister Minami over the course of the crisis.65 
 The cabinet was also deeply concerned with the reaction of the other great powers, the 
members of the Nine Power Treaty, and the League of Nations at large. In the cabinet’s first 
meeting dealing with the crisis, on the morning of 19 September, Prime Minister Wakatsuki 
rhetorically queried Minister of War Minami: if the Mukden incident turned out to be “an act 
of conspiracy by the Japanese army, what do you propose we do about our nation’s standing 
in the world?”66 In the decade running up to the invasion of Manchuria, Japan’s trade as a 
percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to approximately 35 percent, 
and, thus, the threat of sanctions loomed particularly large.67 In early October, in response to 
the suggestion of setting up an autonomous regime in Manchuria, Wakatsuki said that, in 
doing so, Japan would not only “be violating the Nine-Power Treaty, we would be making 
enemies of the whole world. We stand a chance of being isolated by economic 
sanctions…”68 That same month, Wakatsuki warned that “if Japan does not act with due 
consideration of her international position, Japan in the end will be isolated, and this will 
bring an unexpected misfortune upon the nation.”69 Similar concerns of economic sanctions 
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and diplomatic isolation were shared by Foreign Minister Shidehara, Emperor Hirohito, and 
central army authorities as well.70 
 Thus, the perceived geopolitical risk associated with further acquisitions in Manchuria led 
the government in Tokyo to oppose the invasion of Manchuria, and to try to rein in the 
Kwantung Army. However, the very fact of the Kwantung Army’s unauthorized expansion 
activated two mechanisms that would put the cabinet in a serious bind, and would ultimately 
make withdrawal impossible to achieve. First, the Kwantung Army’s quick successes in its 
operations in Manchuria dramatically drove down the costs of acquisition. By 21 September, 
the Kwantung Army had secured all major centers along the South Manchuria Railway and 
had occupied Kirin, a city roughly 100 km east of Changchun. In mid-November, the army 
moved on Tsitsihar in north Manchuria,71 and in early January 1932, it took Chinchow and 
Shanhaikwan, completing the occupation of the south right up to the Great Wall.72 On 5 
February, Harbin was occupied, effectively completing the conquest of Manchuria.73 These 
territories had been acquired at remarkably little cost. In taking the barracks at Mukden, the 
Kwantung Army suffered only 24 casualties in an assault on as many as 10,000 personnel.74 
The Kwantung Army suffered 155 casualties in its occupation of Changchun just days later.75 
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Kirin was then occupied without firing a shot.76 And Tsitsihar was taken over the course of 
less than two days, and the entry into the city itself was bloodless.77 Overall, the Imperial 
Japanese Army suffered 2,530 killed in its conquest of Manchuria, a low figure given the area 
of the territory acquired, the size of the forces it faced, and the kinds of casualties it had 
suffered in past wars.78 
 These successes were facilitated, not only by the rigor of the Kwantung Army’s training 
and the detail of its planning, but also by the Fengtian Army’s policy of non-resistance and 
the lack of intervention by the Soviet Union and the other great powers. The Soviet Union 
was far more concerned domestic political issues, and with its European flank, than with 
events in Manchuria at this time. The Soviets’ defensive intentions were strongly signaled in 
their December 1931 proposal of a non-aggression pact with Japan, just as the Kwantung 
Army was beginning to wrap up the conquest of Manchuria.79 And the reactions of the 
United States and the other great powers were similarly muted.80 This was, in part, because 
they were still preoccupied with the continuing fallout of the Great Depression of 1929. 
However, it is also clear that within a few days of the invasion, both the United States and 
the United Kingdom were aware that the central government had lost control of the 
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Kwantung Army, and this, too, likely tempered their responses.81 This absence of effective 
resistance severely weakened the arguments for restraint from leaders in the capital.82 And it 
made the hawks, who had doubted the great powers’ willingness to intervene, look prescient. 
Thus, the reservations of leaders in the capital would dissipate as the conquest progressed, 
as, one-by-one, their greatest fears failed to come to pass.83 And with every act of defiance 
committed by the Kwantung Army, the cabinet, court, and Diet was rendered progressively 
weaker. 
 A second mechanism that would crop up and make retrenchment difficult was the 
overwhelming support among the public and the press that the Kwantung Army’s actions 
received.84 In a severely economically-depressed Japan, the idea of a resource-rich Manchuria 
as an “economic lifeline” came to be widely accepted among the populace, particularly in 
rural areas. In fact, Ishiwara, Itagaki, and other conspirators had deliberately sought to shape 
elite and public opinion at home and in Manchuria in the months and weeks leading up to 
the invasion.85 They did so by producing and distributing pamphlets and organizing speaking 
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tours throughout Japan, with the support of some members of the General Staff in Tokyo.86 
They were greatly aided in this by the Manchurian Youth League, a nationalist organization 
formed with Kwantung Army backing in 1928. The League traveled widely throughout Japan 
in the months preceding the invasion, arguing for a stronger policy in Manchuria.87  
Once the invasion was underway, the Kwantung Army continued to foster this support, 
setting up a propaganda office, holding regular briefings, distributing pamphlets, and 
broadcasting patriotic songs and messages over the radio.88 All of this public support 
generated significant pressure on the cabinet to protect and defend Japanese nationals and 
soldiers in Manchuria. And the Kwantung Army exploited this pressure masterfully, using 
“false flag” operations as an excuse to occupy Manchurian cities. In Kirin, for instance, 
Kwantung Army agents were dispatched to foment unrest, which was then used as an excuse 
to invade in September 1931, in order to “protect” Japanese property and nationals.89 A 
similar strategy was attempted in Harbin that same month, though in this case the cabinet 
stood firm for the time being.90 As time went by, the public and the press became 
increasingly unified behind the Kwantung Army’s invasion of Manchuria, to the point of the 
press voluntarily turning itself into a “propaganda machine for the army.”91 
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 The overwhelming public support for the army’s actions created easy avenues of attack 
for the cabinet’s opponents in and out of government, severely raising the risk of domestic 
political punishment. The first attacks on the Minseitō Party cabinet of Prime Minister 
Wakatsuki came from the opposition Seiyūkai Party and its leaders.92 Already prone to see 
the ruling cabinet’s Shidehara diplomacy in China as “weak-kneed,” the opposition was 
quick to capitalize on the opportunity of a popular war in Manchuria to attack.93 And these 
attacks ultimately paid off at the ballot box. While Wakatsuki came to office with his 
Minseitō Party holding a large majority in the Diet, the party would be absolutely trounced in 
the February 1932 elections, losing 127 seats (and their majority) to the opposition 
Seiyūkai.94 This was a strong endorsement of the Kwantung Army’s actions in Manchuria, 
and a vote against the Minseitō cabinet’s cautious policy in China.95 
 Other forms of potential domestic political punishment faced by the cabinet were far 
more radical. For instance, the Sakurakai (Cherry Blossom Society), a secret ultranationalist 
organization within the Imperial Japanese Army, staged coup attempts against Minseitō 
cabinets in March and October of 1931. Since their formation in September 1930, they had 
advocated for a much more forceful policy in Manchuria and the establishment of 
totalitarian government in Japan.96 While in neither case did the coup succeed, these were 
clear expressions of opposition to Shidehara Diplomacy in China, and would have a chilling 
 
92 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, pp. 39-40. 
93 Seki, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” p. 178. 
94 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, p. 169; Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, p. 74. 
95 Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 79. 
96 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 95-102; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 30-31. 
252 
 
effect on the cabinet, leading the foreign minister and others to soften their resistance to the 
Kwantung Army’s insubordination.97 
Besides coup plots, there were also assassinations. In November of 1930, Prime Minister 
Hamaguchi Osachi was shot by an ultranationalist who was opposed to his signing of the 
London Naval Treaty, reducing Japan’s naval armaments.98 While Hamaguchi would survive 
the initial attempt, he would never recover his health, and died from related complications 
less than a year later. It would also come to light that the abortive October 1931 coup 
included planned assassinations of both Prime Minister Wakatsuki and Foreign Minister 
Shidehara.99 And Inukai Tsuyoshi, the Seiyūkai party leader who would succeed Wakatsuki as 
prime minister in December 1931, would himself be killed in office in May 1932. His 
residence was stormed by young officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy who, 
despite the Inukai cabinet’s more forward-leaning policy in Manchuria, were opposed to his 
attempts to subject the military to stricter civilian control.100 The very real risks of coup and 
assassination in these years had a profound effect on Japanese leaders. As Shimada notes, 
“The spectacle of army terrorism was reducing the cabinet, and even the supreme command, 
to impotence.”101 
 One final additional means by which the Kwantung Army manipulated the cabinet in 
Tokyo and enhanced their relative influence was through veiled threats of secession from 
 
97 Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, pp. 82-83; Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 100; Shimada, “The Extension 
of Hostilities,” p. 279. 
98 Coox, Nomonhan, p. 24. 
99 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 95. 
100 Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 85. 
101 Shimada, “The Extension of Hostilities,” p. 280. 
253 
 
Japan. In mid-October 1931, rumors began to circulate in government and military circles in 
Tokyo of the possibility of the Kwantung Army seceding and independently establishing 
itself in Manchuria. While the origin of these rumors is a matter of dispute,102 during the 
invasion of Manchuria Ishiwara Kanji is believed to have sent a telegram to Tokyo stating 
that “if the Japanese government constantly interferes… [then] we will have to break the 
glorious history of the Imperial army and separate ourselves from the empire.”103 The 
purpose of these threats was to put pressure on the government in Tokyo to support the 
Kwantung Army’s expansionist policy in Manchuria.104 And whatever doubts may have 
existed in Tokyo as to the credibility of these threats, central army authorities took them 
seriously enough to investigate carefully.105 Thus, a combination of the Kwantung Army’s 
early successes and fervent support for their actions among the press and the public would 
effectively bind the hands of leaders in Tokyo, making restraining or withdrawing the 
Kwantung Army incredibly difficult. 
Wakatsuki’s Dilemma 
Thus, the cabinet in Tokyo was faced with conflicting pressures in Manchuria. On the one 
hand, the risk of Russian intervention and the expected reactions of the other great powers 
pushed them to tighten the reins on the Kwantung Army. On the other hand, the Kwantung 
Army’s initial successes and the overwhelming support their exploits received from the 
public and the press created incentives for leadership to swim with the tide and accept their 
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faits accomplis. The cross-pressures created by these conflicting incentives presented the 
cabinet with a deeply distressing dilemma. The Prime Minister himself was discouraged, even 
despairing. As he told a secretary to the court the day following the invasion, “Under these 
circumstances I am quite powerless to restrain the military. How can his majesty’s military 
act without his sanction? What can I do? …I am in serious trouble.”106 Almost a month later, 
the Prime Minister was even more exasperated. As he told this same secretary on 12 
October,  
“We are in real trouble. In the interest of Japan, I have done all I can to improve her 
relations with other nations… I have constantly endeavored to base the conduct of 
our foreign relations on good faith. I would summon the Minister of War to explain to 
him at great length the necessity of maintaining orderly conduct of our troops 
abroad… Then what would happen? The troops stationed abroad would commit acts 
which would run completely counter to the agreement that the Minister of War and I 
had just made. This is followed by immediate repercussions at Geneva. I am as good 
as betrayed. Too, they are blemishing Japan’s reputation. I am at a loss as to what to 
do. I cannot go on like this. Yet, I cannot very well resign at this point. Indeed, 
matters have come to a serious pass.”107 
The dilemma facing the cabinet weighed heavily on Foreign Minister Shidehara as well. The 
Mukden consul-general met with Shidehara on 16 November, and described him as follows:  
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“His demeanor seemed discouraged, disappointed, and dejected. One could recognize 
without words how much he was suffering in this unprecedented emergency. I had 
unbound sympathy for him in his predicament.”108 
Tokyo Decides 
These pressures were ultimately more than the leadership could bear. On 12 December 
1931, having lost the confidence of the imperial court, the Wakatsuki cabinet fell. They were 
replaced the following day, as noted above, by the opposition Seiyūkai cabinet of Inukai 
Tsuyoshi. By this point it had become clear that the geopolitical risk involved in acquiring 
Manchuria was far less severe than first supposed, allowing the Inukai cabinet to adopt a 
more forward-leaning Manchuria policy than its predecessors. The rise of Inukai effectively 
ended serious resistance by the central government to the Kwantung Army’s conquest of 
Manchuria.  
Yet, the Inukai cabinet faced their own struggles with the Kwantung Army. Inukai, a 
hawk on Manchuria policy, was nonetheless concerned about the reactions of the great 
powers, and was intent on restoring discipline within the army.109 This was not just his 
preference—he was under orders to do so. As Emperor Hirohito admonished him upon his 
appointment as prime minister, the “meddling of the army in domestic and foreign affairs is 
something which, for the welfare of the nation, must be viewed with apprehension. Be 
mindful of my anxiety.”110 The Emperor again warned Inukai in late December to “maintain 
international trust” and to be aware of the impact the Kwantung Army’s actions were having 
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on international affairs.111 Inukai would try; and he would worry. As he wrote to a senior 
army official in a 15 February 1932 letter: 
“what is most worrisome is that the will of the senior officers is not thoroughly 
observed by their subordinates. For example, the action in Manchuria seems to have 
been brought about by the united power of the field-grade officers, who made their 
superiors acquiesce automatically… It is feared that it might became customary to act 
single-mindedly upon the belief that should those who hold direct command over 
regiments unite and cause a disturbance, the superiors would finally give ex post facto 
approval to all matters, and that [such a trend] might create a major change in military 
control and discipline… Therefore I wish the elders of the army to take remedial 
measures now, when the malady has not yet spread widely.”112 
But Inukai, too, was only minimally in control of events in Manchuria. With popular 
opinion surging behind the Kwantung Army, and having appointed the radical, “fire-eating” 
Araki Sadao as minister of war, in the long run Inukai had few options but to swim with the 
tide.113 The invasion and occupation of Manchuria was an accomplished fact. 
*** 
The Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo was proclaimed on 1 March 1932, marking the 
end of Japan’s conquest of Manchuria. It was nominally independent, but was, in fact, under 
the strict control of the Kwantung Army. As an internal document from January 1932 put it, 
Manchukuo would adopt “the external form of a constitutional, republican government… 
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but maintain the internal reality of a centralized dictatorship imbued with the political 
authority of our empire.”114 The Inukai cabinet would initially hold off on formally 
recognizing Manchukuo; notably, out of concern for the reactions of the other great 
powers.115 Though, this, too, would occur in September 1932 with the same sense of 
inevitability that had permeated the entire affair. Inukai’s cabinet would be the last party-led 
government in pre-war Japan, and his May 1932 assassination was an important milestone in 
Japan’s turn toward military dictatorship. 
Despite their insubordination, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō would be generously 
rewarded for their actions in Manchuria, and would continue to rise through the ranks of the 
Imperial Japanese Army. Ishiwara was given the Order of the Golden Kite, third class, for 
the invasion of Manchuria, and was promoted to full colonel ahead of most of his Army 
Staff College classmates. He retired from the Imperial Japanese Army at the rank of 
lieutenant general in March 1941, just a few months before the outbreak of the Pacific 
War.116 Itagaki rose to even greater heights, being promoted to the rank of general and 
serving as chief of staff of the Kwantung Army and the China Expeditionary Army, as well 
as a short stint as minister of war. Yet no individual had been as important to the Japanese 
conquest of Manchuria as Ishiwara. With the aid of Itagaki and others, he had been deeply 
involved in nearly all aspects of the invasion, from the Mukden Incident in September 1931 
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to the establishment of Manchukuo in March 1932. As Itagaki had told a friend a few weeks 
into the invasion, this isn’t the Kwantung Army’s war, “it’s Ishiwara’s war.”117 
 
D’Annunzio’s Sacra Entrada: Italy and Fiume, 1919-1920 
Italy refrained from acquiring the Adriatic port city of Fiume118 between September 1919 and 
December 1920. The ultimately failed conquest of Fiume was independently planned and 
carried out by disgruntled members of the Italian armed forces, led by an eccentric literary 
figure and World War I veteran. The theory of inadvertent expansion makes two arguments 
that are borne out in this case. First, that once a territory is acquired, a number of 
mechanisms are activated that make it very difficult for leaders in the capital to easily 
withdraw and return the territory. In the case of Italy in Fiume, early domestic political 
support for the venture effectively bound the hands of the leadership in Rome. And second, 
that the perception of significant geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will discourage 
leaders in the capital from retaining the territory, leading to non-expansion. In the case at 
hand, Italy’s WWI allies stood firm, absolutely refusing to accept the conquest of Fiume. 
These perceived risks would ultimately be decisive, leading the Italian government to sign 
the Treaty of Rapallo in November of 1920, paving the way for the city’s independence as 
the “Free State of Fiume.” 
Historical Background 
Fiume in the early twentieth century was a small, bustling port city of approximately 50,000 
in the northeast corner of the Adriatic Sea, where the Dalmatian coast meets the Istrian 
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Peninsula. As a port city nestled between Austrian and Hungarian territories within the Dual 
Monarchy’s multi-ethnic empire, and sitting just 120 km from Italy’s pre-World War I 
border, Fiume’s political and cultural identity had long been diverse and cosmopolitan. A 
1910 census recorded the population as consisting of 49 percent Italian, 31 percent Slav, 13 
percent Magyar (Hungarian), as well as a smattering of Germans and other ethnicities.119 
Fiume was strategically and economically important, as a regional economic hub with rail 
lines connecting Belgrade, Prague, Budapest, and Zagreb to the coast.120 
 With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the aftermath of World War I 
(1914-18), the Allies established a joint occupation of the city, consisting of American, 
British, French, and Italian forces.121 The Italians, for their part, were intent on ultimately 
annexing the city. While Fiume was not promised to Italy in the 1915 Treaty of London, 
which had conditioned its entry into the war, many surrounding territories were, and the city 
would have added to Italy’s growing dominance of the Adriatic. After 462,000 dead, 954,000 
wounded, and three-and-a-half years of fighting, many in Italy only hoped to receive what 
they saw as their due.122 Yet the status of Fiume would have to await the negotiations of the 
Paris Peace Conference, which were to begin in January of 1919. And as it would turn out, 
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this port city of roughly 30 km2 would be a major stumbling block in Italy’s negotiations 
with its allies at Versailles.123 
 Italy’s territorial ambitions in Fiume and beyond ran headlong into the Allies’—and 
particularly, American President Woodrow Wilson’s—interest in what was known as 
“national self-determination,” the idea that nationalities should have the right to freely 
choose their sovereignty. Wilson flatly refused to accept the Treaty of London, arguing in 
the first of his Fourteen Points that only “Open covenants… openly arrived at” should be 
recognized in the postwar international order. The President also claimed, for Italy 
specifically, that adjustment of its borders “should be effected along clearly recognizable 
lines of nationality,” a clause that weakened many of Italy’s territorial claims, Fiume 
included.124 While, as noted above, Fiume proper had a plurality of Italians in its population, 
if the adjacent and deeply interconnected suburb of Suzak was added, the plurality went to 
the Slavs. And estimates based on political party affiliation in Fiume suggest that a narrow 
plurality favored annexation to the newly formed Kingdom of Yugoslavia, rather than to 
Italy.125 In short, Italy’s territorial claims rested on shaky ground, and the American president 
simply wouldn’t budge. 
 The conflict over Fiume at Versailles would spark protest and unrest in Italy and in 
Fiume itself. Italy faced severe economic hardship in the aftermath of the war. It owed the 
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Allies the equivalent of $3.5 billion in wartime loans, saw greater inflation than anywhere in 
Europe with the exception of Russia, and demobilization had resulted in widespread 
unemployment.126 This was the beginning of Italy’s Biennio Rosso, or “Two Red Years,” a 
period marked by mass strikes, land seizures, factory occupations, and violent conflict 
between socialist, anarchist, and nationalist political organizations.127 Fiume, as well, saw 
roving nationalist gangs, deadly riots, and armed clashes between Italian and Allied forces in 
the spring and summer of 1919.128 
Amid the political turmoil of these months, Fiume emerged in Italy as a potent symbol of 
Italian pride and honor; and its failure to acquire it, a symbol of national humiliation. As 
Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando told his colleagues at Versailles in April 1919, 
“Italian public opinion is very excitable. I am doing what I can to calm it; but the 
consequences of disappointment of this kind would be very grave.”129 The nationalist press 
pushed for the annexation of Fiume, while placards were posted and walls painted 
throughout the country with similar demands. When Orlando eventually withdrew from the 
Conference over disagreements regarding Fiume, he was greeted in Rome with cries of 
“Viva Fiume!”130 
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 Prominent among those agitating for the annexation of Fiume was the Italian poet, 
playwright, novelist, and philosopher, Gabriele D’Annunzio. A gifted and prolific writer 
from an early age, D’Annunzio was Italy’s most esteemed literary figure. The Irish novelist 
James Joyce would rank D’Annunzio alongside Rudyard Kipling and Leo Tolstoy as one of 
the “most naturally talented writers” of the era.131 So broad was his fame and success that 
most Italians simply referred to him as Il Vate, or “The Poet.”132 D’Annunzio was not a 
physically attractive man. He was short, thin, totally bald, with close-set eyes, a bulbous nose, 
and crooked, decaying teeth. Yet he walked with confidence, wore well-cut clothes, donned 
copious amounts of cologne, and was irresistibly charming.133 He was notoriously eccentric 
and famously promiscuous, carrying on dozens of affairs throughout his adult life, most 
notably with Italy’s most acclaimed actress of the time, Eleanora Duse. He flouted 
convention and had a flair for the dramatic, possessing an almost-hypnotic effect on those 
around him. He was also an ardent nationalist, had an immensely inflated sense of his own 
importance, and had a great deal of contempt for the political class in Rome.134 
Besides writing and womanizing, D’Annunzio had a short parliamentary career, serving in 
the Italian Chamber of Deputies from 1897 to 1900, where he often seemed far more 
interested in gaining publicity than engaging in the mundane business of governing.135 After 
spending a few years in France, having fled creditors in Italy in 1910, D’Annunzio returned 
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to his native country to enlist with the outbreak of World War I, where he had a roving 
commission between Italy’s army, navy, and air force. D’Annunzio lost an eye landing an 
airplane during the war, and was ultimately decorated for his service.136 Back in Italy after the 
war, at the age of 55, he became engaged in nationalist causes and organizations and was 
unmatched in his ability to whip crowds up into a frenzy with rousing speeches and pungent 
language. D’Annunzio was the actor on the periphery who would aim to drag Italian leaders 
in Rome into acquiring Fiume. 
Fiume 
Within a week of the armistice on 11 November 1918, D’Annunzio was contacted by local 
Italian authorities in Fiume seeking his aid in facilitating its acquisition.137 Planning for some 
sort of march on the port city began in earnest between the winter of 1918 and early spring 
of 1919.138 Financing for the operation, largely through nationalist organizations and Italian 
industrialists, was secured in the spring of that year, as were the forces necessary to carry out 
the conquest. By May 1919, D’Annunzio was enlisted to lead the march. Rumors began to 
circulate in Rome that summer that a conspiracy involving Fiume was being cooked up.139 
The Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, repeatedly reminded his generals in the region 
that the government’s policy was to avoid any precipitous action in Fiume at all costs.140 
Naturally, D’Annunzio did nothing to calm nerves in Rome, asking, in a public address on 7 
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May, “Down there, on the roads of Istria, on the roads of Dalmatia, do you not hear the 
footsteps of a marching army?”141 
The conquest of Fiume was ultimately set for 11 September 1919. D’Annunzio 
considered the eleventh of each month to be lucky, as it coincided with a successful WWI 
mission he participated in (as well as a past sexual exploit).142 D’Annunzio was to travel from 
Ronchi in Italy’s northeast corner, across the Istrian Peninsula, arriving in Fiume in the 
morning, a distance of about 100 km. He began with just 186 members of the First Battalion 
of the 2nd Grenadiers, based out of Sardinia, but had a Fiuman militia that was to join his 
forces upon arrival.143 He and his grenadiers set off from Ronchi at midnight on the 
eleventh, D’Annunzio leading the column in a bright red Fiat 501. Before departing, 
D’Annunzio sent then-nationalist journalist Benito Mussolini the first of hundreds of letters 
the two would exchange in the months that followed: 
“My dear companion, the die is cast. I depart. Tomorrow morning I will conquer 
Fiume. May the God of Italy help us.”144 
 Along the way, D’Annunzio and his forces were met by numerous Italian soldiers who 
were under orders to stop, and even fire on, the Poet if he tried to pass. However, most were 
sympathetic to his cause and instead cheered him as he passed, with many abandoning their 
posts to join his column.145 By the time he arrived at the outskirts of Fiume on the morning 
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of the twelfth, D’Annunzio was at the head of between 2,000 and 2,500 personnel, with 
dozens of trucks, tanks, and armored cars.146 D’Annunzio was met outside of the city by the 
commander of Italian forces in Fiume, General Pittaluga, who implored him to turn back. In 
typically dramatic fashion, D’Annunzio replied, “I understand you will have to open fire on 
my soldiers…, but if you must do this, fire first upon me!” as he pulled back his coat, 
revealing his WWI decorations.147 Seeing no other option, the general let D’Annunzio and 
his forces into the city, and by noon the conquest of Fiume was complete. With 
characteristic grandiosity, D’Annunzio would refer to his acquisition of Fiume as the Sacra 
Entrada, his “Sacred Entrance.”148 That evening, at 6:00 PM, D’Annunzio appeared on the 
balcony of the governor’s palace, and addressed the crowd: “Italians of Fiume!... I proclaim: 
I, a soldier, a volunteer, a wounded veteran of the war, believe that I interpret the will of the 
people of Italy in proclaiming the annexation of Fiume!” a declaration that was met with an 
eruption of celebration.149 
Rome Reacts & Decides 
When Prime Minister Nitti learned of events in Fiume, he was visibly shocked and absolutely 
livid, forcefully pounding his fist on his desk.150 He was not surprised by D’Annunzio’s 
attempt to take Fiume; he had, after all, been receiving reports on this possibility for months. 
What surprised him was the Poet’s success—and the defection of thousands of Italian soldiers 
that it had required. The following day, on 13 September, Nitti made a statement before the 
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Italian parliament, expressing publicly his anger and disapproval, and assuring his colleagues 
that “the Government had taken appropriate measures.”151 A few days later, on 18 
September, Nitti’s cabinet ordered a blockade on Fiume, with the Italian Third Army 
surrounding the city by land and the Italian navy blocking the entrance to its harbor.152 Then 
Nitti took the extraordinary step of requesting Italian King Victor Emmanuel III to call a 
meeting of his privy council, which was held a week later, on 25 September. It was attended 
by leading Italian political figures, top military leaders, the king and his closest advisors, and 
the prime minister, and they were unanimous in their opposition to D’Annunzio’s 
unauthorized conquest.153 With this strong backing, the prime minister returned to 
parliament and called for snap elections to be held in November. The leadership’s position 
was firm. D’Annunzio’s fait accompli could not be accepted. 
 The primary reason for the government’s strenuous opposition was the perceived 
geopolitical risk associated with accepting the city. As noted above, D’Annunzio’s fait accompli 
occurred in the context of a joint Italian occupation of Fiume alongside the U.S., Britain, and 
France. After receiving assurances from Rome that the matter would be dealt with 
expeditiously, Italy’s great power allies agreed to have their forces make a hasty exit, though 
no one was pleased with the situation.154 Prime Minister Nitti initially thought that the 
situation could be used to Italy’s advantage, and that D’Annunzio’s escapade might help 
strengthen his position in negotiations over Fiume.155 Yet while the British and French were 
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somewhat more sympathetic, President Wilson was absolutely firm: D’Annunzio had to go, 
and Fiume was to become a free city under League of Nations auspices.156 The president 
made his view clear to Italian Foreign Minister Tommaso Tittoni just days after 
D’Annunzio’s march on Fiume,157 and Britain, France, and the United States penned a joint 
memorandum on 9 December pointing to the “urgent necessity” of creating an independent 
Fiuman state.158 When he delivered this memorandum to the Italians, French President 
Georges Clemenceau noted that “There could be no peace in Europe till this question was 
settled.”159 It was clear to Nitti that the allies were in no mood to make concessions.160 
And Italy had few options. For one, it was militarily much weaker than any of its allies, let 
alone all three of them together, so it couldn’t exactly stand and fight.161 But more 
importantly, in its dire postwar economic state, it needed its great power allies, and the U.S. 
in particular, more than ever. As noted above, Italy had borrowed billions from its allies, and 
the U.S. was continuing to extend it credit. Rupture with the United States at this point 
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would have meant true economic calamity for Italy, something Prime Minister Nitti, as a 
trained economist, understood only too well.162 
 However, the decision was complicated by the fact that D’Annunzio’s conquest of Fiume 
itself activated mechanisms that made withdrawal difficult from the perspective of Rome. 
The first was the simple fact of his success. Fiume had been acquired by D’Annunzio at no 
cost in human life, driving down the costs of acquisition for leaders in the capital. But 
second, and more importantly, the conquest of Fiume had the backing of a significant 
portion of the Italian military, as well as the press and public more broadly. A perceived risk 
of popular backlash led Prime Minister Nitti to soften the blockade of Fiume after just a few 
days.163 Its resulting leakiness meant that soldiers, sailors, and air personnel continued to 
desert to Fiume in droves to enlist in D’Annunzio’s army and join the cause. The Fiuman 
forces numbered as many as 9,000 at its peak, and at a certain point D’Annunzio had to 
begin turning military defectors away for lack of accommodations.164 The press, too, seized 
on the march on Fiume, painting D’Annunzio as an Italian folk hero.165 And important 
sections of the public backed D’Annunzio’s venture as well. 
The domestic political threats that leaders in Rome faced were not merely electoral. For 
instance, former Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando claimed during the Paris Peace 
negotiations that a secret society had pledged to assassinate him if he returned without Italy’s 
irredentist claims.166 Furthermore, in June 1919 a nationalist coup plot seeking to overthrow 
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the Italian government was uncovered and broken up.167 And there were rumors circulating 
about assassins sent from Fiume to kill Prime Minister Nitti and Foreign Minister Tittoni.168 
Thus, members of the Nitti cabinet were aware that rising nationalist sentiment in Italy 
represented a threat, not only to their electoral fortunes, but to Italian political institutions 
and even to their lives.169 
 This combination of strenuous allied opposition and public and military support created a 
real dilemma for the Nitti cabinet.170 President Wilson was unwilling to give an inch on 
Fiume, and had significant economic leverage over the prime minister. Yet there were 
military and nationalist forces pressing him on, threatening, not only his prime ministership, 
but possibly his life. It was as if the ground beneath Nitti’s feet, as he put it, “had been 
mined.”171 Under these trying circumstances, the prime minister adopted a patient and 
delicate strategy of assuring the allies that Italy would clean up the Fiuman mess, while 
negotiating with D’Annunzio to resolve the situation. 
D’Annunzian Fiume & its End 
For the fifteen months of its existence, Fiume under Gabriele D’Annunzio reflected all of 
the eccentricities of its leader. The outlaw city attracted curious visitors from all over 
Europe—gangsters and prostitutes, politicians and war heroes, famed musicians and Nobel 
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Prize-winning scientists.172 There were parades and political rallies by day, and banquets and 
torchlit processions by night. The city was said to have reverberated with the sounds of love-
making, and local hospitals reported seeing ten patients with venereal disease for every one 
patient with other ailments.173 Drugs—particularly, cocaine—were everywhere, and alcohol 
flowed like water.174 And the Poet was at the center of it all, addressing throngs of admirers, 
glad-handing his loyal supporters, and hosting debaucherous soirees at the governor’s palace. 
 Yet there was a much darker side to it all, as well. For D’Annunzio would turn out, not 
only to be a hopeless administrator, but also a deeply authoritarian leader.175 The Poet 
embraced a charismatic form of personalistic rule, in which he was entirely above the law 
and dissent was made a capital crime.176 Before long, the prisons in Fiume began to 
overflow, and extrajudicial expulsions, kidnappings, and killings became commonplace.177 
Security forces were on every corner, and anti-Slavic pogroms were a regular feature of life. 
The results of unfavorable petitions and plebiscites were ignored, and other local political 
forces marginalized. In his raucous public addresses, D’Annunzio used a dialogical style that 
would eventually become associated with Italian and German fascism, employing violent and 
vulgar language, and having crowds hurl obscenities at his political enemies in Fiume and 
Rome. And Benito Mussolini was watching carefully, visiting the city as a journalist on a 
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number of occasions and corresponding with D’Annunzio regularly.178 Reflecting on this 
period, the Italian statesperson and diplomat Carlo Sforza would refer to D’Annunzio as the 
true “inventor of fascism.”179 
Back in Rome, as well as in Fiume, the D’Annunzian spectacle soon began to lose its 
luster. In November 1919, Italians went to the polls where Nitti was confirmed in his 
leadership, the nationalist party won just a handful of seats, and not a single fascist candidate 
was elected to office.180 In the prime minister’s view, as he communicated to D’Annunzio 
shortly after the election, the results were a strong indication that Italians were “against any 
adventurous policy” in Fiume and beyond.181 And while it would be more than a year of on-
again, off-again negotiations before the Poet was finally removed, it was clear by early 1920 
that his days in Fiume were numbered. Francesco Nitti would resign from office in June 
1920 to be replaced by Giovanni Giolitti, a more decisive politician who soon entered into 
negotiations with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia over the fate of Fiume.182 The resulting Treaty 
of Rapallo, signed on 12 November 1920, established the Free State of Fiume as an 
independent city-state between Italy and Yugoslavia. Despite the treaty passing by 
overwhelming majorities in the Italian parliament, D’Annunzio clung to power in Fiume and 
continued to call for its annexation to Italy.183 
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But enough was enough. Prime Minister Giolitti had to take action. On 20 December 
1920, he sent D’Annunzio an ultimatum, demanding his exit. In response, the following day 
the D’Annunzio declared war on Italy. On Christmas Eve, the Italian army and navy were 
ordered into action. After a few dozen casualties were taken by both sides, the Italian navy 
cruiser Andrea Doria fired two shells on D’Annunzio’s palace on 26 December. This was 
ultimately decisive. On 28 December, D’Annunzio left Fiume for good.184 
D’Annunzio would not be punished for his open defiance of Italian authorities. Despite 
his reduced stature, he was still deemed too popular among important segments of the 
Italian public. This, and the fact that Giolitti chose 24 December for D’Annunzio’s ouster to 
minimize press and public attention, indicates the popular constraints under which Italian 
leaders were operating.185 D’Annunzio may have ultimately failed in his greatest ambitions, 
but his example would play an important role in the success of some of his descendants in 
Italy and Portugal, Spain and Germany.186  
Less than two years later, Benito Mussolini seized power with his “March on Rome,” 
establishing fascist dictatorship in Italy and adopting many of the repertoires of rule he 
observed in Fiume. D’Annunzio, for his part, effectively retired to his home on Lake Garda 
at the government’s expense. He evidently still had his hypnotic charm, and Mussolini saw 
him as a potential political threat in his emerging fascist movement. As Il Duce explained, 
“When you have a rotten tooth, you have two possibilities open to you: either you extract 
the tooth or you fill it with gold. With D’Annunzio I have chosen the latter treatment.”187 
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Three alternative explanations that might account for the cases of Japan in Manchuria and 
Italy in Fiume are strategic expansion theory, state institutional weakness, and leader 
interests. First, it is obvious that neither Japan in Manchuria nor Italy in Fiume are cases of 
strategic expansion. In Manchuria, the invasion was planned and conducted by the 
Kwantung Army against explicit orders to the contrary from leaders in Tokyo. In Fiume, 
Gabriele D’Annunzio managed to pass, and even to recruit, soldiers who had been told to 
fire on him as he approached. There is no evidence, in either case, of orchestration or 
collusion by important leaders in Tokyo or Rome. And while the decisions to retain 
Manchuria by Tokyo and to reject Fiume by Rome were strategic in nature—based on 
considerations of domestic political costs and perceived geopolitical risks—these leaders 
were forced to make these decisions by actors and processes over which they had 
vanishingly little control. Manchuria and Fiume are clear-cut cases of inadvertent expansion. 
 Second, state institutional weakness doesn’t appear to explain unauthorized peripheral 
expansion in either Manchuria or Fiume. Japan and Italy both had many of the institutional 
features of relatively strong states. Both had established universal male military conscription 
decades earlier—in 1861 in the case of Italy, and in 1873 in the case of Japan.188 Both were 
able to extract significant amounts of revenue in the form of taxes from their publics. Italy’s 
tax revenue averaged at approximately 15 percent of the value of its GDP between 1918 and 
1920, and Japan’s average was 29 percent between 1929 and 1931.189 And both states had a 
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great deal of reliable information about their populaces. Italy had decades of experience 
running a population statistics agency, a civil registry, and a decennial census. Japan also had 
decades of experience with a statistics agency and a civil registry, and had instituted a regular 
census in 1920.190 While clearly both states suffered problems of civilian control over their 
militaries, these were two states with relatively strong institutions. 
 Third, the cases of Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Fiume are at odds with a simple 
explanation based on leader interests. Leaders in Japan—most notably, Prime Minister 
Wakatsuki and Foreign Minister Shidehara—didn’t exactly want Manchuria in its entirety, 
and certainly not in the way that it was ultimately acquired. And yet, due to domestic political 
pressure and the ultimate fall of their cabinet, Japan ended up with Manchuria nonetheless. 
Leaders in Italy, in contrast, clearly did want Fiume, and their efforts to negotiate for it at 
Versailles is a clear indication of this. And yet, due to perceptions of severe geopolitical risk, 
Italian leaders ended up rejecting the territorial fait accompli. In short, leader interests can’t 
explain these two cases. 
*** 
This chapter has presented comparative cases of inadvertent expansion and non-expansion 
in Manchuria and Fiume. Both cases strongly support the theory of inadvertent expansion 
presented in Chapter 2. First, in both cases unauthorized peripheral expansion resulted from 
inadequate monitoring and control over agents on the periphery—the Kwantung Army in 
Manchuria and D’Annunzio and segments of the Italian Army in Fiume. Second, in both 
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cases peripheral expansion activated mechanisms that made it difficult for leaders in the 
capital to easily withdraw—in both Japan and Italy, the most important of these were 
domestic-political risks and costs associated with doing so. And third, in both cases the 
ultimate decision of whether to accept the fait accompli was crucially determined by the 
perceived geopolitical risk associated with doing so. In the case of Japan in Manchuria, 
perceived geopolitical risk pushed Prime Minister Wakatsuki to work strenuously to put a 
halt to the conquest and to rein in the Kwantung Army. Yet, once it became clear that such 
risks wouldn’t come to fruition, his government was replaced by the more pliant Inukai 
cabinet, and the invasion of Manchuria moved forward. In the case of Italy in Fiume, the 
strong stance of Britain, France, and particularly the United States in opposition to 
D’Annunzio’s conquest gave the Italian government little alternative but to roll it back, 
which it ultimately did by force. In both cases, what I referred to in Chapter 2 as the 
“dilemma of inadvertent expansion” was illustrated powerfully—the agonizing situations in 
which leaders simultaneously face severe domestic political costs associated with territorial 
withdrawal as well as significant geopolitical risk associated with territorial acquisition. 





INADVERTENT ANNEXATION: GERMANY IN EAST AFRICA 
 
“As my comrades and I sailed to Zanzibar in 1884, the German government wanted 
nothing to do with the founding of a colony in East Africa and she did everything in 
her power to prevent such a thing from happening.” 
Carl Peters1 
 
This chapter examines inadvertent expansion through two examples from the German 
Empire in East Africa. The first case focuses on the German acquisition of what would 
become German East Africa in 1884-85. The second examines Germany’s non-acquisition 
of a number of territories in modern-day Kenya and Uganda in 1889-90. The purpose of this 
chapter is twofold. First, it presents the dissertation’s fifth and final pair of comparative 
theory-testing case studies, showing how variation in perceived geopolitical risk led to 
divergent outcomes, with expansion in the first case but non-expansion in the second. But 
second, and more importantly, this chapter presents the dissertation’s only cases of 
inadvertent expansion via political annexation, as all qualitative cases to this point have focused 
on armed conquest. While the data presented in Chapter 3 includes many observations of 
inadvertent expansion via political annexation, this chapter allows the reader to observe how 
the theory works in practice in two in-depth case studies of annexation. 
 
1 “Carl Peters Describes his Problems in Founding a Colony” in Arthur J. Knoll and Hermann J. Hiery, eds., 
The German Colonial Experience: Select Documents on German Rule in Africa, China, and the Pacific, 1884-1914 (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2010), p. 66. 
277 
 
 These two German cases are a useful comparison in that they hold many factors fixed—
the same great power, operating in the same region, separated by only five years, and driven 
by the very same peripheral actor—while the outcomes across the two cases vary. One 
important difference between the two cases, which presents an inferential opportunity, is a 
leadership change that takes place in the German capital, Berlin. In March 1890, after 28 
years at the helm of Prussian and then German power, the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von 
Bismarck was dismissed by the new German emperor, Wilhelm II, in the midst of a process 
of inadvertent expansion. The fact that Bismarck, the famously-reluctant imperialist, accepts 
his peripheral agent’s fait accompli in 1885, whereas the more expansionist Wilhelm ultimately 
rejects the territorial fait accompli in 1890, helps highlight the crucial role played by domestic 
political pressure and perceived geopolitical risk in these cases. 
 The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present the case of Germany in 
East Africa, where, despite efforts to discourage a private organization from territorial 
annexations ex ante, Berlin ultimately accepts the territory, gaining what would become its 
largest and most populous colony. Second, I present Germany’s non-acquisition of a 
number of territories in modern-day Kenya and Uganda, where the very same peripheral 
actor’s fait accompli is rejected in Berlin before he even has a chance to make his case. And 
third and finally, I conclude with a brief consideration of alternative arguments, as well as a 
discussion of the importance of these cases for the theory of inadvertent expansion 
presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Germany in East Africa, 1884-1885 
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The German Empire acquired what would become German East Africa2 between 
November 1884 and February 1885. A series of annexations in the core of East Africa were 
independently planned and carried out by a private German colonial organization, despite 
repeated efforts at discouragement by Berlin. This case supports three of the central 
arguments of the theory of inadvertent expansion. First, that inadvertent expansion results 
from a principal-agent problem, due to divergent preferences between the capital and the 
periphery and information asymmetries in favor of the latter. In the case of Germany in East 
Africa, the actors on the frontier were far more interested in colonial expansion than the 
leaders in Berlin, and a lack of telegraphic communications made it difficult to control their 
behavior. Second, that once a territory is partly or wholly acquired, a number of mechanisms 
are activated that make it difficult for leaders in the capital to simply withdraw. In the case at 
hand, the successful annexation of these territories drove down the costs of acquisition and 
generated domestic political pressure on leaders in Berlin to accept them. And third, that the 
absence of perceived geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will encourage leaders in 
the capital to accept the fait accompli, resulting in territorial expansion. In the case of German 
East Africa, Britain was simply in no position to resist the German advance, and would 
quickly acquiesce to the annexations. These facts strengthened the case for subsequent 
central authorization, which would occur when Kaiser Wilhelm I signed the imperial charter 
on 27 February 1885, adding East Africa to the German colonial empire. 
Historical Background 
On the eve of the annexations in November and December 1884, what would become 
German East Africa was divided among dozens of small chiefdoms, many of which were 
 
2 Contemporary Burundi, Rwanda, and mainland Tanzania. 
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under the loose control of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, just across the Zanzibar Channel from 
central Africa’s east coast. Up the north coast lay more of the Sultanate’s territory in 
modern-day Kenya, and to the south lay Mozambique, where the Portuguese had had a 
presence since the early 16th century. To the west, in the heart of Africa, sat what would soon 
become the Congo Free State, a colony that would be privately owned by King Leopold II 
of Belgium. These were the early days of the European “Scramble for Africa,” when a great 
deal of territory, particularly in the interior, remained unclaimed. 
 There were two key leaders in the German capital, Berlin, responsible for issues of 
territorial expansion and empire. The fist was the emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm I, the German 
head of state who had ultimate authority and the final word on any decisions regarding 
territorial acquisition and control. The second was the “Iron Chancellor,” Otto von 
Bismarck. As the chancellor of the German Empire and, effectively, its foreign minister, 
Bismarck’s personal influence on foreign and imperial policy in this era is difficult to 
overstate. A leader whose very name has become synonymous with Realpolitik, Bismarck was 
tough, energetic, brilliant, and uniquely rational and strategic in his thinking about 
international affairs.3 The German Second Reich did have a State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs in Paul von Hatzfeldt, but his was much more of a supporting role, drafting memos 
and executing decisions made by the Chancellor. The empire also had a Colonial Secretary in 
Heinrich von Kusserow, but this position was under the authority of the foreign ministry, 
not itself at the cabinet level.4 Finally, until the end of World War I, Germany didn’t have a 
 
3 Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 188-190. For an interesting 
take on Bismarck’s foreign policy, see: Brian Rathbun, “The Rarity of Realpolitik: What Bismarck’s Rationality 
Reveals about International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Summer 2018), pp. 7-55. 




single national war or defense ministry, with this role being divided among several major 
states, such as Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg. Kaiser Wilhelm I and the 
Chancellor Bismarck were the crucial leaders in the capital who would be inadvertently 
dragged into the acquisition of East Africa. 
 The early 1880s saw the emergence of a number of German civil society organizations 
advocating for colonialism.5 Prominent among these was the Deutscher Kolonialverein (DKV) 
or “German Colonial Association,” which was formed in December 1882 and had 
approximately 3,500 members by early 1884.6 The DKV’s primary modes of advocacy were 
the creation of colonial propaganda, rallying of public opinion, and lobbying within the 
Reichstag (German parliament).7 A more radical alternative organization was formed in 
March 1884, the Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation (GfdK) or “Society for German 
Colonization.” In contrast to the more-moderate roles of the DKV, the GfdK advocated 
for, funded, and organized private expeditions and activities directly aimed at attaining 
colonies for the empire.8 
 The GfdK was co-founded-and-led by a 28-year-old historian and philosopher by the 
name of Carl Peters. Peters was the eighth of the nine children of a clergyman from 
Neuhaus, a small town on the Elbe, just upriver from Hamburg. By all accounts, he was 
intellectually gifted. He was accepted at prestigious schools, performed well, and ultimately 
 
5 Smith, The German Colonial Empire, pp. 25-27; Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 1856-1918: A 
Political Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 34-35. 
6 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 35. 
7 Smith, The German Colonial Empire, p. 25. 
8 H.P. Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa, 1884-1885,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 21, No. 
1 (1978), p. 98; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 38. 
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received a doctorate in history from the University of Berlin in 1879.9 He was also 
charismatic, had exceptional talent for persuasion, and a passion to succeed in whatever 
endeavor he pursued.10 Heinrich Schnee, the last governor of German East Africa, described 
him as “one of the sharpest-men and one of the most stimulating companions I have ever 
met in my life.”11  
However, Peters didn’t exactly appear to be the type of person you might expect to be 
founding a new German empire in Africa. He was small and frail, with a gaunt face, a 
protruding nose, a prominent, waxed moustache, and large, pale blue eyes, ringed by pince-
nez-style glasses.12 His health and stature were such that he had been turned down for lack 
of fitness when he applied for German military service at the age of twenty.13 Yet Peters was 
an ardent German nationalist, a firm believer in the colonial cause, and saw the need for 
German territorial expansion in life-or-death terms.14 And, as his leadership of the GfdK and 
his time in East Africa would show, he was arrogant to the point of being megalomaniacal, 
could be brutal and dictatorial in his treatment of others, and was deeply and profoundly 
racist.15 Peters and the GfdK were the key peripheral actors who would present Berlin with 
the East African fait accompli. 
 
9 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 14, 16, 18. 
10 Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 (New 
York: Perennial, 2003), p. 296; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 50. 
11 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 10. 
12 Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 290; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 16. 
13 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 17. 
14 H.L. Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914, Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans 
(Westport: Praeger, 1996), p. 140; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 10, 36-37, 91. 
15 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 10, 31, 51, 57, 115-116, 118. 
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 Peters made himself something of a known quantity in German Foreign Office circles. 
This was due not only to his leadership role in the GfdK, but also to his pitching of various 
colonial schemes to foreign office personnel. His first plan, put forward in the spring of 
1884, was to establish a German colony on the Zambezi River in Africa’s south-central 
interior. This plan was rebuffed by the foreign office, according to Peters, because they saw 
the territory as within Britain’s sphere of influence.16 His second pitch, sent to the foreign 
office on 13 August 1884, was for a colony in the hinterlands of Angola. This plan too, was 
turned down on the grounds that it was within Portugal’s sphere.17 By the fall of 1884, time 
was passing and Peters and the GfdK were feeling pressure to get some sort of expedition 
under way. Having raised funds from their now-roughly 350 members, the organization’s 
leadership felt it had to move forward or potentially face an open revolt among 
shareholders.18 
In mid-September 1884, Peters and the GfdK came up with a third plan: to acquire 
territory on the East African mainland across from the Island of Zanzibar. On 20 
September, Peters once again wrote the foreign office, but this time he phrased his message 
as an announcement rather than a request. Then, without awaiting a reply, Peters and his 
colleagues hastily packed their belongings and departed.19 The rag-tag expedition consisted 
 
16 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 98; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 
pp. 35-36. 
17 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 99; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 
pp. 48, 51-52. 
18 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 99. 
19 Peters would later claim that he was given “confidential hints” that the government was behind him, and 
some scholars have echoed these claims, arguing he was given a “tentative go-ahead” by the government (see: 
Smith, The German Colonial Empire, p. 32; Mary Evelyn Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire, 
1884-1918 (New York: MacMillan, 1930), p. 132). But a careful examination of the evidence indicates this was 
not the case. Peters, it turned out, likely overinterpreted some oblique statements made by a retired government 
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of Peters and three companions: Count Graf Joachim von Pfiel, a German aristocrat; Carl 
Jühlke, a lawyer; and August Otto, a young businessperson.20 On 1 October, they boarded 
the steamer Titania at Trieste bound for Aden, and from there they were to board the 
Baghdad bound for Zanzibar.21 For the five-week journey, the quartet traveled as deck 
passengers and pretended they were English in order to conceal their identities.22 Just like 
that, Peters’ fait accompli had been launched. 
Berlin & East Africa 
Leaders in Berlin faced important principal-agent problems with respect to these actors on 
the periphery, due to a divergence of preferences and information asymmetries favoring the 
periphery. For one, Bismarck was less keen on imperial ventures than many of his European 
contemporaries, a sentiment well summed up by his 1881 statement that “As long as I am 
Reichskanzler, we shall not pursue a colonial policy.”23 This promise wouldn’t hold, and 
Germany had recently burst upon the imperial scene, claiming South West Africa in April 
1884,24 Togoland and Cameroon in July, 25 and New Britain and northeastern New Guinea in 
 
official who was in no way authorized to speak for the government. See: Meritt, “Bismarck and the German 
Interest in East Africa,” p. 100n13. 
20 Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 141; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 290; Perras, Carl Peters and German 
Imperialism, pp. 51-52. 
21 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 51-52, 55. 
22 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 100; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 141; 
Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, pp. 284, 290; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 52. 
23 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Bismarck’s Imperialism, 1862-1890,” Past & Present, No. 48 (August 1970), p. 129. 
24 Contemporary Namibia. Note that this was, itself, a case of inadvertent expansion. See: J. H. Esterhuyse, 
South West Africa, 1880-1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South West Africa (Cape Town: C. Struik, 
1968), pp. 47-48. 
25 Contemporary Togo. Note that this was, itself, a case of inadvertent expansion. See: Arthur J. Knoll, Togo 
Under Imperial Germany, 1884-1914: A Case Study in Colonial Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 
20, 22, 23, 171n26. 
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November.26 Yet Bismarck was often reluctant in these acquisitions, and had very little 
interest in what Peters and his colleagues were planning in East Africa. Just two days after 
Peters’ departure, on 3 October, the German Foreign Office composed a response to the 
announced expedition, which was awaiting him upon arrival in Zanzibar on 4 November. 
The cable, which had been personally approved by Bismack, stated explicitly that the 
government had given them no encouragement or assistance for their venture, and that they 
could not count on protection for any territorial claims they might stake out—they were 
there at their own risk and on their own responsibility.27 
 There were also important information asymmetries between Berlin and the East African 
periphery. While Zanzibar had been connected to the global telegraph network in 1879, the 
East African coast wouldn’t see telegraphic connection until 1890, at Dar-es-Salaam.28 This 
meant that once Peters and his colleagues were on the mainland, and particularly in the 
interior, they would be very difficult to communicate with, and thereby control. Thus, the 
combination of diverse preferences for expansion and information asymmetries favoring the 
periphery made unauthorized peripheral expansion all the more likely. 
East Africa 
 
26 Contemporary Papua New Guinea. 
27 Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire, p. 132; G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, “The German 
Sphere, 1884-98,” in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), p. 435; W. O. Henderson, “German East Africa, 1884-1918,” in Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver, 
and Alison Smith, eds., History of East Africa, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 125; Smith, The German 
Colonial Empire, p. 32; Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” pp. 102-103; Wesseling, 
Divide and Rule, p. 141; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 291; M.E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa, 3rd 
ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2010), p. 63. 
28 Anton A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications (Hoboken: Wiley-Interscience, 2003), p. 137; 
Bill Glover, “Cable Timeline: 1850-2018,” History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications (2021), 
Available at: https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/CableTimeLine/index.htm. 
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Once in Zanzibar, Peters and his colleagues hastily prepared for their expedition to the 
mainland. They hired 36 porters, six servants who would double as interpreters, and 
purchased food, arms, and other equipment.29 They continued to try to conceal their 
identities and the purpose of their visit while in Zanzibar, but they weren’t fooling many. As 
a local German merchant later recalled, “After a few days it was an open secret that these 
gentlemen wanted to annex territory.”30 In the early morning of 10 November, they set out 
on a hired dhow across the Zanzibar Channel toward the mainland. They ultimately left 
behind much of the food they had purchased for the expedition, in order to make room for 
gifts for local chiefs, and they lacked medicine and other essentials for tropical travel.31 They 
disembarked at Saadani on the East African coast, and after some organizing, began their 
expedition into the interior on 12 November.32  
Peters and his colleagues moved with impressive speed. In a little over a month, they 
covered hundreds of kilometers of ground and concluded twelve treaties with local chiefs in 
the regions of Usagara, Nguru, Uzigua, and Ukami.33 The process of treaty-making followed 
a consistent pattern. They would, first, ask permission to camp on a chief’s territory. They 
would then circulate rumors among the people of Peters’ extraordinary power and influence. 
This was followed by offering the locals rum and gifts. Then the treaty would be signed and 
 
29 Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 141; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 290; Perras, Carl Peters and German 
Imperialism, p. 56. 
30 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 55. 
31 Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 141; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 56. 
32 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 57. 
33 Freeman-Grenville, “The German Sphere, 1884-98,” p. 435; Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in 
East Africa,” p. 104; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 284; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, pp. 141-142; Perras, 
Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 1, 57-59. 
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the German flag hoisted. Peters followed this by giving a short speech, before the ceremony 
closed with a cheer for the Kaiser and the firing of three volleys.34 Then, the expedition 
would move onto the next chiefdom, and the process would begin anew. Peters and his 
colleagues ultimately claimed some 140,000 square kilometers of territory in this manner.35 
 Yet, in almost all other respects, the expedition was an utter fiasco. Otto, the merchant, 
was constantly drunk, and bad blood developed between Peters and Pfiel, to the point of 
Pfiel apparently firing his revolver at Peters during a particularly nasty quarrel. Peters 
severely burnt his foot a few weeks in, and thereafter had to be carried by porters in a 
hammock. The effects of a lack of food, medicine, and equipment quickly began to show 
themselves, with porters falling ill and abandoning the expedition, and the Germans 
suffering severe and recurrent fever. Otto would ultimately die in an Usagara goat shed, and 
Pfiel almost certainly would have died as well, had he not been stumbled upon by a traveling 
French scientist after he had been abandoned by Peters. After 37 days in the interior, Peters 
and Jühlke, starving and grievously ill, staggered into a French mission church in the coastal 
town of Bagamoyo on the evening of 17 December.36 Peters later recalled that, when he saw 
the cross and heard the resonant sound of the organ, he “broke down in convulsive sobs 
and all the tension of the last weeks dissolved in a stream of tears.”37 
Berlin Reacts 
 
34 Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 291; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, pp. 141-142; Perras, Carl Peters and 
German Imperialism, pp. 57-58. 
35 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 97; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 142; Perras, 
Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 1. 
36 Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 142; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 291; Perras, Carl Peters and German 
Imperialism, pp. 1, 61-62. 
37 Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 292. 
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After a few days of recovery on the coast, Peters returned to Zanzibar and telegraphed the 
GfdK in Berlin with news of his acquisitions. The GfdK then contacted on the foreign 
office and a representative of the organization met with Colonial Secretary Heinrich von 
Kusserow on 29 December, requesting government protection for Peters’ claims.38 
Kusserow decided to await a more comprehensive report on the acquisitions before 
informing and making a recommendation to Bismarck, which would arrive in the form of a 
formal letter of request from Peters about a month later. In the meantime, Peters embarked 
on the long journey home, where he would arrive in early February 1885.39 The GfdK 
followed up with the foreign office a week after Peters’ return, again requesting protection, 
but also authorization for further annexations in the area. At this point, it had been almost 
seven weeks without a definitive response from the government, and Peters started to get 
anxious.40 
By 15 February, Kusserow felt that he had enough information, and sent a detailed memo 
to the chancellor.41 The timing of Peters’ fait accompli was complicated by the fact that the 
imperial powers were just wrapping up the Berlin-hosted West Africa Conference, which 
delineated a free-trade area in the Congo basin and established the principle of “effective 
occupation” in European colonialism in Africa.42 Suddenly springing an East Africa 
protectorate upon the other great powers, after having said nothing about it through months 
 
38 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 63n190. 
39 Freeman-Grenville, “The German Sphere, 1884-98,” p. 436; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 142. 
40 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 104; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 292. 
41 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 105, Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, 
p. 63n191. 
42 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 109. 
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of discussion of colonial matters, would undoubtedly come as a surprise, and to some, an 
unwelcome one. 
Despite the awkward timing, the very fact of Peters’ annexations helped generate two 
mechanisms that made returning the territories difficult for leaders in Berlin. For one, the 
job was already half done. While Bismarck and the foreign office had tried to dissuade Peters 
with the strongly-worded cable of 3 October referenced above, now the picture had changed 
considerably. Peters and his colleagues had laid claim, without resistance, to a large portion 
of East Africa, and they were likely to press on to the borders of King Leopold’s newly-
constituted Congo Free State. They had also promised, in letters and memos to the 
government, that the colony could be operated at minimal expense, that governance and 
development of East Africa could be handled by the GfdK, and that the territory was 
suitable for the cultivation of a wide variety of valuable crops.43 Thus, Peters’ success and his 
persuasive arguments meant that the perceived costs of acquisition had been dramatically 
lowered. 
The second reason Bismarck would have trouble rejecting the fait accompli was political. 
While the core of the colonial movement in Germany was relatively small, colonialism and 
empire were increasingly popular in some influential German circles.44 A federal election had 
been held in late October 1884, and the Bismarck-aligned Conservative and National Liberal 
parties had made colonial policy an important theme of their campaigns. Their relative gains, 
and the losses of the Left Liberal party, were widely perceived to be due, in important part, 
 
43 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” p. 104; Smith, The German Colonial Empire, p. 33; 
Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 292; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 64. 
44 Smith, The German Colonial Empire, pp. 29-30; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 8, 66. 
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to their divergent views on Germany’s growing overseas empire.45 By accepting German 
East Africa, Bismarck could strengthen his own domestic political support, and that of his 
allies in the Reichstag, at relatively low cost. As the chancellor had written to a colleague just 
three weeks before the East Africa decision landed on his desk, for “reasons of domestic 
policy the colonial problem is a vital question for us… At present public opinion emphasizes 
colonial policy so strongly in Germany that the position of the Government within Germany 
largely depends on its success.”46 
Besides these incentives to retain the territories, there were also few perceived geopolitical 
risks associated with doing so. While clearly the British might be surprised, even alarmed, by 
German gains in the region, they had made very clear to Bismarck in correspondence in 
January and February 1885 that their interests were mainly confined to the Island of 
Zanzibar itself, not the East African mainland.47 London was also not in a strong position to 
resist any German moves in East Africa. In what would become known as Germany’s 
“Egyptian lever” or its “bâton égyptien,” the British were heavily reliant upon German 
diplomatic support for their occupation of Egypt, and the German government used this to 
their advantage repeatedly.48 As British Prime Minister William Gladstone acknowledged in 
December 1884, the Germans “could do extraordinary mischief to us at our one really 
 
45 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 169-
173; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 42-46. 
46 Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “Domestic Origins of Germany’s Colonial Expansion under Bismarck,” 
Past & Present, No. 42 (February 1969), p. 140. 
47 Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa,” pp. 112-113. 
48 Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 173, 176-177, 180-181; John Lowe, The Great Powers, 
Imperialism, and the German Problem, 1865-1925 (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 85-87, 96-99; Perras, Carl Peters 
and German Imperialism, pp. 43, 100. 
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vulnerable point, Egypt.”49 And Bismarck, reflecting on this fact in January 1885, noted that 
“Egypt… is merely a means of overcoming England’s objections to our colonial 
aspirations.”50  
The timing of Peters’ fait accompli was also fortuitous with respect to potential geopolitical 
risk for Berlin. British imperial forces under General Charles Gordon had been under siege 
at Khartoum since March 1884, and in February 1885, Russian forces occupied the border 
town of Panjdeh in Afghanistan (then a British protectorate), sparking a major crisis between 
the two powers.51 Under these circumstances, London could, and likely would, do little to 
forestall Berlin’s gains in the region. As historian Arne Perras notes, “The attractiveness of 
Peters’ scheme [for Bismarck] lay in the fact that it made a further colonial claim possible 
without provoking an imperial showdown” with London.52 
Berlin Decides 
Therefore, after some brief correspondence with his consul-general in Zanzibar and a few 
meetings with Kusserow, Bismarck decided on 24 February to establish a protectorate over 
Peters’ acquisitions in East Africa—just nine days after becoming aware of them.53 Two days 
later, Bismarck informed Kaiser Wilhelm I of the acquisitions, and advised him to accept 
them as a protectorate. The following day, the Kaiser signed an imperial charter, proclaiming 
 
49 Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 180-181. 
50 Lowe, The Great Powers, p. 99. 
51 Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 181; Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 292. 
52 Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, p. 66. 
53 Some scholars have argued that Bismarck had “misgivings” and was “reluctant” in accepting East Africa, and 
that the territory was “unwanted” (see: Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire, p. 133; Smith, 
The German Colonial Empire, pp. 32-33, 36-37, 91; Steven Press, Rogue Empires: Contracts and Conmen in Europe’s 
Scramble for Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 217). But Bismarck asked few questions 
about the territory itself, and came to his decision very quickly. See: Meritt, “Bismarck and the German Interest 
in East Africa,” p. 106; Wesseling, Divide and Rule, p. 142; Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism, pp. 64-65. 
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East Africa as a German protectorate, and this fact was made public on 3 March 1885.54 
Without having planned on it or having played any role in its actual annexation, the German 
Empire had just acquired what would soon become its largest and most populous imperial 
holding.55 
 Bismarck would approve further annexations sought by the GfdK, informing Peters on 
11 July 1885 that “the company should take what it feels confident to take… We shall see 
later what we can back officially.”56 But Peters was already well ahead of him. He had 
ordered his subordinates to engage in further annexations in East Africa on 24 February—
three days before East Africa was officially made a German protectorate—and by July they 
had extended the territory hundreds of kilometers in each direction.57 The Sultan of Zanzibar 
would raise a protest over the claims, but, in reality, there was little he could do without 
overt and forceful British backing. After Bismarck sent five German warships into the 
harbor of Zanzibar on 7 August 1885, the Sultan formally recognized all German claims on 
the mainland.58 East Africa was to remain German, and would go on to be the Second 
Reich’s most important colony—a status it would retain until it was invaded by a joint 
British-Belgian force in November 1914, in the opening months of the First World War. 
*** 
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In November 1885, Germany and Britain agreed to set up a joint commission to determine 
the limits of Zanzibar’s territories on the mainland, and to demarcate their respective spheres 
of influence there.59 The following October, the two sides came to an agreement, with 
Kenya, to the north, falling within the British sphere, and Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi, in 
the south, falling within the German sphere.60 And while the Sultan of Zanzibar retained 
control over the East African coast, Germany was able to lease the ports of Pagani and Dar 
es Salaam, providing it important “windows” to coastal trade.61 However, the treaty left 
many areas of possible contention unsettled, the most important of these, as the following 
case will show, being Uganda.62  
 For his part, Peters would retain a central position in Germany’s new East African 
empire. Far from being ostracized or punished for his disregard of official orders, he was 
instead tapped to organize and ultimately lead the chartered company that was to run the 
East Africa protectorate, the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (DOAG) or “German East 
Africa Company.”63 However, titles and responsibilities were not nearly enough to put a 
leash on the young administrator, as Peters was much more interested in expanding the 
empire than running it competently.64 And when stories began to circulate in European 
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capitals of a certain German national under siege in southern Sudan by a large Mahdist army, 
Peters—among others—saw it as a golden opportunity to strike out once again. 
 
Germany and Kenya & Uganda, 1889-1890 
The German Empire refrained from acquiring a number of territories throughout Kenya and 
Uganda between June 1889 and July 1890. A series of annexations were independently 
executed over the course of a privately-sponsored German expedition, despite efforts by the 
German government to discourage its launch and hamper its progress. This case provides 
support for the three central arguments of the theory of inadvertent expansion presented in 
Chapter 2. First, that inadvertent expansion results from a principal-agent problem, rooted in 
diverse preferences between the capital and periphery and information asymmetries favoring 
the latter. In the case of Germany in Kenya and Uganda, a sharp divergence of preferences 
for expansion would develop as the expedition’s launch neared, and a lack of telegraphic 
communications hampered central government control. Second, that once a given territory is 
claimed, a number of mechanisms are activated that make it difficult for metropolitan 
leaders to easily relinquish it. In the case under examination, the annexations drove down the 
costs of acquisition of these territories and generated some domestic political pressure on 
leaders in Berlin to authorize the fait accompli. And third, that perceptions of unacceptable 
geopolitical risk associated with acquisition will discourage leaders in the capital from 
authorizing territorial claims, resulting in non-expansion. In the case at hand, the importance 
of the Nile Valley to Britain’s entire imperial strategy meant that Uganda was seen as 
strategically vital to London, and this was well understood in Berlin. These perceived 
geopolitical risks strongly discouraged territorial acquisition among German leaders, leading 
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to the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of July 1890, in which Germany renounced all territorial 
claims in Kenya and Uganda. 
Historical Background 
Kenya and Uganda were largely independent in these years, divided up among numerous 
kingdoms and chiefdoms of varying size. Since 1885, Germany had had a small coastal 
protectorate around the mouth of the River Tana in Kenya, known as “Wituland,” with the 
remainder of Kenya being considered as falling within the United Kingdom’s sphere of 
influence.65 Uganda’s status had yet to be defined by the colonial powers. To the south, of 
course, lay the new German protectorate of East Africa, and to the east lay Belgian King 
Leopold’s Congo. To the north from Lake Victoria flows the Nile River, through Uganda, 
Sudan, and Egypt, before emptying in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, just 50 km west of the 
Suez Canal. Much of the interior of these territories was unknown to the imperial powers, 
though this was rapidly changing with all of the private chartered companies operating in the 
area. 
 For the time being, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck retained his position as the 
key leader in Berlin responsible for German imperial policy. However, with the death of 
Kaiser Wilhelm I in March 1888, the German throne was to be occupied by a new 
emperor—first in the form of Frederick III, who himself died just three months later, 
passing the title of Kaiser to his son, Wilhelm II. Wilhelm II’s accession was viewed by many 
with apprehension, not least by Bismarck himself. At just 29 when he acceded to the throne, 
Wilhelm was young, brash, and self-confident to an extent not nearly warranted by his 
practical and intellectual abilities. He was stubborn and impulsive, with only superficial 
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knowledge of government, military, and international affairs. Yet he was also stridently 
nationalistic and expansionist in his foreign policy views, seeking to reorient the Empire’s 
foreign policy toward a more aggressive Weltpolitik.66 It was Wilhelm II who would make the 
ultimate decision regarding the fate of any territory claimed in Kenya or Uganda. 
 The key actor on the periphery was, again, Carl Peters. Still only in his early thirties by the 
late 1880s, he remained very much the unconstrained peripheral agent, and a thorn in 
Berlin’s side. As the local head of the German East Africa Company (DOAG)—the 
chartered company that administered German East Africa—he would prove to be a hopeless 
administrator, with the company operating on the verge of bankruptcy until they were bailed 
out by the German government in 1887.67 Peters was also a cruel administrator, having 
further developed the strong sadistic streak that had been evident during his earlier 
annexations in East Africa. He and his subordinates regularly committed atrocities against 
the local population in and around the company’s stations throughout East Africa, including 
arbitrary detention, torture, murder, and sexual slavery.68 At the end of 1887, Peters was 
recalled to Berlin by the DOAG, though it wouldn’t be long before he returned.69 
 The occasion for Peters’ return to East Africa was what became known as the “German 
Emin Pasha Relief Expedition.” Emin Pasha (born Eduard Schnitzer) was a physician and 
colonial administrator of German-Jewish origin, who had converted to Islam while living in 
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Ottoman Albania. While traveling in Egypt he became a medical officer for the British 
colonial official General Charles Gordon, who he ultimately succeeded as governor of the 
Sudanese province of Equatoria in 1878, then an unofficial protectorate of the British 
Empire.70 With the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in 1885, the spread of the 
Mahdist Army throughout Sudan forced Emin to retreat to southern Equatoria, near the 
Uganda border.71 From there he put out a call for help to the British government in July 
1886, as he was under siege and running low on ammunition and other supplies.72 
  Word of Emin Pasha’s plight reached London in late September 1886, and the news 
quickly spread to other European capitals.73 His story captured the imagination of European 
publics and publishers, and advocacy organizations and relief committees quickly sprang into 
being, pushing for rescue expeditions.74 For colonial organizations and private chartered 
companies in the region, this was clearly an opportunity, and a British Emin Pasha Relief 
Committee was established in November 1886, with the famed Welsh explorer and colonial 
official Henry Morton Stanley as the planned expedition leader.75 Despite some reluctance, 
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British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury and his cabinet gave their approval (though no official 
support), and the expedition set off in January 1887.76 
 The idea of a rival German expedition developed more slowly. The German Emin Pasha 
Relief Committee only formed in June 1888, with Peters—having been recently recalled 
from East Africa—very much at the center of it.77 Publicly, Peters would claim that the 
expedition’s purpose was “to furnish Emin Pacha, in his isolated position in the Equatorial 
Province, with ammunition and men, and to enable him to maintain his position.”78 
Privately, however, he was more candid, noting that the “German Emin Pasha expedition 
was no pleasure trip, but a large-scale colonial, political enterprise.”79 Emin Pasha’s rescue 
was a mere pretext. The broader aim on the part of Peters and the Committee was the 
extension of Germany’s East African empire, to encompass Uganda, southern Sudan, and 
the Nile basin.80 
Like Salisbury, Bismarck was reluctant to get involved. When the Committee made a 
formal request of the chancellor for German government funding in July 1888, Bismarck 
would decline, noting that “the rescue of Emin Bey would be primarily an Egyptian-English 
interest.”81 Yet many around him were more receptive. The expedition, for instance, 
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garnered the support of prominent figures from each of the major parties in the Reichstag.82 
And the young Kaiser himself, in August 1888, had the foreign office pass on his “warmest 
sympathies for the success of the enterprise” to the Committee.83 Under these conditions, 
Bismarck felt that he had to play along, writing the Committee on 15 August 1888 that, 
while the expedition was “alien to our colonial interests,” he recognized its “high-minded 
purpose” and similarly wished that “the patriotic efforts of the committee may succeed in 
carrying out this difficult venture.”84 Peters would later write that, at this point, he and the 
Committee felt that “His Majesty the Emperor and Prince Bismarck [were] sympathetically 
welcoming the carrying out of a German Emin Pasha Expedition.”85 With these 
endorsements, they felt they had all the backing they needed. 
Berlin & East Africa 
In Kenya and Uganda, leaders in Berlin faced important principal-agent problems with 
respect to actors such as Peters on the frontier. First, a divergence of preferences would 
develop between Bismarck and the expedition. While Bismarck was, at first, reluctantly 
supportive, events on the ground soon changed, leading the chancellor to alter his stance. In 
September 1888, a rebellion broke out on the coast of German East Africa.86 The 
introduction of new taxes on commerce, as well as the heavy-handedness of German 
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colonial administration, led to an armed uprising that quickly spread to the interior.87 By the 
end of the year, all territory under the control of the DOAG was in open revolt. Bismarck 
was dismayed by this turn of events, and in December 1888 and January 1889, he managed 
to convince the Reichstag to fund a military operation to suppress the rebellion.88 As part of 
the pacification campaign, the chancellor announced a naval blockade of the East African 
coast, and Prime Minister Salisbury agreed to send British naval vessels to participate.89 
Under these conditions, an officially-endorsed expedition to the interior seemed out of the 
question, and Bismarck began erecting barriers to its success. 
On 14 September, Bismarck wrote a lengthy memorandum to the Kaiser, arguing against 
the expedition and claiming to see no advantage of “such an eccentric extension” of 
Germany’s African territories.90 The following day, the chancellor informed the DOAG that 
he would take “no further interest” in the expedition unless they got rid of Carl Peters—who 
Bismarck blamed for the mess in East Africa—arguing that Peters was “entirely incapable of 
leading such a difficult venture” due to his “lack of caution, and excessive self-confidence.”91 
Bismarck then began planting stories in German newspapers, critical of Peters and the 
expedition, in an effort to sway public opinion. The Chancellor also began meeting with 
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members and supporters of the committee, individually lobbying them to turn against the 
enterprise.92 Thus, Bismarck quickly became strongly and openly opposed to the expedition. 
A second problem was that there were information asymmetries favoring the German 
Emin Pasha Expedition in the periphery. As in the case of East Africa, the closest telegraph 
station was still in Zanzibar, as coastal Kenya would not see a connection until the following 
year, at Mombasa.93 This made the expedition difficult to communicate with, and potentially 
control, once they were on the mainland. As Peters remarked in recounting events there, 
once they were in the interior the expedition would be “masters of the situation.”94 Thus, the 
principal-agent problems facing Berlin made unauthorized peripheral expansion more likely. 
Kenya & Uganda 
Peters and the Committee would not be discouraged by Bismarck’s opposition, completing 
their preparations in Berlin over the course of January 1889. And, frankly, as a private 
organization funding a private expedition, there were limits to what Bismarck could do to 
stop them. On 25 February, Peters left for East Africa. In contrast to his cheerful departure 
of five years earlier, this time he seemed to leave with a sense of foreboding, later writing 
that his departure “was characterized rather by seriousness and emotion than by joyful 
hope.”95 
Peters arrived in Zanzibar on 31 March 1889, and immediately ran into trouble. For one, 
the Somali soldiers he had recruited in Aden for the expedition were barred from 
disembarking by Zanzibari authorities, forcing Peters to leave them, for the time being, on 
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the East African coast at Bagamoyo.96 Peters also quickly learned that the six hundred local 
porters he had planned on hiring had been prohibited from joining his expedition by the 
Sultan of Zanzibar.97 Just days before Peters’ arrival in Zanzibar, Bismarck had also notified 
Prime Minister Salisbury that their joint blockade should apply to all armed vessels in the 
area, which led to the confiscation of all the weapons Peters had purchased for the 
expedition.98 When Peters went and complained to the British naval officer who was holding 
his weapons, the captain’s response was, simply, “C’est la guerre!”99 And the local German 
consul proved to be of no help either, refusing to mediate Peters’ conflicts with the British 
and Zanzibari authorities.100 
After nearly a month of frustration, Peters telegraphed the Emin Pasha committee in 
Berlin on 29 April, asking them to contact the German Foreign Office and plead his case. 
When he hadn’t heard back, he telegraphed again on 6 May, and then, receiving no reply, 
again on 10 May. On 13 May he finally received a curt telegraphic response from the 
committee, informing him that the “Foreign Office refuses all mediation and support.”101 
Peters was livid. “If the Imperial Government did not wish that the German Emin Pasha 
Expedition should be undertaken,” he replied on 17 May, “it should have forbidden the 
project” from the start. He added that “to have allowed the development of the project to 
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the present point, and now to permit its being hindered under every imaginable pretext, 
…and even with the co-operation of the German authorities, is certainly a very peculiar 
method of advancing German interests and German honour.” However, while Peters was 
outraged, he was not deterred. As he continued in the very same telegram: 
“in the face of the difficulties in every direction, in face of the intrigues with which we 
have to fight daily, all of us here, I am proud to say, are only the more firmly resolved 
to carry on the undertaking to the utmost verge of possibility.”102 
The German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition would go on. 
 On 1 June, Peters crossed from Zanzibar to Bagamoyo, on the mainland, in a privately-
chartered vessel.103 From there he continued south to Dar-es-Salaam. Peters’ resolve would 
only strengthen with time and distance, later recalling that he “considered it more consonant 
with our national honour and our national interest to perish, on the sea or on the land, with 
my whole expedition, than to retreat before this paltry mass of obstacles and intrigues.”104 
From Dar-es-Salaam, the expedition was officially launched on 7 June, heading north up the 
East African coast by boat, with plans to land on the Kenyan coast near Kiwayu Island, just 
north of the German protectorate of Wituland. Since, by this point, Bismarck had instructed 
local German officials to neither let the expedition through the blockade at sea nor to pass 
through Wituland, this seemed the most promising approach.105 After a treacherous journey 
up the coast—characterized by heavy seas, a near capsize, a fire on board which nearly blew 
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up the ammunition (and all passengers along with it), roving naval blockade vessels, and a 
shortage of potable water—the expedition arrived at Kiwayu Bay on 15 June.106 While Peters 
and the committee had initially planned for an expedition of upwards of seven hundred, the 
various hurdles put in their way by the German government had shrunk their numbers to a 
little over one hundred.107 The 25 Somali soldiers Peters retained were armed only with 
hunting rifles, and the expedition had no goods whatsoever with which to buy passage 
through tribal territories.108 It was not exactly an auspicious beginning. 
 The expedition began its march toward and then up the River Tana on 26 July 1889.109 
Their ultimate destination was Wadelai, some 1,200 km away in northern Uganda, where 
Emin Pasha was supposedly fending off attacks from the Mahdist Army. Once the 
expedition got underway, it became clear that Peters’ faculties for brutality had developed 
considerably since his East African expedition five years earlier. Conditions were difficult 
early on, as the expedition lacked supplies, and as porters began to disappear in the night, 
Peters had some of them flogged, others of them shot, and, ultimately, all of them put in 
chains to prevent further escape.110 For the local population as well, the German Emin Pasha 
Relief Expedition would amount to a veritable campaign of terror. Peters and his followers 
plundered and razed villages, raided thousands of cattle, held dozens of captives, and battled 
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anyone who resisted their advance.111 Peters had no evident misgivings about the conduct of 
the expedition either, claiming to have “found that in the end only the bullets of a repeater… 
make an impression on these wild sons of the steppe.”112 
 While the ultimate aim was to find Emin Pasha, and to annex his province of Equatoria, 
Peters would claim various territories for the German Empire as he progressed. His first 
protectorate treaty was with the Wapokomo people in what he referred to as the “Massa 
Country” on 12 September 1889.113 From here, the expedition claimed territory via treaty of 
protection—often coerced—every few weeks, planting a series of German flags in their 
wake as they advanced. Peters would discover along the way that Emin Pasha had long been 
rescued by the British expedition, having left from Wadelai for the East African coast in 
April 1889, months before Peters’ expedition had even begun.114 However, this ultimately 
mattered little. He resolved to press on to Uganda, where he had heard that the Kabaka 
(king) of Buganda was in need of help against internal challenges, and Peters saw this as an 
opportunity to claim an even greater prize for the empire.115 Peters would be frustrated in 
this final ambition—the Kabaka had no interest in a treaty of protection—and he had to 
settle for a treaty of amity and cooperation, which was signed on 28 February 1889.116  
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Buganda would be the culmination of the expedition, and in mid-March, Peters and his 
followers began their journey back to the coast, traveling south on Lake Victoria and 
returning through German East Africa.117 They reached the coast at Bagamoyo on 16 July 
1889, after having traveled over 3,000 km in a few weeks shy of a full year.118 Over the 
course of the expedition, Peters had signed between eight and ten of treaties of protection.119 
The question now was what Berlin would do with them. 
Berlin Reacts 
By April 1890, it was clear in Berlin that Peters had made it as far as Uganda, and by June 
news of his treaties began to reach European capitals.120 While Bismarck and other German 
leaders had clearly tried to prevent the expedition before it was launched, now that it had 
seen a measure of success, Peters’ actions had generated some reasons to consider retaining 
the territories he had claimed. For one, the privately-funded expedition had driven down the 
costs of acquiring these territories for the German Empire. Peters would be returning in 
mere months with a handful of admittedly-dubious, though likely-defensible, treaties of 
protection that stretched through Kenya and Uganda. If German leaders wanted these 
territories, they were theirs for the taking. And Peters’ martial successes in dealing with local 
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tribes, though troubling to many from a humanitarian standpoint, showed that resistance 
may not be as heavy as might have been expected. 
 Perhaps a more important reason it may have appeared difficult to readily relinquish 
Peters’ claims, however, was that the expedition itself generated domestic political pressure 
in favor of imperial expansion. Peters was among Germany’s most famous colonial figures, 
and he and the expedition were glowingly presented in the press and public as the 
embodiment of German courage and national honor.121 This was also the height of the 
“Scramble for Africa,” and the German public, like most European publics, was swept up in 
the rising tide of colonial enthusiasm.122 Expansionist fervor was strongest among some of 
Bismarck’s most important supporters in the Reichstag, narrowing the chancellor’s latitude 
in response.123 And Britain’s participation in the blockade only served to inflame these 
passions. As Herbert von Bismarck, the chancellor’s son and foreign minister, wrote to their 
ambassador in London on 27 July 1889, news of the confiscation of Peters’ weapons “had 
caused extreme excitement among the German public” and had “triggered a press campaign 
against England.”124 Peters and the Committee did their own part to foster this public 
support. For instance, before leaving, Peters made public statements emphasizing the extent 
of support for the expedition in the Reichstag, in an effort to put pressure on Bismarck.125 
The Committee in Berlin also helped stoke moral outrage over the confiscation of Peters’ 
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supplies by publicizing the issue, and using it to raise further funds.126 In short, the very fact 
of Peters’ having launched the expedition created incentives for leaders in Berlin to consider 
accepting the territories he claimed. 
 However, there were also severe geopolitical risks associated with retaining Peters’ 
territorial claims. The key problem, of course, was the United Kingdom. While much of 
Kenya was formally independent, it clearly lay within Britain’s sphere of influence according 
to an agreement the two powers had come to in October and November 1886. This first 
agreement was followed up by what was known as the “hinterlands agreement” of July 1887, 
in which Prime Minister Salisbury and Chancellor Bismack agreed that they should 
discourage territorial annexations in the hinterlands of each other’s spheres.127 Thus, 
Bismarck was on record, multiple times, recognizing many of these territories claimed by 
Peters as lying within the British sphere. 
 Another key factor was that Germany’s position vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, while 
strong in 1885 when the East Africa claims were settled, had weakened considerably. With 
Britain looking increasingly likely to stay in Egypt for the time being, Bismarck’s support 
there became less crucial, and his “bâton égyptien” began lose its bite.128 Germany’s own 
conflicts with both France and Russia, as well as a visible rapprochement between those two 
great powers, also meant that Germany increasingly needed Britain on its side.129 Friedrich 
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von Holstein, an influential member of the German Foreign Office, wrote in October 1888 
that “Our colonial crises lie upon us like a nightmare, and we need England of all places. 
Our relations with the English government are being most carefully cultivated.”130 This 
sentiment was echoed at the highest levels, with Bismarck writing in early 1889, “At present 
we need England if peace is to be maintained.”131 In January of that year, Bismarck went as 
far as to make an offer of a formal alliance to Prime Minister Salisbury.132 While Salisbury 
would politely decline, it was an unmistakably clear signal of Bismarck’s view of his 
diplomatic position at the time. 
 Yet, perhaps the most important reason Germany faced geopolitical risk in considering 
Peters’ annexations was that the United Kingdom began to view the entire Nile Valley, 
which included large portions of Uganda and Sudan, as a core geostrategic interest.133 When 
Britain invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882, it gained control of the Suez Canal, a crucial 
chokepoint in passage between Europe and British India. And the security of Egypt was 
seen as depending critically on that of the Nile. Genuine, though perhaps not all that well-
founded, fears of a rival great power coming in and diverting or obstructing the flow of the 
Nile thus led the British to view the entire course of the Nile—from Lake Victoria in 
Uganda, through Sudan, and into Egypt—as a crucial imperial interest. Once the United 
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Kingdom had determined it would stay in Egypt—which was publicly announced in 
November 1889134—Uganda became utterly indispensable.135 Even Germany’s protectorate 
in Wituland began to be looked upon with increasing anxiety.136 And the British made their 
feelings known. For instance, in December 1888, Prime Minister Salisbury asked Bismarck 
to define his attitude to the German Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, a veiled notification of 
Britain’s special interests in the area.137 And during a visit to London in March 1889, Herbert 
Bismarck was astonished by how quickly each of his interlocutors brought up East African 
affairs and potential colonial crises there.138 As Prime Minister Salisbury put it in March 
1890, his government was firmly resolved to defend the “Nile Valley against the dominion of 
any outside power.”139 
A Dismissal and a Decision 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Chancellor Bismarck was sensitive to these risks early on. In his 
September 1888 memorandum to the Kaiser, he argued against supporting the Emin Pasha 
Expedition on the grounds that it was likely to antagonize the British, which regarded Egypt 
as a vital interest.140 In December 1888, Bismarck personally assured Prime Minister 
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Salisbury that he would give the Peters expedition no official support whatsoever.141 The 
following June, with the expedition just about to commence, Bismarck had his ambassador 
in London assure Salisbury that “Uganda, Wadelai, and other places to the east and north of 
Lake Victoria Nyanza are outside the sphere of German colonization.”142 And to make his 
views known more publicly, in August 1889 Bismarck stated in the German newspaper 
Norddeutsche Allegmeine Zeitung that his government was opposed to the expedition on the 
grounds that “England regards [it] as an interference in her sphere of interest.” “English 
friendship,” he added in the article, “is far more valuable for us than anything which the 
expedition could hope to achieve.”143 The chancellor had made up his mind before Peters’ 
expedition even got its start. 
 However, a change was to come that would shake the Wilhelmstrasse to its core. As noted 
above, with the death of Wilhelm I in March 1888, the German throne was soon occupied 
by his grandson, Wilhelm II.144 The young, nationalistic Kaiser had dramatically different 
foreign policy views from Bismarck, and was less pliant than his grandfather had been on 
these issues. After clashing with Bismarck for 21 months, particularly on Russia policy, 
Wilhelm dismissed the Chancellor in March 1890, while Carl Peters was still annexing 
territory deep in the East African interior.145 This change was seen with alarm in many 
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European capitals, not least in London. Salisbury had been deeply concerned with the rise of 
Wilhelm II, and referred to Bismarck’s dismissal as “an enormous calamity, of which the 
sinister effects will be felt in every part of Europe.”146 Wilhelm II was also more sympathetic 
to the Peters expedition than his grandfather or Bismarck had been, raising new questions 
about how he would respond to Peters’ fait accompli.147 
 As it would turn out, the new government in Berlin would see things much like the old 
one, desiring to avoid conflict with London rather than claim new East African territory.148 
In fact, leaders in Berlin wanted to move rapidly toward a settlement of their outstanding 
conflicts with London in the region, before, as their ambassador in London put it, “an 
intolerable situation” develops.149 In early May 1890, the new foreign minister, Adolf 
Marschall von Bieberstein, gave his British interlocutors “the positive assurance that any 
action… taken by Dr. Peters would be considered as null and void by the German 
government.”150 He was echoed a few days later by another foreign office official, who, in 
conversation with a British interlocutor, affirmed that his government recognized that 
“Uganda at least as far as one degree south is in the British sphere.”151 And news that Peters 
had signed some sort of treaty with the Kabaka of Buganda, which arrived in Europe in late 
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May 1890, made leaders in Berlin only more eager to get an agreement with London as soon 
as possible.152  
While the back-and-forth between the two governments would last a few more weeks, 
the ultimate result was the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890.153 According to the terms 
of this agreement, the United Kingdom gained the German protectorate of Wituland, 
territory between Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, and recognition of its sphere of 
influence over Uganda and its protectorate over Zanzibar. In return, Germany gained some 
small concessions in West Africa as well as Heligoland, an archipelago of less than 2 km2 off 
of Germany’s North Sea coast.154 With this agreement, Germany’s presence in the area was 
limited to German East Africa proper, which, after the failures of the DOAG, had recently 
been converted to a full-fledged, state-run colony.155 Thus, Britain effectively gained 
everything it wanted, and stopped the threat of German expansion in East Africa in its 
tracks.156 Peters’ fait accompli had been firmly and thoroughly rejected before he had even 
made it out of the interior. 
 When Carl Peters arrived back on the coast at Bagamoyo on 16 July 1890, and learned 
that his claims had been relinquished, he was so enraged that he was rendered speechless.157 
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As he later recalled the experience, “I remained two hours in the salon to regain my 
composure, and begged the gentlemen to say nothing more on the whole subject.”158 Upon 
his arrival in Zanzibar a few days later, he cabled Berlin, trying to get the decision reversed, 
but it was no use. What was done was done.159 He shortly thereafter departed for home, 
arriving on German soil on 18 August 1890.160  
German leaders recognized, however, that they would have to handle Peters with caution. 
He still had a large popular following, was well-connected with the German press, and had 
proven himself to be an able political agitator. To both placate his anger and indulge his 
narcissism, the new chancellor, Leo von Caprivi, personally telegraphed Peters, promising 
that he would be rewarded by the Kaiser if he could remain on his best behavior. A few 
weeks later, Wilhelm II would bestow upon Peters the Order of the Crown, 3rd Class, and he 
received other decorations from the King of Saxony and the Grand Duke of Saxony-
Weimar-Eisenach.161 Peters would be back in East Africa just one year later, serving as an 
imperial commissioner for German East Africa in the Kilimanjaro region. However, he was 
soon forced to resign in disgrace after his penchant for brutality helped spark yet another 
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Three alternative explanations that might account for the cases of Germany in East Africa in 
1885 and Kenya and Uganda in 1890 are strategic expansion theory, state institutional 
weakness, and leader interests. First, clearly neither German case is an example of strategic 
expansion. In both East Africa and in Kenya and Uganda, Carl Peters was acting without 
government sanction or support, and in the latter case, against active efforts to stop him. 
While the ultimate decisions made by Bismarck in 1885 and by Wilhelm II in 1890 were 
strategic in nature—based on calculations of domestic-political benefits and perceived 
geopolitical risks—these decisions were forced upon them by actors and processes that were 
beyond their control. In short, these two German cases of annexation are clearly inadvertent 
in nature. 
 Second, state institutional weakness doesn’t appear to explain unauthorized peripheral 
expansion in the two German cases, as late-19th century Germany is often considered to be 
an archetypal “strong” state. While, as a federal state, its central government tax revenue was 
relatively small,163 its Prussian predecessor had experimented with various forms of military 
conscription since the 17th century, and it had been universal and permanent since 1813.164 
Prussia had also had a civil registry since the 18th century, a statistical agency since the early 
19th century, and a regular census since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, giving it ample 
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reliable information about its population and territory.165 Given the relative strength of 
German state institutions, institutional weakness is an unlikely explanation for these cases. 
 Finally, a simple appeal to leader interests is not in line with the evidence regarding 
subsequent central authorization in these two cases. In the case of East Africa in 1885, 
Bismarck was incentivized to accept the fait accompli, even after sending Peters a cable stating 
that the government would not support him in any territorial claims there. In the case of 
Kenya and Uganda in 1890, by contrast, Wilhelm II had to reject the fait accompli, despite his 
interest in the expedition and after extending his “warmest sympathies” for its success. In 
short, while not completely irrelevant, leader interests are an insufficient explanation for the 
two German cases. 
*** 
This chapter has presented the comparative case studies of inadvertent expansion and non-
expansion by Germany in East Africa in 1885 and in Kenya and Uganda in 1890. This 
chapter is unique in the broader project, in that it presented the dissertation’s only two cases 
of inadvertent expansion via political annexation, as opposed to armed conquest. Both cases 
support the theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2. First, both cases 
showed unauthorized peripheral expansion to be a manifestation of a principal-agent 
problem: a divergence of preferences between Berlin and the East African periphery and a 
lack of telegraphic communications hampered Berlin’s ability to communicate with, and 
potentially control, the expedition. Second, in both cases the very act of engaging in 
territorial expansion activated mechanisms that made withdrawal appear difficult from the 
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perspective of leaders in the capital. Peters’ faits accomplis both drove down the perceived 
costs of territorial acquisition and helped general domestic political pressure on leaders in 
Berlin in favor of acceptance. And third, both cases showed how perceptions of geopolitical 
risk play a crucial role in driving decisions of whether to ultimately accept or reject the 
territorial fait accompli. In the case of East Africa in 1885, a lack of perceived geopolitical risk, 
when combined with domestic political pressure, convinced Bismarck that the potential 
costs of accepting the territory were sufficiently low as to merit its acquisition. In contrast, in 
the case of Kenya and Uganda in 1890, perceived geopolitical risk in the form of the British 
Empire convinced both Bismarck, and then Wilhelm II, that the costs of acceptance were far 
too great, resulting in territorial relinquishment. 
At least part of what is striking about these two cases are the key leaders in the capital 
that ultimately accept and reject the faits accomplis. In the case of German East Africa in 1885, 
it was Otto von Bismarck, the reluctant imperialist and practitioner of Realpolitik—who 
famously said “All this colonial business is a sham”166—who made the ultimate decision to 
retain the territory his agents had claimed.167 In contrast, in the case of Kenya and Uganda in 
1890, it was Wilhelm II, the aggressive nationalist and proponent of Weltpolitik—who would 
aim to give Germany its “place in the sun”168—who exercised restraint in deciding to 
relinquish the territorial claims. The cases of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, and the theory of 
inadvertent expansion more broadly, illuminate the various constraints—both domestic and 
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international—that leaders operate under, leading them to make decisions that are at odds 







“Leadership, calculation, control over events—these are merely the illusions of 
statesmen and scholars. The passions of men and momentum of events take over and 
propel societies in novel and unanticipated directions.” 
—Robert Gilpin1 
 
This dissertation has examined inadvertent expansion in the modern history of great power 
politics. It has introduced the concept of inadvertent expansion, has put forward a theory to 
explain when and why it occurs, and has supported the theory with a great deal of 
quantitative and qualitative evidence. This brief, final chapter concludes the dissertation. It 
has two central purposes. First, to recap what has been learned in the pages above, 
summarizing the concept and theory of inadvertent expansion and highlighting key findings 
in each of the quantitative and qualitative empirical chapters. Second, to discuss some of the 
implications of the arguments and evidence presented for both international relations 
scholarship as well as the practice of foreign policy. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I summarize the concept and theory of 
inadvertent expansion, and review the key findings presented in each empirical chapter. 
Second, I present the most important implications of the arguments and evidence for 
international relations scholarship. Third and finally, I present the implications of this project 
for the practice of foreign policy. 
 
 




Arguments & Primary Findings 
Inadvertent expansion is territorial expansion that is planned and executed by actors on the 
periphery of a state or empire, without the foreknowledge or involvement of leaders in the 
capital. In Chapter 2, I argued that instances of inadvertent expansion tend to unfold in two 
basic steps. The first step is what I referred to as “unauthorized peripheral expansion.” This 
occurs when state and non-state actors on the periphery of a given state or empire plan and 
execute instances of territorial expansion, without the foreknowledge, authorization, and 
support of leaders at home in the capital. The second step is what I referred to as 
“subsequent central authorization.” This occurs when these peripheral actors, having 
claimed foreign territory with the authority to do so, present leaders in the capital with their 
claims as a fait accompli, and these leaders are forced to decide whether to accept or reject the 
territorial claim in question. 
 The theory of inadvertent expansion presented in Chapter 2 made three central 
arguments. First, that the most important explanation for unauthorized peripheral expansion 
is the degree of control by leaders in the capital over the periphery. Unauthorized peripheral 
expansion is best understood as a principal-agent problem, where diverse preferences 
between the capital and the frontier, and information asymmetries favoring the latter, help 
create the conditions for frontier actors to engage in unauthorized expansion. When leaders 
in the capital have the ability to regularly monitor the behavior of their peripheral agents—
typically, though not exclusively, in the form of rapid communications technology—
unauthorized peripheral expansion is much less likely to occur. In contrast, when leaders in 
the capital lack the ability to regularly monitor their peripheral agents, unauthorized 




very much about control. It should be most likely to occur where centralized control is at its 
weakest. 
 The second key argument in the theory of inadvertent expansion is that the very act of 
unauthorized peripheral expansion changes “the facts on the ground,” and thereby alters the 
strategic calculus facing leaders in the capital. Peripheral expansion helps generate powerful 
incentives for these leaders to consider retaining the territory that they wouldn’t have 
otherwise, and it does so for three basic reasons. First, unauthorized peripheral expansion 
will often dramatically drive down the costs of acquiring the territory in question. Since these 
peripheral actors have paid most of the costs of expansion “up front” and on behalf of the 
state or empire, all leaders will often have to do is agree to accept what they are presented 
with and the territory will be theirs. Second, unauthorized peripheral expansion will 
frequently generate domestic political pressure on the leaders to support their own agents 
and nationals, regardless of their insubordination or how unscrupulous they may have been. 
Leaders themselves may feel a sense of personal or professional responsibility to support 
their own subordinates, or the public at large may become aware of events on the frontier 
and rally to the cause of their co-nationals, putting pressure on the leaders. Third, 
unauthorized peripheral expansion tends to engage the state or empire’s prestige, honor, and 
reputation in a way it simply wasn’t engaged before. Once a territory has been partly or 
wholly acquired, it often appears difficult, if not impossible, to back down and relinquish the 
claims without an unacceptable stain on the national honor. Thus, unauthorized peripheral 
expansion tends to generate its own incentives for territorial retention. 
 The third central argument of the theory of inadvertent expansion is that leaders’ ultimate 
decision to either accept or reject the territorial fait accompli is crucially conditioned by their 




perceived geopolitical risk associated with acquisition—in the form of crippling economic 
isolation, armed conflict with a regional power, or encroaching upon the interests of a rival 
great power—leaders will be far less likely to accept the fait accompli and retain the territory. 
In contrast, when there is little perceived geopolitical risk associated with acquisition, these 
leaders will be far more likely accept the territorial fait accompli, thereby completing the 
process of inadvertent expansion. 
 These arguments were supported with a variety of different kinds of empirical evidence. 
Chapter 3 focused on the broad patterns of strategic and inadvertent expansion over the past 
two hundred years. It presented new data on great territorial expansion from 1816 to the 
present, and included three central findings. First, that inadvertent expansion is a 
surprisingly-general phenomenon, occurring in nearly one-in-four cases of territorial 
expansion by the great powers.2 Second, that cases of territorial expansion are significantly 
more likely to be inadvertent when the territory in question lacks a connection to the global 
telegraph network. And third, that cases of territorial expansion are significantly less likely to 
be inadvertent when they involve considerable geopolitical risk.3 These last two findings 
remain strong and significant even when controlling for a number of important, potential 
confounding variables, including the passage of time, the distance from the capital to the 
territory in question, whether the expansion took place as part of a broader conflict, the 
strength of the great power’s institutions, the great power’s regime type, its relative power, 
and whether the expansion took the form of annexation rather than conquest.4 
 
2 See: Tables 3.3 & 3.4. 
3 See: Figure 3.2. 




 Chapters 4 through 8 then presented a series of paired, comparative case studies of 
inadvertent expansion and non-expansion in the history of great power politics. Chapter 4 
presented two cases of the United States in the American south. In the case of Florida, a lack 
of control by Washington over its southern frontier allowed Andrew Jackson to 
independently claim Spanish Florida for the United States, and perceptions of only modest 
amounts of geopolitical risk within the Monroe Administration encouraged them to retain 
his territorial claims in 1818-19. In the case of Texas, by contrast, the desire to avoid what 
was seen as a likely war with Mexico pressured the administration of now-President Andrew 
Jackson to pass up the opportunity to acquire the newly-independent republic in 1836-37. 
 Chapter 5 presented two cases of Russia on the Central Asian Steppe. In the case of the 
Khanate of Kokand, a lack of control by St. Petersburg over its peripheral agents enabled 
Mikhail Cherniaev to independently conquer the cities of Chimkent and Tashkent, and the 
absence of perceived geopolitical risk associated with doing so led to their retention in 1864-
66. In the case of the Ili Region, by contrast, a similarly unauthorized claim by Konstantin 
Petrovich von Kaufman was turned back by St. Petersburg after a nearly-ten-year 
occupation, out of fear of war with China over the distant territory. 
 Chapter 6 presented two cases of France in the Southeast Asian region of Tonkin. In the 
first case, occurring in 1873-74, a lack of control by Paris over its peripheral agents allowed 
Francis Garnier to independently claim Tonkin for the French Empire. However, after his 
death and beheading, Paris would return the territory to local Vietnamese authorities due to 
concerns over the potentially-adverse reactions of Germany and the United Kingdom. In the 
second case, occurring in 1882-83, a similar lack of central control enabled Henri Rivière to, 
again, claim Tonkin on behalf of the empire without authorization from Paris. In this case, 




territory, and consistently downplayed the risks of Chinese intervention, leading to Tonkin’s 
acquisition. While French leaders were ultimately mistaken, and war with China would, 
indeed, result, the perceptions and behavior of leaders in Paris were consistent with the 
theory of inadvertent expansion. 
 Chapter 7 presented the comparative cases of Japan in Manchuria and Italy in the port 
city of Fiume. These two cases were noteworthy, in that it was relatively-weak civil-military 
relations, rather than rudimentary communications technology, that led to a lack of control 
by these capitals over their peripheral agents. In the Japan case, the independence of the 
Kwantung Army vis-à-vis Tokyo allowed them to launch the invasion of Manchuria in late 
1931. And while perceptions of geopolitical risk were initially very high among leaders in 
Tokyo, over time these concerns dissipated, leading to the territory’s retention by March the 
following year. In the Italy case, in contrast, Gabriele D’Annunzio’s unauthorized conquest 
of the port city of Fiume was supported by much of the Italian military, but leaders in Rome 
quickly decided to turn the city back out of concern over the harsh reactions of France, the 
United Kingdom, and, most importantly, the United States. 
 Chapter 8 was the final empirical chapter of the dissertation, presenting two cases of 
Germany in East Africa. These two cases were also noteworthy, in that they presented the 
dissertation’s only two cases of inadvertent expansion via territorial annexation, the previous 
cases having all consisted of armed conquest. In the first case, a lack of control by leaders in 
Berlin over a colonial organization operating in the region enabled Carl Peters to annex a 
number of territories in what would become German East Africa in 1884-85. And the 
absence of perceived geopolitical risk associated with the annexations encouraged Otto von 
Bismarck to retain these territorial claims. In the second case, by contrast, Peters’ 




by Kaiser Wilhelm II in Berlin, largely due to concerns over a potential conflict with the 
United Kingdom over them. In sum, the theory of inadvertent expansion was given strong 
support using both comprehensive quantitative data as well as a variety of comparative 
historical case studies. 
 The key alternative arguments considered throughout the dissertation have been strategic 
expansion theory, state institutional weakness, and leader interests. Strategic expansion 
theory found little support in Chapters 3 through 8. The simple fact is that not all instances 
of territorial expansion can be characterized as strategic in nature. Roughly one-in-four cases 
of territorial expansion by the great powers are inadvertent, and these include six of the nine 
great powers, occur across a large swath of time, in a wide variety of regions, and involve 
many different types of territory. And upon careful examination, none of the historical case 
studies presented could reasonably be considered instances of strategic expansion. 
Inadvertent expansion is an important—and as-yet underappreciated—form of territorial 
expansion by the great powers. 
 State institutional weakness was also not well supported as an alternative explanation for 
unauthorized peripheral expansion. In Chapter 3, I presented data that showed little 
meaningful difference between strategic and inadvertent expansion with respect to the 
expanding great power’s “information capacity,”5 a new and important measure of state 
institutional capacity, and this held in the more formal regression analysis as well. Each of 
the qualitative chapters also examined state institutional weakness as a potential alternative 
explanation. In most of the cases—including France, Japan, Italy, and Germany—the state 
institutions of the great power experiencing inadvertent expansion were, in fact, relatively 
 




strong, casting doubt upon this alternative explanation. And even in cases where the great 
power’s institutions were relatively weak, the overall infrequency of inadvertent expansion by 
that great power (in the case of the U.S.6), and its sharp decline once telegraph technology 
becomes widespread (in the case of Russia7), further call the institutional explanation into 
question. 
 Leader interests, too, did not receive much support as an alternative explanation for 
subsequent central authorization. While this alternative explanation was not able to be 
examined using the quantitative evidence presented in Chapter 3, it was considered in each 
of the qualitative cases, and did not find consistent support. In some chapters—such as the 
U.S. cases presented in Chapter 4—leader interests were constant, but the outcomes 
observed varied. In the many other chapters—including the United Kingdom case in the 
Introduction, the Russia cases in Chapter 5, the Japan and Italy cases in Chapter 7, and the 
Germany cases in Chapter 8—leader interests pointed to the opposite of what we would 
expect. They were opposed to acquisition in the cases in which territory was ultimately 
gained, and were supportive of acquisition in the cases in which territory was turned down. 
The two French cases in Chapter 6 were indeterminate on this front, as the incentives of 
both leader interests and geopolitical risk pointed “in the same direction.” But the lack of 
support for leader interests as an explanation for central authorization across the remainder 
of the cases rules it out as a serious alternative.  
Table 9.1 (below) summarizes the evidence presented for the central arguments of the 
theory of inadvertent expansion as well as for alternative explanations, indicating which 
 
6 See: Table 3.4. 















U.K. in Sind ✓ ✓  —  
Expansion Data (Ch. 3) ✓ ✓ —  — 
U.S. in Florida ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
U.S. in Texas — ✓  ✓  
Russia in Kokand ✓ ✓  ✓  
Russia in the Ili Region ✓ ✓  ✓  
France in Tonkin (1873-74) ✓ ✓   ✓ 
France in Tonkin (1882-83) ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Japan in Manchuria ✓ ✓    
Italy in Fiume ✓ ✓    
Germany in East Africa ✓ ✓    
Germany in Kenya & Uganda ✓ ✓    





were supported and which were not. As is clear, those associated with the theory of 
inadvertent expansion—principal-agent problems and geopolitical risk—receive much 
broader and more consistent support than these alternative explanations. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The theory of inadvertent expansion and the evidence presented in this dissertation have 
two important implications for international relations theory. The first is that they should 
lead us to be cautious when attempting to infer the intentions of great powers.8 If such high-
risk great power decisions as territorial expansion can routinely be inadvertent, it complicates 
our ability to reliably define certain states as “revisionist” or “greedy” and others as “status 
quo oriented” or “security seeking.” Certainly, the behavior of states engaging in inadvertent 
expansion is ultimately classifiable as revisionist in nature, but the intentions behind it are far 
less clear. This should lead us to be modest regarding the extent to which we can safely infer 
preferences from behavior.9  
The second theoretical implication is that the arguments and evidence support what 
Richard Betts has long argued: that strategy is often (though not always) an “illusion.”10 As 
Edelstein and Krebs put it more recently, in “the complex and highly uncertain world of 
international politics, it is all but impossible to identify the ideal strategy ahead of time” and 
 
8 Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 
2014/15), pp. 48-88; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 45; Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging 
Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74. For critiques, see: 
Charles L. Glaser, Andrew H. Kydd, Mark L. Haas, John M. Owen IV, and Sebastian Rosato, 
“Correspondence: Can Great Powers Discern Intentions?” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2015/16), pp. 
197-215. 
9 This is what economists typically refer to as “revealed preferences.” See: Jeffrey A. Frieden, “Actors and 
Preferences in International Relations,” in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 39-76. 




that descriptions of state strategy often “confuse cause with after-the-fact rationalization.”11 
Given such important and abundant non-strategic behavior, perhaps it is worth considering 
that in many instances, strategic behavior will be less deliberate and more like what 
Mintzberg and Water refer to as “emergent strategy,” consisting of patterns of behavior 
realized despite, or even in the absence of, intentions.12 
 
Policy Implication 
The arguments and evidence presented above also have one crucial policy implication. This 
is that they should lead foreign policy practitioners to be cautious in how they interpret each 
and every behavior they see another state engage in. “A common misperception,” Robert 
Jervis notes in his classic work on the subject, “is to see the behavior of others as more 
centralized, planned, and coordinated than it is.”13 This article has indicated one crucially-
important historical phenomenon—inadvertent territorial expansion—where such 
assumptions would be wholly misplaced. A clearer understanding of the nature of 
inadvertent foreign policies, and the conditions under which they are most likely, will reduce 
the tendency for misperceptions to drive foreign policy decision making. And this, it is 
hoped, will help us avoid the potentially-gravest of misunderstandings in world politics. 
 
 
11 David M. Edelstein and Ronald R. Krebs, “Delusions of Grand Strategy: The Problem with Washington’s 
Planning Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6 (November/December 2015), pp. 110, 111. 
12 Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 6 (1985), pp. 257-272. See also: Ionut C. Popescu, “Grand Strategy vs. Emergent Strategy in the 
Conduct of Foreign Policy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2018), pp. 438-460. 
13 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 







Balance Test for Case Selection (Chapter 2) 
The following table compares the cases selected with the remainder of the cases of 
inadvertent expansion by the great powers between 1816 and 2014. Note that the “cases” 
here only include positive cases of inadvertent expansion, including: Sind (1843), Florida 
(1819), Chimkent (1864), Tashkent (1865), Annam (1883), Tonkin (1883), East Africa 
(1885), and Manchuria (1932). Definitions of, and details on, these variables can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
Table A2.1: Balance Test for Case Selection 
Variable Range Cases  
(n=8) 
Rest of Population  
(n=48) 
Difference 
Year (median) 1818-1932 1874 1875 -1 
Regions (count) 1-5 4 4 0 
Extra_regional 0/1 0.5 0.81 -0.31 
Distance (km) 1,033-18,817 5,064 7,262 -2,198 
Telegraph 0/1 0.12 0.23 -0.11 
Risky 0/1 0.25 0.19 -0.06 
Conflict 0/1 0.5 0.38 +0.12 
Annexation 0/1 0.12 0.5 -0.38 
Rev_GNP (%) 1.97-35.95 12.56 10.39 +2.17 
Info_capacity 0.18-0.73 0.55 0.60 -0.05 
Democracy 0/1 0.38 0.29 +0.09 
Autocracy 0/1 0.25 0.21 +0.04 
Mixed_regime 0/1 0.38 0.5 -0.12 
Polity (-10)-9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 
Polyarchy 0.02-0.57 0.29 0.31 -0.02 
CINC 0.03-0.33 0.11 0.16 -0.05 
Note: Values refer to averages unless otherwise noted. 
 
 The table shows the balance between the sample of cases selected and the broader 
universe of cases of inadvertent expansion to be fairly even. There is little or no meaningful 
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difference between the sample selected and the universe of cases with respect to: the year in 
which the expansion observation took place; the number of regions represented;1 the risk 
involved in the expansion observation; the great power’s state revenue as a percentage of its gross 
national product;2 the great power’s information capacity;3 whether the great power was a democracy 
or an autocracy;4 the great power’s polity score;5 the great power’s polyarchy score;6 or the great 
power’s CINC score.7 There are only moderate differences between sample and universe 
with respect to: whether the territory acquired was connected to the global telegraph network 
 
1 Region classification derived from: Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “The MID3 Data Set, 
1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 
(2004), pp. 133-154 (Region data no longer available online). 
2 Data from: “G6 Asia: Central Government Revenue with Some Main Tax Yields” (pp. 1743-1772), “J1 Asia: 
National Account Totals” (pp. 1992-2000),” “J1 North America: National Accounts Totals” (pp. 3273-3308), 
“G6 North America: Central Government Revenue, with Some Main Tax Yields” (pp. 3153-3171), “G6 
Europe: Central Government Revenue and Main Tax Yields” (pp. 4672-4733), and “J1 Europe: National 
Account Totals” (pp. 4818-4875) in International Historical Statistics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
Available at: https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1057%2F978-1-137-30568-8. Russian GNP data for 
1885-1913 from: Paul R. Gregory, Russian National Income, 1885-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), ch. 3 (tables 3.1 & 3.2, pp. 56-59). 
3 See: Thomas Brambor, Agustin Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall, and Jan Teorell, “The Lay of the Land: 
Information Capacity and the Modern State,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2020), pp. 175-213. 
Data available at: http://www.stanceatlund.org/. 
4 Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, 
“Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2018,” Center for Systemic Peace 
(2019). Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. 
5 Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. 
6 Michael Coppedge, et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9,” Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) Project (2019). https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy19; Daniel Pemstein, et al., “The V-Dem Measurement 
Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data,” V-Dem Working 
Paper, No. 21, 4th Ed. (2019), University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute. 
7 National Material Capabilities (v5.0). J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability 
Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965,” in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), pp. 19-48. Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
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at the time of acquisition;8 whether the expansion was part of a broader conflict;9 and whether 
the great power had a mixed domestic political regime.10  
The only variables on which there is a substantial difference between the sample selected 
and the broader universe is: whether the expansion occurred in a region beyond the great power’s 
own region; the distance between the territory acquired and the great power’s capital;11 and 
whether the expansion took the form of annexation rather than conquest. The difference with 
respect to annexation, as noted in Chapter 2, is by design. I mostly selected cases of 
conquest in order to facilitate cross-case comparison. And the difference with respect to 
region and distance, if anything, should be biased against my own arguments. Given that the 
theory is importantly about monitoring and control, the fact that the cases selected are, on 








8 Much of the telegraph data is from: Bill Glover, “Cable Timeline: 1845-2018” in History of the Atlantic Cable 
& Undersea Communications (2021), Available at: https://atlantic-cable.com/; Anton A. Huurdeman, The 
Worldwide History of Telecommunications (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), ch. 8, Appendix A. 
9 For the purpose of this variable, I consider wars as being those conflicts included in the Correlates of War’s 
“Inter-state”, “Intra-state”, and “Extra-state” war lists. See: “COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0).” Meredith 
Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 - 2007 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Available at: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
10 Polity IV Annual Time Series Data, 1800-2018. 
11 Distance is measured using the “Measure distance” tool in Google Maps to ensure as accurate a measure 
between locations as possible. See: Google Maps (2021). https://www.google.com/maps. 
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Robustness Tests for Data Analysis (Chapter 3) 
The following table is a robustness test of the main model presented in Chapter 3 (Table 
3.7). The results are mostly unchanged, though the coefficient on Telegraph is now only 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. 
Table A3.1: Logistic Regression Analysis of 
Inadvertent Expansion 
============================================= 
                      Dependent variable:     
                  --------------------------- 
                          inadvertent         
--------------------------------------------- 
telegraph                   -1.013*           
                            (0.535)           
                                              
risky                      -1.113**           
                            (0.557)           
                                              
year                        -0.014*           
                            (0.008)           
                                              
extra_regional               0.204            
                            (0.670)           
                                              
conflict                     0.439            
                            (0.454)           
                                              
info_cap                    -0.048            
                            (1.324)           
                                              
democracy                   -0.166            
                            (0.405)           
                                              
gainer_cinc                 -4.725*           
                            (2.422)           
                                              
Constant                   27.155**           
                           (13.849)           
                                              
--------------------------------------------- 
Observations                  233             
Log Likelihood             -108.912           
Akaike Inf. Crit.           235.825           
============================================= 






 This next table is a robustness test of the main model presented in Chapter 3, but with 
Distance instead of Extra_regional as the control for distance from the capital. The results are 
mostly unchanged, and Distance is not statistically significant. 
Table A3.2: Linear Probability Analysis with Distance 
=============================================== 
                        Dependent variable:     
                    --------------------------- 
                            inadvertent         
----------------------------------------------- 
telegraph                    -0.198**           
                              (0.085)           
                                                
risky                        -0.147**           
                              (0.064)           
                                                
year                          -0.001            
                              (0.001)           
                                                
distance                     -0.00000           
                             (0.00001)          
                                                
conflict                       0.051            
                              (0.070)           
                                                
info_cap                      -0.022            
                              (0.214)           
                                                
democracy                     -0.018            
                              (0.064)           
                                                
gainer_cinc                   -0.363            
                              (0.360)           
                                                
Constant                      2.994*            
                              (1.579)           
                                                
----------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    233             
R2                             0.140            
Adjusted R2                    0.109            
Residual Std. Error      0.402 (df = 224)       
F Statistic           4.547*** (df = 8; 224)    
=============================================== 









 This last table reruns the main model presented in Chapter 3, but with alternative 
measures for the great power’s domestic political regime type, including whether it was an 
Autocracy, its Polity score, and its Polyarchy score. The main results are unchanged, and none of 
these alternative measures is statistically significant. 
Table A3.3: Linear Probability Model with Alternative Regime Measures 
============================================================ 
                             Dependent variable: inadvertent     
                               -----------------------------          
                                  (1)       (2)       (3)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
telegraph                      -0.185**  -0.186**  -0.186**  
                                (0.083)   (0.083)   (0.084)  
                                                             
risky                          -0.138**  -0.137**  -0.138**  
                                (0.067)   (0.067)   (0.067)  
                                                             
year                            -0.001    -0.001    -0.001   
                                (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
                                                             
extra_regional                   0.033     0.029     0.021   
                                (0.087)   (0.093)   (0.098)  
                                                             
conflict                         0.059     0.058     0.056   
                                (0.070)   (0.071)   (0.070)  
                                                             
info_cap                        -0.057    -0.073    -0.081   
                                (0.236)   (0.235)   (0.242)  
                                                             
autocracy                        0.031                       
                                (0.066)                      
                                                             
polity2                                   -0.001             
                                          (0.005)            
                                                             
v2x_polyarchy                                       -0.001   
                                                    (0.216)  
                                                             
gainer_cinc                     -0.471    -0.465    -0.466   
                                (0.364)   (0.364)   (0.359)  
                                                             
Constant                        3.037*    2.904*    2.924*   
                                (1.654)   (1.638)   (1.629)                                                        
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations                      233       233       233    
R2                               0.140     0.139     0.139   
Adjusted R2                      0.109     0.108     0.108   
Residual Std. Error (df = 224)   0.402     0.402     0.402   
F Statistic (df = 8; 224)      4.541***  4.521***  4.516***  
============================================================ 
Note:                            *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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